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When Theodore Roosevelt became President of the United
States in 1901 it was the navy to which he turned as the
vehicle for his diplomacy. At first Roosevelt proceeded
cautiously. He pushed through the Congress legislation for
the construction of new battleships and armored cruisers,
and he began bringing the navy's scattered warships together
in the Atl antic as a single powerful force . During the win-
ter. of 1902-03 this fleet held the navy's first peacetime
maneuvers, and by the summer of 1903 Roosevelt's battleships
were conducting naval exercises off the Azores in the mid-
Atlantic .
All of this prepared the way for a naval display which
dwarfed anything similar in the past, and which took the
American navy in large numbers into the Mediterranean Sea.
During the summer of 1904 a total of fourteen warships (60%
of the navy's first-class armored ships; and over 30% of the
navy's strength, cruiser-class and above), along with a num-
ber of support vessels, embarked on this cruise; the greatest
demonstration of American naval power ever seen outside of
the Western Hemisphere. The heart of the fleet were the six
battleships of the Battleship Squadron, the single most
powerful unit the navy possessed.
The cruise served a number of purposes. It gave Europe
a first-hand exhibition of American naval strength. If
Roosevelt was to participate on a basis of equality with the
great powers he had to establish the robustness and reach of
the American navy, and what better way to do this than a
cruise by a powerful fleet off the coasts of Europe. Also,
on a more practical level, Roosevelt decided to employ the
fleet in putting pressure on the Ottoman Empire to settle
certain outstanding problems which the United States had
long been trying to resolve with Constantinople.
However, before this demonstration could take place the
fleet was involved in another bit of gunboat diplomacy. The
kidnapping of an American in Morocco coincided with the ar-
rival of the fleet in European waters, and Roosevelt had no
hesitation about using its presence to put pressure on the
Sultan of Morocco. For almost two months American warships
prowled the Straits area, much to the discomfort of Spain
and France.
To cruise the Mediterranean with such a large force was
in its own right an important and significant employment of
United States sea power, but the use of the fleet in aggres-
sive naval demonstrations against the Sultans of Morocco and
Turkey underlined for Europe the practical capabilities of
Roosevelt's navy. What the President established by
displaying his battleships at close range to the great powers
was a concrete exhibit of America's right to be accepted as
an equal.
Historians who have dealt with the role of the navy
during the Roosevelt years have generally examined two dis-
tinct manifestations. The first of these was the physical
growth of the navy — a growth which brought the United
States to a position as the third largest naval power in the
world by the time Roosevelt left office. The second was the
sending of the fleet on an epic round the world voyage
during Roosevelt's second term. What has been largely
ignored , however , was the use of this naval power in the
years between 1902 and 1905. The Mediterranean cruise of
1904 was an important chapter in a growing application of
the navy as a diplomatic tool, and it represents the culmi-
nation of Rooseveltian naval policy in the first three years
of his presidency.
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INTRODUCTION
"It is said ... in some quarters that America,
being so distant a Power, can have no good reason for inter-
ference; but that, surely, is /77 matter for her own decision,
not the decision of Europe. She has as much right to her own
ambitions, her own purposes, and her own complaints as any
other Power.
. . . Seated on two oceans, with unlimited
wealth, and a population possibly more patriotic than that of
any white State, her weight must be felfc m every corner of
the world.
There was nothing unusual about this editorial opin-
ion which appeared in the influential English periodical The
Spectator during the summer of 1904. The imperialistic im-
pulse held full sway in the world The Spectator ' s readers
knew, and the casual racism and unapologetic acceptance of
Europe's right to exert its power across the globe was not
questioned. This was also a time when diplomatic relations
between the United States and Great Britain were becoming in-
creasingly warm after over a century of thinly veiled antago-
nism, and, for the most part, Britons were now looking at
Brother Johnarhan as an undeclared ally in a world in-
creasingly divided by potentially dangerous alliances.
Wnat was exceptional about the editorial was that it
did not refer to the United States in the Caribbean or South
America as one might have expected; nor did it concern
American penetration in the Orient — the "ambitions^' which
were alluded to lay in Europe, specifically in the
Mediterranean.
The United States had, in a sense, taken on the
status of a world power with its victory over Spain in 1898,
and in the acquisition of a fairly substantial colonial burden
in the Caribbean and the Far East. But what was the basis
upon which this new world power rested? The American army at
the turn of the century was a small force composed mainly of
regiments more skilled in Indian fighting than in modern war-
fare. A large, unwieldy and inefficient militia system
existed, but it was an anachronism in the tv/entieth century
and could not compare with the well-trained conscript armies
of Europe. Only in its navy did the United States possess a
respected tool which gave substance to its newly gained great
power status. In an age lacking air power and interconti-
nental ballistic missiles it was the battleship which was the
principal agent of national pride and aggrandizement.
When Theodore Roosevelt became President in late
1901 it was the navy to which he turned as the vehicle for
his diplomacy. The fleet was to be his "big stick." At
first Roosevelt proceeded cautiously. He pushed through
Congress legislation for the construction of many new battle-
ships and armored cruisers, and he began bringing the navy's
scattered warships together in the Atlantic as a single
powerful force. During the winter of 1902-03 this fleet
VI
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held the navy's first peacetime maneuvers in the Caribbe
and by the summer of 190 3 Roosevelt's battleships were con-
ducting naval exercises off the Azores in the mid-Atlantic.
All of this prepared the way for a naval display
which would dwarf anything similar in the past, and which
would take the American navy in full force into the
Mediterranean Sea. During the summer of 1904 a total of
fourteen warships, along with a number of support vessels,
were to embark on this cruise; the largest demonstration of
United States naval power ever seen outside of the Western
Hemisphere. The heart of the fleet would be the six battle-
ships of the Battleship Squadron, the single most powerful
unit the navy possessed. These were the navy's newest and
best armored vessels, and comprised over one-half of its
strength in first-class warships.
The cruise would serve a number of purposes, both
diplomatic and practical. It would give to Europeans a
first-hand exhibition of American naval strength. If
Roosevelt was to participate on a basis of equality with
Europe he would have to establish the robustness and reach of
American naval power, and what better way to do this than a
voyage by a powerful war fleet off the coast of Europe. Also,
the cruise would give the navy a splendid chance to train and
exercise both its personnel and ships.
The presence of the American navy in the
Mediterranean in such large numbers would alone have justi-
fied the comm.ents in The Spectator , but the cruise was to
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serve an even more useful purpose. Roosevelt decided to em-
ploy the fleet in putting pressure upon the Ottoman Empire
to settle certain outstanding problems which the United States
had long been trying to resolve with Constantinople. The
latter part of 1904 would see an election, and a successful
naval display against Turkey could be of great benefit to the
President in an age in which the use of force was generally
seen as the right and proper response of a great pov^er seeking
to establish its proper place in the world. Also, the "sick
man of Europe" was easy prey, and Roosevelt could be fairly
sure of a prestigious yet unexacting victory.
However, before this demonstration could take place
the fleet was involved in another bit of gunboat diplomacy.
The kidnapping of an American in Morocco by a bandit chief-
tain coincided with the arrival of the fleet in Europe, and
Roosevelt had no hesitation about using its presence to put
pressure on the Sultan of Morocco. For over a month American
warships prov^led the Straits area, much to the discomfort of
Spain and France.
To cruise the Mediterranean with such a large force
was in its own right an important and significant employment
of American sea power, but the use of the fleet in aggressive
naval demonstrations against the Sultans of Morocco and
Turkey underlined for Europe the practical capabilities of
Roosevelt's navy. The role the President was to play in
world diplomacy in the course of the next two years at
Portsmouth and Algeciras was undoubtedly helped by cha
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expression of sea power shown by the 1904 cruise. What the
President established by displaying his battleships at close
range to Europe was a concrete exhibit of America's right to
be accepted as a great power, a right underscored by the ag-
gressive use of the fleet in Morocco and Turkey, and a right
recognized by The Spectator
. What made a nation respected
and feared in \:his age of imperialism was not economic
strength alone — nor was a large population or land mass in
itself necessarily a factor — the key lay in a nation's
military strength and its willingness to make use of this
factor.
Historians who have dealt with the role of the navy
during the Roosevelt years have generally examined two dis-
tinct manifestations. The first of these was the physical
growth of the navy — a growth which brought the United
States to a position as the third largest naval power in the
world by the time Roosevelt left office. The second v/as the
sending of the fleet on an epic round the world voyage during
Roosevelt's second term. What has been largely ignored, how-
ever, was the use of this naval power in the years between
1902 and 1905. The Mediterranean cruise of 1904 was an im-
portant chapter in a growing application of the navy as a
diplomatic tool, and it represents the culmination of
Rooseveltian naval policy in the first three years of his
presidency. What this study will attempt to do will be to
deal with this cruise and the events which occurred during
it, examine its wider ra.ificat.ons
, and place it in
.
proper historical perspective.
X
CHAPTER I
THE ROOSEVELT NAVY
The great bay of Guantanamo lies some forty miles
east of Santiago de Cuba, and sixty miles from the eastern
end of Cuba's southern coast. It is a large well-sheltered
bay some ten miles in length and about five miles at its
widest, boasting a narrow, easily-defended entrance. The
bay flanks the strategic Windward Passage which provides ac-
cess from the Atlantic into the Caribbean. During most of
its history it played a role of little importance as the
port of Santiago had been the main focal point of Spain's
interests in the area. After the Spanish American War, due
to increased United States naval penetration of the
Caribbean and the distinct possibility of a transoceanic
canal being built across the Central American isthmus, the
bay was leased in 1903 for use as an American naval base."''
Today "Gitmo," as it is called by navy personnel,
is a well-developed base of marginal military/ importance.
Surrounding the bay there exist large complexes of buildings,
docks, and repairshops. In February, 1904, when its military
significance was much greater, only a few rudimentary shore
installations were visible against the low green hills and
white beaches. The broad waters of the lower bay, however,
presented a picture that was anything but tranquil, for
2anchored there was a gleaming array of white-hulled battle- '
ships, cruisers, gunboats, and auxiliary vessels. The
resting armada included the Battleship Squadron of the North
Atlantic Station under the command of Rear Admiral Albert S.
Barker.
In the years following the Spanish American War the
navy, attending to Admiral Mahan's concept of concentration,
had consolidated its main strength in the waters off the east
coast of the United States on its North Atlantic Station.
Of the several squadrons in this fleet Barker's was by far
the most important, comprising six of the navy's eleven
first-class battleships. One more, the Iowa, was due to join
it within a month. Of the remaining battleships, the
I ndiana was out of commission at the New York Navy Yard; the
Oregon and Wisconsin were in the Orient; and the eleventh,
2the Kentucky
, was on her way home from the Asiatic Station.
Barker's six battleships were the K^arsarge (flag),
Missouri
,
Alabama
,
Maine
,
Illinois
,
and the squat, monitor-
like Massachusetts . All were grouped together except for the
Maine
,
which because of an outbreak of measles on board lay
alone, "far from the rest with the yellow flag at the
3
fore. ..." Clustered around the battleships were a num-
ber of smaller warships. Among them puttered steam launches,
tenders, whaleboats, and officers' barges.
The senior officer present at Guantanamo was Rear
Admiral Barker. A Massachusetts native, he had graduated
from the Naval Academy in 1861, and had been aboard the steam
frigate Mississippi when she sailed with Farragufs squadron
to capture New Orleans in 1862. After a long and distin-
guished career he had been promoted to rear admiral in 1899,
and was commandant of the New York Navy Yard before taking
over the Battleship Squadron in early 1903. Barker was, as
Theodore Roosevelt noted in a letter to Mahan, an officer
"excellent in point of decisions," and one who shows a
.... 4
"willingness to accept responsibility."
In July of 1903 Barker had led his battleships,
along with other warships, in maneuvers off the Azores in the
mid-Atlantic — a radical strategic departure in that American
ships had never before moved out of the Western Hemisphere in
such numbers during peacetime. After an autumn naval review
by President Roosevelt off the Maine coast Barker brought his
command south into the Caribbean. He arrived at Guantanamo
Bay on December 7th, and took possession of the anchorage for
the United States.^
For the next two months the battleships were oc-
cupied off the island of Culebra "in drilling, maneuvering,
boat exercises, etc., and for the greater part of the time
under war conditions." On the 15th of February the squadron
returned to Guantanamo and found the battleship Maine there
in quarantine. The Missouri came in on the 17th bringing the
squadron's strength to six. Rear Admiral Sigsbee, the former
captain of the old Maine sunk at Havana in 1898, anchored on
the 18th with the cruisers which made up his South Atlantic
6Squadron
.
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On the 26th the converted yacht Mayflower entered
the bay. With her large marble bathtub and other luxuries,
the Mayflower would one day serve as a presidential yacht.
Now she bore the Admiral of the Fleet, George Dewey; the
head of the Bureau of Navigation, Rear Admiral Henry Clay
Taylor; and the Assistant Secretary of State, Francis Butler
7Loomis
.
Adrairal Dewey x>7as at Guantanamo primarily to view
the winter exercises of the fleet, however, he also had a
secondary commission. He had been ordered by President
Roosevelt to "go to Santo Domingo, investigate conditions
and give a full, impartial searching account of the situa-
gtion as it now presents itself to your eyes." Santo Domingo
was going through one of its periodic revolutions, and the
delicate diplomatic situation which existed in the Caribbean
in 1904 gave the potential change in government increased
importance in Roosevelt's eyes.
On the morning of the 29th, a Saturday, the entire
fleet cleared the bay and stood out to sea where the battle-
ships maneuvered against the cruisers, while Dewey and Taylor
watched from the bridge of the Mayflov/er . Rear Admiral
Taylor was, like Dewey and Barker, a veteran of the Civil
War. A former president of the Naval War College, he had
commanded the battleship Indiana during the Spanish American
War, and his present position as head of the Bureau of
Navigation corresponded with that of the Chief of Naval
Operations today. Taylor found neither the battleships nor
cruisers brilliant in their evolutions, but he felt that this
was only natural, "for with all our efforts in the last two
or three years we find it difficult to induce fleets to have
these really effective drills, their tendency being to con-
fine themselves to purposeless wheelings and countermarches."
Overall, however, he found the Battleship Squadron in good
order, and the individual ships efficient. He saw some room
for encouragement, and he wrote the Secretary of the Navy,
William K. Moody, that "we still go forward, though perhaps
for the moment a little slowly."^
That evening, after the warships had returned to the
bay, Taylor revealed a startling aspect of that forward move-
ment. Barker, it seemed, was to command an operation of un-
precedented scope — a cruise of the Mediterranean with his
battleships and other units. "^^
The battleships would join with the European
Squadron and "visit Lisbon, Trieste, and possibly one of the
French Mediterranean ports, remaining in each port about six
weeks, after v/hich they would proceed together to Gibraltar."
It would be, as Secretary of State John Hay wrote, "by far
the most formidable fleet of battleships ever sent by this
Government tc Europe . . . ." While these two squadrons were
traversing the Mediterranean a third, the South Atlantic,
11
would be cruising along the North African coast.
The combined strength of the three squadrons would
total fourteen warships, not counting a number of auxiliary
vessels. This was approximately 30% of the commissioned
fighting strength of the navy, cruiser class and above; and
about 60% of its firsr-class vessels - an impressive under-
taking by any measure, and one which could have a number of
diplomatic repercussions.
Before examining the strategic considerations that
dominated United States naval thinking in 1904, and lay be-
hind the cruise, it would be advantageous to briefly review
the growth of the modern American steel navy from its incep-
tion almost a quarter century before. In 1880 the navy of
the United States was distinctly that of a third-class power
lagging behind such nations as Chile and Turkey. It con-
sisted almost totally of rotting wooden steam frigates, cor-
vettes, and sloops, as well as a number of rusting Civil War
monitors. During the mid-1870' s, in a move born of despera-
tion, the navy surreptitiously laid down five large iron-
hulled monitors and gave them the names of useless older
monitors. It was only through the deception of repairing
existing ships that funds could be wrung from a reluctant
Congress. The period was typified by Grant's Secretary of
the Navy George jyi. Robeson, who was once described as a
"first-rate judge of wines, second-rate trout fisherman, and
12
a third-rate New Jersey lawyer."
Congress, in 1383, finally passed an appropriation
for the construction of a number of new steel ships. The
first four authorized were the protected cruisers Chicago ,
Boston
,
Atlanta, and the despatch vessel Dolphin . The ships
were built by the John Roach Company of Chester, Pa., which '
unfortunately went into bankruptcy in 1885 while work was
still in progress. They were completed in Roach's shipyard
by the navy the Dolphin in 1835, the Atlanta in 1886, the
gQ^'^Q^ 1887, and the Chicago not until 1889. They were
transitional vessels, carrying tall wooden masts and sailing
rig above their steel hulls, and their performance was
generally less than satisfactory. Yet their building rep-
resented a major breakthrough for the navy, and the four
ships with their while hulls — a change from the black hulls
of the old navy — provided the foundation upon which the new
13
navy would be built.
The first battleships for the navy were authorized
in 1886 but not commissioned until 1895. They too were
hybrid, smallish steel ships, variously designated as second-
class battleships or as armored cruisers. They were unlucky
vessels. The Maine blew up in Havana harbor, and the Texas
was accident-prone, developing a reputation as a "hoodoo."
By the time of their commissioning both were considered
u . ^. 14anachronistic
.
The navy's first true battleships were the three
vessels of the Indi ana class ( Oregon and Massachusetts )
authorized in 1890. These ships were designated as coast
battleships, a misleading term which, for political reasons,
was applied to all capital ships until 1901. They carried a
strong armament and heavy armor. Critical weaknesses in-
volved slow speed and poor seagoing qualities. They were.
8in a cense, simply an advancement on the monitor design which
had dominated naval thinking since the Civil War. A fourth
battleship, the Iowa
,
an improvement on the Indiana type, was
laid down in 1892. These four battleships formed the
pivotal strength of the navy during the Spanish Am.erican War.
Of the other ships built prior to the war a couple
stand out from a heterogeneous collection of cruisers and
gunboats. The two armored cruisers New York and Brooklyn
were excellent, well-founded fighting craft. These armored
cruisers were the only vessels of this type the navy pos-
sessed until 1905. Another, the large protected cruiser
Olympia was one of the finest warships built in this era,
"with her admirable blend of heavy armament, thick protected
deck, high speed, and great endurance." At 5,870 tons she
was the navy's third largest protected cruiser, and she still
exists today at a berth on the Delaware River in Philadelphia,
1
6
the only vessel to survive from the period.
Between the end of the war and 1903, seven battle-
ships joined the five pre-war armorclads for a total of
twelve. Most were products of the patriotic excitement in-
duced by the war. By 1901 this fervor had expended itself
and no battleships were authorized by Congress in that year.
When commissioned in early 1900, the Rears arge and Kentucky
were the first new capital ships to join the fleet since
1897. Both possessed the unusual feature of superposed
turrets. Within eighteen months the three battleships of
the Illinois class had been commissioned (Alabama and
9Wisconsin)
.
They in turn were joined in 1902 by the Maine .
and finally in December, 1903, by the Missouri . The third
vessel in this class, the Ohio
,
was not put into service
until late in 1904.-'^
In this era the battleship was the primary index of
national strength, and by early 1904 the existence of twelve
gave America a rank of fifth or sixth place among the powers.
However, the United States had in various stages of com-
pletion, authorized, or to be shortly authorized fourteen
more battleships and ten armored cruisers. This paper total
of twenty-six battleships and twelve armored cruisers was
expected to raise the United States to third place after
Great Britain and France. Behind this second spurt of
American naval power lay the energy and decermination of
18Theodore Roosevelt.
The strategic considerations which dominated
American naval thinking in the nineteenth century were pro-
foundly conservative and defensive. They rested on the twin
pillars of coastal defense and the disruption of an enemy's
commerce. The navy fought the War of 1812 with Jefferson's
gunboats and the large frigates of the Constitution class.
The latter were the pocket battleships of their day. Very
fast, they could run away from British ships-of-the-line
;
heavily-gunned, they could overcome most of the frigate
types then extant in the Royal xNavy. Their primary target
was an enemy's commerce, not his fleet.
10
The Civil War underlined the use of this strategy.
Confederate raiders such as the Alabama showed what commerce
destroyers could do, while the Union monitors were the direct,
albeit more successful, heirs of Jefferson's gunboats. After
the war the navy continued this policy, as much as funds al-
lowed, when they began building the monitors Puritan
,
Amphitrite , Mi antonomoh
,
Monadnock, and Terror in 1874-75.
They also introduced the fast cruisers of the Wampanoag type.
The latter failed not because of technical problems, but be-
cause of economic ones. They were felt to be too costly to
1 9
run and thus laid up. As late as the 1890 's the navy was
still building monitors and commerce raiders v;ith even less
success.
After 1865 United States warships returned to their
historically fixed peacetime occupation — cruising in for-
eign waters and showing the stars and stripes, nearly always
singlv, and never more than two or three ships at a time.
There was little thought given to operating as a fleet in
V. • 20being.
The concepts of coast defense and commerce raiding
had considerable logic to them given the geographical posi-
tion of the United States. The wide expanse of two great
oceans provided an important barrier to aggression and as
long as the nation looked inward, as it did for most of
the
nineteenth century, it was felt that there was no need for
a
powerful, wide ranging navy. Even Commander Alfred
T. Mahan,
in 1885, could write that the "surest deterrent
will be a
fleet of swift cruisers to prey upon the enemy's com-
merce .... Running away is demoralizing" to the enemy.
However, Mahan also included the important caveat that his
observations were "based upon the supposition that we don't
have interests out of our own borders When, in the
1890' s, the eyes of Americans began to lift beyond the
limits of their own coastlines, Mahan was there with new
naval concepts to fit the political and emotional change.
At first the navy's tactical arrangements were
largely based upon lessons gained in 1866 at the naval
battle of Lissa, In that action the Austrians had defeated
the Italians by using tactics "of ramming, line abreast
formation, and bow fire." The results of this engagement
influenced naval tactics and architecture for almost thirty
years. Most of the warships in this period were built with
rams, and the navy's first two armored vessels, Texas and
Maine
,
were especially constructed to give their strongest
22
performance while firing at the charge.
The development of the self-propelled torpedo in the
1870 's and 1880 ' s effectively destroyed the concept of the
charge and of ramming, as it became next to impossible for
warships to close with one another. In the next great naval
engagement after Lissa the Japanese at the battle of the Yalu
in 1894 used the old, classical in column, or line ahead
tactics of Nelson's time to defeat the Chinese charge.
American naval tactics changed too, but slowly. In 1898
Dewev used the line ahead evolution against the Spanish at
Manila, while at Santiago Sarapson used a modified charge
against Cevera's armored cruisers — the last use of the
maneuver in naval warfare.
The Sprouts' have characterized the period from the
end of the Spanish American War to the advent of Theodore
Roosevelt to the presidency in 1901 as one of "reaction and
drift" for the navy. The armored ships were dispersed to
overseas cruising stations, and the Bureau of Navigation had
"frankly no fleet policy." Long, the Secretary of the Navy
under McKinley was, as Roosevelt wrote to Mahan in 1897,
"only lukewarm about building up of our Navy, at any rate as
regards battleships." Long was still the Secretary of the
Navy in 1901, and still as conservative. The entrance of
Theodore Roosevelt as President changed all of this, for
24
with him "Mahan' s philosophy entered the White House."
Roosevelt's military service had been limited to a
brief tour of duty with the Rough Riders in Cuba, however
his identification with the navy was a strong one and it
stretched back to his early years. As a child he had
idolized his two Bulloch uncles, one a former Admiral in the
Confederate Navy, and the other a junior officer who had
served on the raider Alabama . His choice of a subject for
his first literary effort was a naval one. He began writing
The Naval War of 1812 while still an undergraduate at
Harvard, and completed it in his spare time while attending
law school at Columbia. Roosevelt found the study of the
law boring and used the writing of the book as an escape.
It was, as he wrote Anna Roosevelt, that "favourite chate au
en-espaqne of mine
. . .
."^^ The work was a labor of love
and it remains today the most readable of his efforts,
Roosevelt's appointment as Assistant Secretary of the Navy
in 1897, and his later succession to President gave him the
stage upon which to develop this early interest in the navy
and the uses of seapower
.
The link between Roosevelt and Mahan began in the
early 1890' s. He was deeply influenced by Mahan' s writings,
and when he became Assistant Secretary of the Navy he wrote
him that he was doing all he could "toward pressing our
ideas into effect . . . ." It was an unusually humble
Roosevelt who could write Mahan that there "is no question
that you stand head and shoulders above the rest of us."
Mahan 's naval philosophy was neither new nor radi-
cal- It was profoundly conservative in that it went back to
the naval concepts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
for its inspiration. The battleship was to be used in the
same way as Rodney and Nelson used the ship-of-the-line . The
old wooden walls of 1800 became the high tensile steel armor
walls of 1900. Mahan "stressed the significance of the sea
as logistical highway and avenue of enemy approach: he
emphasized the power which 'due use and control' of sea com-
munication would endow any belligerent, and argued that this
•due use and control' had been and was attainable by power-
ful battle fleets organized and operating as units." There
was only one primary function for the fleet: the
"destruction or confinement of the enemy's fighting fleet, as
a preliminary to commercial blockade or military invasion."
The old concepts of coast defense and commerce raiding while
not abandoned were relegated to a secondary role. The pro-
tection of one's own commerce and trade routes were best
achieved by the destruction of the enemy's battle fleet.
The defensive role assigned to the navy since the late
eighteenth century was now abandoned in favor of an offen-
27
sive one.
The strategic consequence of this conception was
that of concentration. The fleet must never be divided and
must, through constant practice, learn to operate as a unit.
In this fleet in being principle lay the origin of the North
Atlantic Battleship Squadron. The General Board of the
Navy, that intellectual heart of American naval strategic
thinking, declared in 1903 that "the proper military policy,
taken as a general principal, for the distribution of the
fleet, is the concentration of all the battleships in the
28Atlantic . "
No longer did United States warships prowl the
oceans of the world as lone sentinals of American power.
Now, more often than not, they were found in groups. Before
1902 the navy had never engaged in formal fleet exercises
during peacetime. The need to, as Rear Admiral Taylor af-
firmed, "think in squadrons," was first satisfied by the
navy's fleet maneuvers in the Caribbean during the winter
months of 190 2-0 3. Roosevelt felt the exercises were of
great importance, and he personally wrote Admiral Dewey
asking him to take overall command of "our first effort to
have maneuvers on a large scale in time of peace. "^^
The crisis with Germany over Venezuela v/hich oc-
curred during the exercises has tended to obscure their im-
portance, but for the navy they marked a new departure.
Roosevelt was beginning to use the navy as a tool, and in
the months following these first maneuvers he constantly ex-
panded its range. By the summer of 1903 his battleships
were cruising off the Azores, halfway to Europe. During the
summer of 1904 they were to reach the Old World, steaming
along the southern coasts of its periphery, announcing the
new naval might of the United States at first hand to the
European pov/ers.
Planning sessions required the designation of pro-
jected enem.ies. After 1898 Great Britain the nemesis of the
American navy in the nineteenth century began to recede as a
threat, although Roosevelt felt that America's new friend-
ship with England was based more upon practicality than on
Anglo-Saxon brotherhood. "If we quit building our fleet,"
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he said, "England's friendship would immediately cool."
The growth of Japan as a viable enemy had to wait until after
1905 and Tsushima. The primary adversary during the period
from 1898 to 1905 then, at least in the minds of most
strategists, v;as the German Empire.
As early as May, 1900, the General Board — a little
over a month after its first formal meeting — suggested the
development of a war plan positing, "an attempt by Germany
to occupy a portion of /the/ South American continent south
of Rio /de/ Janeriro /sic/ in 1905. A declaration of war by
the United States. Possession of the Cape Verde Islands by
Germany. Advance of the Germans upon Puerto Rico and Hayti
/si£/ and a consequent centering of the theater of action in
those Islands." As late as July, 190 3, the General Board
approved a memorandum which suggested "that the most impor-
tant war problem to be studied is that which is based upon
the supposition that Germany is the enemy . . . ."
American mistrust of Germany was not without some
foundation. In December, 1899, the Kaiser ordered the Chief
of Staff of the Navy Admiral von Diederichs, and the cele-
brated General von Schlieffen to develop a war plan for a
conflict with the United States, The Kaiser wanted a plan
to seize Cuba, draw out the fleet and defeat it, and then
invade the American mainland. The Army General Staff, how-
ever, preferred a direct attack on the United States,
focussing on Cape Cod and using Massachusetts Bay and
Provincetown as the center of operations. This scheme was
dropped in 1902, but the Kaiser continued his interest in
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other plans "at least until March, 190 3."
The War Game, or Kriegspiel , was a favorite pastime
of naval officers before 1914. The most famous of these was
the Jane Naval War Game, developed by the influential com-
piler of Jane' s Fighting Ships . The only Kriegspiel ever to
appear in that then quarterly Bible of the American navy the
United
_States Naval Institute Proceedings
, was published in '
September, 1903. It featured a naval war between the United
States and Germany of almost Wagnerian proportions. The
destruction of warships was frightful. Six mutually costly
sea battles lead up to a final action off Key West, Florida,
where the American navy achieved a Pyrrhic victory only by
the successful use of its submarines — an unusually
prophetic denouement. ^
This Kriegspiel is interesting because it reveals,
like the war plans of the General Board, the essentially de-
fensive nature of American naval thinking vis-a-vis a
European antagonist before 1904. The navy would wait off
the coast of the United States for the German High Seas
Fleet or any other enemy to come to it. This was a per-
fectly viable strategy given the strength of the American
navy — Japan would use this strategy in 1904-05 to deal
with a numerically superior Russi an navy . The United States
had only fourteen armored warships (excluding monitors) in
1904, but it fully expected to have almost forty in commis-
sion within two years. More than enough to defend the coast
and yet take aggressive action. The naval \^sso\\ for
Europe, particularly Germany, which would be underlined by
the Mediterranean operations of 1904 was clear; if the
United States could bring six battleships with attendant
cruisers and auxiliaries to Trieste, Austria, it could just
as easily bring them to the mouth of the Elbe.
The advantages to the prestige, as well as to the
diplomacy, of the United States by the 1904 cruise are more
difficult to measure than the strictly naval considerations
we have previously examined. One historian, Walter Millis
in Arms and Men
,
sees the navy and its ships as providing
"the dramatic and obvious symbols of the new militarism that
ruled after 1898." However, he also sees them as of "no
visible use under the actual international contexts of the
time
. . .
." They had, Millis asserts, "no more than a
peripheral effect upon the main streams of American foreign
policy." This judgement is incorrect. The navy, especially
after Roosevelt became president, was the primary tool of
American foreign policy. It was, as another historian has
—
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aptly put it, "the 'cutting edge' of _/that^/ diplomacy."
One might paraphrase von Clausewitz's dictum that
war was an extension of diplomacy, by saying that the tools
of war are also an extension of diplomacy. What indeed
would be the effect on European perceptions of the United
States by the steaming of a fleet composed of some fourteen
highly visible, powerful warships through the Mediterranean,
visiting various ports, and conducting naval exercises?
The ostentatious employment of fleets of warships
to gain prestige, and to influence or celebrate diplomatic
events was well known to the European powers. In the early
1890 's a large French fleet that visited Kronstadt had a
great deal to do with cementing the Franco-Russian rapproach-
ment. The fleet's visit "was a diplomatic gesture of the
most open type; it was not misunderstood anywhere
. . .
."35
Another, even more graphic example of the use of
fleets occurred in 1903. The Kaiser, feeling that the young
King of Spain Alfonso XIII was impressionable, sent his sea-
going brother Prince Henry of Prussia to Vigo in May, 1903,
with eight cruisers. "The object of the demonstration was
to impress the King with German military might and, in-
directly, to show her ability to help Spain." The French,
with the encouragement of Prime Minister Silvela of Spain,
sent twenty-one warships commanded by Admiral Pottier to
Cartagena in June to counterbalance the effect of the German
visit.
The United States also began to play this naval
game of prestige diplomacy with its new navy. After the
commissioning of the Chicago in 1889 the navy sent its first
three cruisers, along with the gunboat Yorktown, on a cruise
in European waters. It was on this voyage of what came to
be known as the squadron of evolution that American naval
officers "received their first real experience in m.odern
fleet operations." A permanent European Squadron, composed
of cruisers and gunboats, was established in 1901 and the
"appearance of Tunerican warships in European ports took on
a political meaning unconnected with the traditional duties
of promoting American commerce and protecting American
3 7property." However, it was not until 1903 that any peace-
time cruise would equal the effect of the squadron of
evolution.
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In that year the European Squadron consisted of
four warships under Rear Admiral Charles S, Cotton, flying
his flag on the armored cruiser Brooklyn
. Its cruise would
be a successful dress rehersal for the more powerful demon-
stration which would follow in 1904. The Caribbean exercises
in the winter of 1902-03, the maneuvers of the Battleship
Squadron off the Azores during the summer of 1903, and now
the cruise of the European Squadron were all part of a
gradual outward movement of American naval power toward
Europe. The master diplomat behind this movement was
Theodore Roosevelt. Like chess pieces he pushed his ships
further and further from American shores, and the great
cruise of 1904 was part and parcel of this policy. That
Roosevelt was behind this naval development cannot be
doubted. He jealously guarded his control of the fleet and
woe to anyone who interfered with their movements without
consulting him. Once, when he thought that Secretary of
State John Hay had done this in 1903 with the Battleship
Squadron, he sent the startled Hay a vigorous telegram which
ended v/ith the curt order: "Do not let the fleet alter ar-
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rangements without my sanction." If warships were to be
moved only Roosevelt would do it.
The European Squadron was at Marseilles on April 30,
1903, to participate in ceremonies welcoming back President
Loubet of France from a highly important tour of French North
Africa. Cotton met with Loubet on board the French armored
cruiser Jeanne d'Arc, and then accompanied the President to
Paris as an honored guest of the French government. Germany
looked askance at these developments and exerted strong
diplomatic pressure on the United States to send Cotton's
warships to the annual Regatta Week at Kiel where the Kaiser
would be reviewing the fleet. Roosevelt, in order to pacify
the Kaiser, and to prevent embarrassment to his friend Speck
von Sternburg (the German Ambassador), detached the
Ke arsarqe from Barker's squadron in the Azores. Cotton
hoisted his flag on her at Southampton and proceeded with
his ships to Kiel. In the hothouse atmosphere that typified
the European power balance of the period the British govern-
ment now requested an official visit, and the squadron
steamed to Portsmouth for a naval review celebrating
39President Loubet's visit to England.
Cotton was to cap the cruise by spending the rest
of the year in Turkish waters around the port of Beirut.
The squadron was in the eastern Mediterranean engaging in
the not so subtle use of naval diplomacy in wringing con-
cessions from Turkey. Although Roosevelt's dispatch of the
cruisers to Beirut in August, 1903, was initiated by the
false report of an attack upon the local American consul,
the warships were kept in Turkish waters for another reason.
Roosevelt and the State Department had been under strong
pressure from missionary societies in the United States be-
cause of the highly ambiguous status of American run schools
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in the Ottoman Empire. " Sending Cotton to Beirut was one
answer to that pressure.
The European nations had already come to satis-
factory agreements with Turkey on the school question.
France even seized part of the Aegean island of Mytilene
(Lesbos) in 1901 in order to underline her demands. As mis-
sionary pressure mounted Roosevelt attempted to engage by
letter in direct personal diplomacy with the Turkish Sultan,
a favorite Rooseveltian tactic. It failed, and the naval
operations in 1903 were an attempt to redress this failure.
The Turkish government marked time, and the ships were
finally withdrawn. In part because the Porte indicated that
it would be more amenable to a settlement if the vessels
were recalled, but mostly because the Navy Department wanted
41them back.
It was an election year in 1904 and this fact was
never far from Roosevelt's thoughts. He had already pro-
tested Russian actions against their Jewish minority, and
the domestic political benefits which could be obtained from
a highly visible parade of naval diplomacy against Turkey
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were obvious. It was decided that along with the prestige
to be garnered from the battleship cruise, perhaps an even
more concrete benefit might be gained.
Secretary of State John Hay in a letter found no- •
where in the official despatches of the period, but in his
personal papers, put the case bluntly. "Within the next six
weeks," May wrote to the American Minister at
Constantinople in late May, 1S04, "an imposing naval force
will move in the direction of Turkey. You ought to be able
to make some judicious use of this fleet in your negotiations
without committing the Government to any action." The care-
ful Hay ordered the Minister to "keep this letter absolutely
confidential, and not place it upon your files." He closed
by asking him to "destroy it, and so report to me."^"^
The road that began at Guantanamo in late February
was the result of a number of trends in American naval and
diplomatic thinking. It was a road which would lead Barker's
warships from one end of the Mediterranean to the other; from
Tangier by the Straits of Gibraltar to Smyrna in Asia Minor;
from the island of Corfu in the Ionian Sea, through the
Straits of Otranto , to Trieste in the Gulf of Venice • The
screws of six American battleships would churn the waters of
the Aegean and the Adriatic, and the strength they repre-
sented would humble two Sultans.
Commenting on the cruise, the Italian newspaper
Nuova Antologia (Rome) pointed out that it was "certain that
the period of American indifference to questions non-American
is closed, and that their policy is one of expansion, moral
or material .... American imperialism has assumed an ag-
gressive character, not only in South America and the ex-
treme East, but also in Asia Minor, and now in the
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Mediterranean, — that is to say, in Europe itself."
CHAPTER II
PREPARATIONS FOR A CRUISE
Two months were to pass before the warships that lay
at anchor in Guantanamo Bay would move out of the Caribbean
and begin their voyage to the Mediterranean. Two months in
which the fleet would engage in training exercises and maneu-
vers, and lose one-third of Barker's Battleship Squadron to
explosion and collision. It was also to be two months filled
with diplomatic preparations by the State Department for the
cruise
.
"In my judgement, we never had as good a Secretary
of the Navy . . . ." The man Theodore Roosevelt extolled
was V7illiam H. Moody, who along with Admiral Taylor would
carry out the planning of the cruise. When Roosevelt became
president one of the first cabinet changes he initiated was
the replacement of the conservative Long by Moody, who, be-
sides being a personal friend of Roosevelt, had a similar
philosophy of naval power. Moody had made a name for him-
self in Massachusetts as a state prosecutor in the notorious
Lizzie Borden murder trial of the early 1890' s, and on the
strength of that reputation was elected to the U. S. House
of Representatives in 1895. He would later serve Roosevelt
as Attorney General and finally be appointed by him to a
seat on the Supreme Court."*"
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In its search of the greatest possible exposure for
its naval power the Roosevelt administration had begun
planning the Mediterranean cruise as early as June, 1903, in
the afterglow of the successful Caribbean maneuvers, and
while the summer exercises off the Azores were just getting
underway. It was decided to begin the operation following
the spring Caribbean exercises of 1904, and February 20th of
that year sav; the beginning of detailed discussions between
the State and Navy departments.
After suggesting to Hay certain ports the navy pre-
ferred to visit, Moody asked about the "propriety of sending
the battleships on such a cruise," and whether the State
Department was of the opinion that they could be sent "with-
. . 3
out giving offense." The question of propriety was a neces-
sary one. Although most of Europe vi/as at peace in mid-
February the balance of power on the continent was tenuous,
and the alliances which the powers would take into V/orld War
One were at this time in the process of assuming their final
configurations. On February 8th war had broken out between
Russia and Japan, and some of these newly fashioned alliances
were experiencing their first real tests.
On the 25th of February Hay replied to Moody's
query, approving the suggested itinerary and finding no in-
surmountable barriers to overcome in carrying it out. Hay
wrote that he had that same day sent despatches to the
American ministers in Portugal and Austria-Hungary appraising
them of our intentions. The United States ambassador in
Paris was also informed of the navy's desire to touch at a
French Mediterranean port, but since the port had not as yet
been selected this request was to be left in abeyance for
the time being. No firm dates for the visits were fixed ex-
cept that they would occur sometime between June and August.
No other countries were mentioned, and Hay went out of his
way to tell United States missions in the principal countries
of Europe that any invitations to the fleet "would be in-
convenient and embarrassing in consequence of the derange-
4
ment" it would cause.
Europe in 1904 lay basking under the high sun of a
general peace which, except for a brief conflict between
Russia and Turkey, had lasted unbroken since the Franco-
Prussian War. Almost thirty-five years of war-scares, al-
liances, counter-alliances, and tensions -- but no war. The
soldiers of Europe still died, but not along the Rhine or in
the fir forests of East Prussia; instead they fought and
fell at such exotic places as Isandhlwana, Majuba Hill,
Tel-el-Kebir , El Obeid, Adov/a, and Omdurman. The tensions
of Europe were played out in Asia and Africa, and when
colonial expansion reached its limits — when there were no
more spoils to be divided — only then would the great
powers turn on themselves.
The tranquility which Europe enjoyed, however, was
in the process of becoming unravelled. The alliance system
with which Bismarck insured the peace of Europe and the
security of Germany had come under increasing strain since
his departure from power in 1890. Kaiser William II 's ser-
vile ministers could not match the skill and daring of the
iron chancellor. First France broke through her isolation
in the early 1890
-s and allied herself with Russia — a mar-
riage of opposites — the most republican of European powers
and the most autocratic. England had gone from a friendly
neutrality tov/ard Germany in 1890 to a poorly-concealed
enmity by 1904. In the Kruger telegram of 1896, and, more
im.portantly
,
the great naval expansion undertaken by Germany
after 1898 lay the basis of this change.
The Russo-Japanese War which broke out in February,
1904, demonstrated the potential fragility of the European
peace. Japan was allied with Great Britain and Russia with
France, yet in Europe both England and France were beginning
to come together out of a mutual fear of Germany. If this
new war should spread it could bring about agonizing con-
flicts of interests. It was into this seething cauldron of
shifting interests and alliances that the American fleet
would steam.
When Hay informed United States ambassadors and
ministers in Europe of the proposed cruise he stressed its
peaceful intent. "The object of this visit," he emphasized,
was "simply to afford the vessels and their crews the oppor-
tunities for practice incident to an extended trans-Atlantic
voyage . . . the visit is without significance of any kind."
If some of the European nations did not quite believe this
explanation, they at least suspended judgement. Hay's
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clarification would later be seen as important in partly
allaying Russian alarm about the fleet's movements.
At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War American
sympathies lay with the Japanese. Not only was Japan seen as
the underdog, but Russia's recent harsh treatment of her
Jewish subjects had been deplored by Americans and protested
by their government. Russia was regarded as the aggressor,
hungry for land and warm water ports. Later, with Japanese
successes, both official and popular support declined as
Japan slowly became the embodiment of the yellow peril with
each additional Russian defeat. But in the beginning
American opinion supported Japan and the Russian government
was well aware of it.^
In an article which appeared in the respected monthly
The Nineteenth Century in April, 1904, an important connection
was drawn between the United States, its fleet, and Russia.
Demetrius C. Boulger's "Coming Continental Complications,"
examined the Russo-Japanese War and its effect on the
European power balance, especially Great Britain's relation
to it in the light of her two-year-old treaty with Japan.
It would be a "distinctly pacific measure" by President
Roosevelt, Boulger wrote, if the "United States were to send
half a dozen battleships across the Atlantic to spend the
next few months at the mouth of the Thames, the evidence
thus afforded that England did not stand alone in the world
would effectually baffle German machinations, and procure
the interval needed for French opinion to become solid on
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the point that sentimental grounds are not sufficient for
France to risk her whole future on behalf of Russia . . . ."^
Boulger's curious article predicting the exact num-
ber of battleships the navy planned to send to Europe before
that information had been officially revealed evidently wor-
ried the Czar's government. The American Minister to Russia,
Robert S. McCormick, brought this to Hay's attention in a
long despatch on April 4th. McCormick contended that the
foresight with which Hay and the State Department had com-
municated through him to the Russian government the peaceful
intent of the cruise would mitigate the article's unfortunate
effect.^
It is doubtful that Russian suspicions as to the
intent of the Voyage were settled by McCormick 's assurances,
and the later movements of the fleet off the Turkish coast
would do even less for Russia's peace of mind. Toward the
end of the cruise the St. Petersburg daily Novoe Vremya
would be editorially complaining that America had "evidently
decided to take advantage of the present moment to establish
9
her supremacy in the Near East."
The first port which the fleet would visit was not
in the Mediterranean, but in the Atlantic. In 1903 the
European Squadron under Cotton had visited Lisbon in mid-
July with a great deal of success. Later the King of
Portugal had fondly recalled the American presence in a
speech to the Cortes, and with this background the
request
that a larger fleet be allowed to touch at Lisbon
in 1904
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was readily accepted by the Portuguese government. Charles
Page Bryan, the American Minister in Lisbon, foresaw no prob-
lems arising to hamper the visit. "'"'^
Preparations for a call at Trieste were not as
easily expedited. The American Minister in Vienna, Bellariy
Storer, approached the Austro-Hungarian foreign office un-
officially and received a somewhat unenthusiastic reply on
April 12th. The Austrian Under Secretary of State Ritter von
Merey acknowledged Storer' s request, saying the "naval section
of the war department of Austro-Hungary has received the
new^s . . . with the greatest pleasure." But there existed a
certain problem, the Austrian added, which would limit the
scope of the visit. "''^
Merey said the Austro-Hungarian law forbade more
than three warships "of the same foreign navy to anchor at
the same time in the same port." The law also extended to
the number of foreign warships allowed in Austro-Hungarian
waters, no more than six at any time. Merey, having heard
that the American fleet far exceeded these limitations, in-
formed Storer that "special authorization through the diplo-
matic channel" must be applied for by the United States.
Hay acquainted Moody with the restriction, and Moody asked
the State Department to officially request that they be
temporarily suspended. This request was duly made by
Storer
.
After a short delay the necessary permission was
granted by the Vienna government, but it was contingent upon
certain modifications to be made in the fleet's schedule.
Although the proposal appears to have been offered by Storer
it was probably suggested to him by the Austro-Hungarian
foreign office as an acknowledgment to Hungarian national
13sensibilities. Trieste was the chief port of the Austrian
part of the Empire, but about 150 miles by sea from Trieste,
on the other side of the Istrian peninsula, lay Fiume , the
principal seaport of Hungary.
Storer wrote Hay that in "view of the intense
national pride that Hungary has in her only seaport," one or
two of the navy's ships should be sent to Fiume as a
"politically gracious act." Storer pointed out that the
State Department, in emphasizing America's "old sympathy and
friendship" with Hungary would gain a great deal of prestige
Also, as an enticement to gain the Navy Department's ap-
proval for the visit, he noted that Fiume "is the head-
quarters of the Austro-Hungarian torpedo boat fleet and the
place of manufacture of the Whitehead /Torpedo/ Company /and
this/ would be in itself ample apparent reason for such a
•
.,14visit . "
Thus the port of Fiume was added to the itinerary
of the cruise. Villefranche was selected as the French
Mediterranean port to be visited, and by the middle of May
all of the necessary diplomatic maneuvering to prepare the
way for the fleet had been accomplished.
The government was somewhat premature in telling
other nations that they would be visited by six battleships.
The fleet at Guantanamo lost its first major unit when Taylor
and Dewey decided that the Massachusetts
.
which they had
observed in maneuvers with the newer battleships, must be
taken out of the Battleship Squadron and sent to join the
Coast Squadron. Although "her battery is ... as formidable
as any vessel's in the world," Taylor judged that "her in-
ferior speed" and "low freeboard with seas breaking con-
tinually over her decks makes her unfit" for service in
15Barker's squadron. Her place v>70uld be taken by the newly
arrived Iow a. There was to be no easy replacement for the
next loss.
On March 1st the battleships again left Guantanamo
for further exercises as well as to see Admiral Dewey's
Mayflower off to Santo Domingo. In the midst of a drill,
with the battleships steaming at ten knots, the Missouri '
s
steering engine broke down causing her to swerve and ram the
Illinois . The collision was serious enough to force the
fleet back into Guantanamo, while the Mayflower and Dewey
went on to Santo Domingo. Back in the confines of the bay
it was discovered that while there was only minor damage to
the bow of the Missouri , the I llinois had suffered a bent
shaft and could not use her port engine. The damage was
temporarily repaired, but the Illinois had to be sent north
for more extensive repairs and would be lost for at least
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part of the Mediterranean cruise.
The Court of Inquiry which investigated the colli-
sion caused not a little embarrassment to President
Roosevelt, for the captain of the Missouri was William S.
Cowles, Roosevelt's brother-in-law. Cowles was fifty-seven
years old, and had commanded the Missouri
.
the newest of the
navy's battleships, since her commissioning in December,
1903. In the 1890 -s he had been naval attache at the U. S.
Embassy in London, and during the Spanish American War com-
manded the gunboat Topeka
. Prior to his command of the
Missouri
.
Cowles held the prestigious post of naval aide to
the President. He was a well-connected, much smiled-upon
naval officer at the pinnacle of his career.
The official proceedings of the Court praised the
captain of the Illinois as well as Cowles for correct
actions taken after the collision. The Court seem.ed in-
clined, however, to hold Cowles partly responsible for
causing the accident, the primary accusation stressing a
failure on Cov^les' part to display the correct signals
warning the Illinois of the coming collision. "This failure,'
said the Court, "to convey to the Illinois as to the actual
conditions on board the Missouri was, in the opinion of the
Court, after the accident to the steering gear, the secondary
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cause of the collision."
Proper signals, it was stated, could have allowed
the Illinois to avoid the Missouri . The Court recommended,
however, that no further proceedings be taken against Cowles.
His battleship, after all, was a newly commissioned ship,
"introduced into a squadron of evolution without previous"
experience in such maneuvers . -"-^
Moody was a bit troubled by the obvious ambiguous
findings of the Court and wrote to Admiral Dewey asking him
to review all the facts in the case. Was the Navy Department,
asked Moody, "justified in acting upon the recommendation of
the Court, approved by the Commander-in-Chief, that no
further proceedings in the premises be taken, or, if, in
your opinion, the Department is not justified, what actions
would you recommend?" Dewey carefully reviewed the Court's
proceedings and advised the Navy Department to approve the
findings .
"
Roosevelt wrote Cowles after the inquiry saying
that the Court had used language which "conveyed an entirely
wrong impression," He felt that they laid too much stress
on the unimportant point of the signals, while not giving
enough credit to Cowles' quick reactions afrer the collision.
Roosevelt then, somewhat ungraciously, told Cowles that if
the Missouri had to come back to the United States for re-
pairs he would be best advised to "stay pretty steadily viith
the ship and not come up to Washington . . . ." Until the
election was over, Roosevelt said, "there /^would_/ be in a
lesser degree the sanie necessity for caution on your part as
,.21on mine .
"
Cowles' problems were far from over. Reviewing the
accident and the actions of the Court of Inquiry in its
April issue. The Army and Navy Journal brought attention to
the family connection between Roosevelt and Cowles, as well
as the ambiguous nature of the final report. The Journal
also stated that the members of the Court received two tele-
grams from influential sources to save Cowles from a courts
martial and removal from his command. Roosevelt ordered
Moody to investigate these allegations, and Moody reported
back on April 4th that a careful preliminary investigation
"does not show that anyone sent telegrams to the court of in-
22quiry .
"
Suspicions of the Court's results still lingered in
the air. If Cowles was not incompetent he was certainly un-
lucky, and in the military an unlucky commander was one to be
avoided. Undoubtedly the naval high command did not receive
any direct pressure, but it certainly was aware of Cowles'
position vis-a-vis the President and drew its own conclusions
The fate of a less well-connected commander might have been
unhappier
.
After the accident the Battleship Squadron remained
at Guantanamo until the afternoon of the 9th of March, when
it steamed for Pensacola, Florida. Barker arrived there on
the 14th and found in the anchorage nearly all the warships
of the North Atlantic fleet, including those of the South
Atlantic and European squadrons. At Pensacola the squadrons
went through a reorganization with ships detailed to new
assignments and new commanders appointed. Except for
bringing the warships out of the harbor to engage in target
practice off the Santa Rosa Island ranges the fleet stayed
at the Pensaccla anchorage for almost two months. ^
Two events would break the boredom in this period
between cruises: a riot of considerable proportions and the
reduction of Barker's strength by yet another battleship.
The Saturday night riot took place on April 16th
when a large group of sailors from the fleet and "a few
artillery men from Fort Barancas" fought a battle royal with
the Pensacola police. One soldier was killed, and four
sailors from the Iowa and Al abama were wounded. Over three
hundred soldiers and sailors were involved in the riot, which
began when the police attempted to arrest an obstreperous
sailor. The police had fired into a yelling mob while being
rushed under a barrage of stones and bottles. The situation
was prevented from becoming more serious when Barker ordered
the fleet's marines ashore to disperse the men and patrol
the port. Numerous attempts by sailors to smuggle arms and
ammunition in from the warships were aborted and many blue-
24jackets arrested and sent back to their ships in chains.
The loss of the second battleship occurred just
three days before the riot. Cowles' Missouri was at target
practice about ten miles off Pensacola in the company of the
Texas and Brooklyn . The Missouri had fired a number of
rounds from each of her four twelve-inch guns when, around
noon, an explosion shook her main aft battery. There was no
loud report, but only a dull thud followed by flames and
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billowing black smoke pouring from the wounded turret.
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Five officers and twenty-eight enlisted men died
that day. The few who were not immediately killed in the
explosion survived only a short time. Among the dead was
Marine Lt. J. P. V. Gridley, the son of Dewey's commander
of the Olympia at Manila Bay. All of the casualties were
located in the turret and the handling room. Below the
latter lay the magazine, and only quick action prevented an
explosion which would have torn the stern off the navy's
newest battleship and sent her to the bottom.
The most important of these actions in insuring the
Missouri '
s
survival was that of Chief Gunner's Mate Monson.
On hearing the explosion Monson immediately entered the
magazine, put out the fire he found there, and secured the
hatches. He remained locked in the magazine when Captain
Cowles had the compartment flooded. Some hours later he v-zas
found up to his neck in water and barely alive. Monson was
decorated for his heroism and Admiral Barker later wrote
that naval history "records no more heroic acr than that of
Monson who crawled through a hole into a burning magazine to
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put out the flames."
Captain Cowles' quick response in the crisis also
came in for praise. Before rushing from the bridge he
ordered the affected area flooded, and had the Missouri steam
for shallow water so that if she sank there would be a better
chance of salvaging her. He then hurried aft and personally
led a number of attempts to enter the still smoldering tur-
ret. Driven back by the intense heat and smoke he could
only
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manage to bring out one already dying man.^^
The dead, with the exception of those bodies which
were sent home at the request of the family, were buried near
the Pensacola Navy Yard. Roosevelt and iMoody sent expres-
sions of grief, a fund was set up, and numerous benefits for
the victims staged throughout the country. A Court of
Inquiry, headed by Rear Admiral French E. Chadwick, con-
cluded that the explosion was caused by a flare-back, or
back-flame; an "inexplicable combination of oxygen with cer-
tain latent gasses in smokeless powder.
Admiral Barker, in his endorsement of the report
issued by the Court, was critical of the navy's smokeless
powder. The "'properties of which," he complained, "have not
been fully understood either by those using it on board our
30ships or by those who make and issue it for service."
No blame accrued to Cowles because of the accident;
indeed, a similar, if less grave, mishap had occurred on the
31Massachusetts in 1903. But his unlucky Missouri was now
unable to participate in the cruise and had to limp north
for repairs. With the loss of the Missouri and the Illinois
Barker's battleship force was now down to four. There re-
mained some hope of regaining the two cripples while the
fleet was still in the Mediterranean if damages could be re-
paired in time.
By the end of April, 1904, the three squadrons in-
volved in the cruise were ready for their departure from
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Pensacola. Two of them, the Battleship and the European,
left on May 5th and headed south for Guantanamo. The re-
organized European Squadron consisted of the Olympia (flag),
Baltimore
.
and Cleveland
. It also had a nev; commander, Rear
Admiral Theodore Frelinghuysen Jewell. He had captained the
cruiser Minneapolis in Schley's Flying Squadron during the
Spanish American War. The command of the European Squadron
was to be his final service before retirement.
The two squadrons reached Guantanamo on the 9th of
May where the ships took on stores for the voyage. On the
13th Barker ordered Jewell to steam for St. Thomas in the
Virgin Islands to coal, and then sail for the Azores where
both squadrons would rendezvous at the port of Horta. Mean-
while Barker's four battleships coaled at Guantanamo and on
the afternoon of the 15th, forming a double column, headed
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out of the bay bound for the Azores.
Although glad to be finally underv;ay Barker felt
some concern about the condition of his battleships. The
"bottoms of the vessels," he grumbled, "were more or less
foul from having been out of dock a long time, but for some
reason the Navy Department did not wish us to touch at any
34
Navy Yard before proceeding to Europe."
The third squadron to steam for the Mediterranean
was the South Atlantic. Commanded by Rear Admiral French E.
Chadwick, it was composed of the armored cruiser Brooklyn
(flag), the old protected cruiser Atlanta , and the two large
ounboats Machias and C astine. Chadwick v;as perhaps the most
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interesting of the three admirals on the cruise. Known as
an "intellectual," he was a writer and a naval theorist of
no mean accomplishment. A veteran of the Civil War,
Chadwick served as the first United States naval attache in
London from 1632 to 1889. He commanded the gunboat Yorktown
on the squadron of evolution's European cruise, and later
headed the Naval Intelligence Office and the Bureau of
Equipment. During the war he captained the armored cruiser
New York
,
and was Sampson's chief of staff. At Santiago he
was cited for his "eminent and. conspicuous" conduct in the
battle. Between 1900 and 190 3 he had held the prestigious
post as head of the Naval War College at Newport, R. I
.
Characterized by a contemporary as a man "very
direct in speech, even almost to brusqueness , " it was as a
vzriter that Chadwick had achieved his greatest eminence.
His best-known work was a highly praised and quite popular
two-volume edition on the diplomacy and military operations
of the Spanish American War. Indeed, it served as an early
official history of the conflict. Chadwick was well known
to President Roosevelt and John Hay, and had a fairly close
3 6
personal relationship with the latter.
Chadv/ick took command of the South Atlantic Squadron
on April 9th, left Pensacola later that month, and arrived at
San Juan, Puerto Rico, on May 6th. On the morning of the
14th he sailed, bound for Santa Cruz, Teneriffe, in the
Canary Islands. The operational plan of the squadron called
for it to steam along the coast of North Africa, calling at
Gibraltar, Algiers, and Alexandria, Egypt, before passing
through the Suez Canal. Chadwick v/as to cruise independently
from Barker's and Jewell's warships, but would be in the same
general area during the month of June.
That the Navy and the State departments may have had
other plans for Chadwick's squadron was hinted at in a letter
sent to him by the Bureau of Navigation (v/ith inserts to be
delivered to the ships of his squadron) containing illustra-
tions of the various Turkish flags and signals. An innocent
gesture? Perhaps. But since Chadwick's plans called for him
to go nowhere near the Turkish coast why was he sent the in-
serts, and why only for Turkey? Hay's instructions to the
American minister in Constantinople informing him of a large
fleet heading for Turkey also mentions Chadwick's squadron
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as part of this force.
The voyage across the Atlantic was uneventful except
for the gunboats. The Machias broke down on the 17th and had
to be towed most of the way by the Brooklyn ; the Casti ne al-
most ran out of coal. Lt. Commander Edward J. Dorn of the
Castine lamented in his diary that he would "never get over
this seasickness." The gunboats were built to serve in
coastal waters and in the deep mid-Atlantic swells they wal-
lowed dreadfully. Late in the afternoon of the 26th the
Brooklyn'
s
lookout sighted the great mountain rising from
the ocean which was Teneriffe, and from the flagship's yard
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blossom.ed the signal: "We see the Peak!"
The ships entered the harbor of Santa Cruz on the
morning of the 27th, but their stay was to be brief for
waiting were emergency orders from the Navy Department
sending the entire force to Tangier, Morocco — an American
citizen had been kidnapped by bandits and was being held for
40
ransom.
Over a thousand miles to the northwest the same
scene was shortly to take place at Horta in the Azores.
Barker had arrived on the 26th and coaled from two colliers
he found waiting for him in the harbor. Early on the 28th
Jewell's cruisers came in, and that afternoon the fleet, ex-
cept the Iowa (her departure delayed because of a very ill
. 41
crewman), cleared Horta bound for Lisbon.
The warships were not yet over the horizon when the
Kearsarge
,
which had been testing her new wireless with the
Iowa back at Horta, received an urgent message from her
ordering Jewell and his squadron to Tangier. Jewell's ships
immediately broke away from the battleships and headed for
Morocco. As Barker later ruminated, this little experience
showed "how easy it is to reduce the strength of a fleet."
From an originally planned force of six battleships and
three cruisers. Barker steamed on to Lisbon reduced in
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strength to four battleships.
There were now seven American warships heading
toward a small Moroccan seaport near the Straits of Gibraltar
Their mission: to rescue a single American citizen of Greek
descent by the name of Ion Perdicaris, living in a dusty
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third-rate se aport at the fringe of civili zation
.
1
CHAPTER III
A KIDNAPPING
From aesthete to imperialist: if the life of Ion
Perdicaris can be summed up in a phrase, this might be it.
The kidnapping of Perdicaris was a strange affair, but it
was no stranger than the life of this long-term American ex-
patriate living in Morocco. Independently wealthy; painter;
sculptor; playwright; businessman; novelist; wife-stealer
;
imperialist; and humanitarian. He had been a resident of
Tangier for thirty years, and was the wealthiest and best-
known of that port city's foreign residents. The path which
had led Ion Perdicaris from Trenton, New Jersey, to Tangier,
Morocco was no less uncommon than the man himself.
His father, Gregory Perdicaris, was born in Greece
but had been forced to flee that country after becoming in-
volved in revolutionary activity. His brother, not as for-
tunate, was beheaded by the Turks. Arriving in the United
States in the 1820 's he graduated from Amherst Collage and
became an instructor of Greek at Harvard, rising to a
Professorship of Latin and modern Greek and Greek history.
He later settled in South Carolina where he married into a
well-established Charleston family, the Hanfords. His wife'
father was a professor at South Carolina College, and a firs
cousin a justice on the state Supreme Court. Perdicaris
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returned to Greece as the Van Buren-appointed Consul-General
in Athens, and it was here that his only son. Ion Hanfcrd,
was born in 1840. Deprived of his diplomatic appointment by
the Whig victory in that same year, Perdicaris and his
family returned to the United States. By now the revolution-
ary ardor of Gregory's early years had substantially cooled,
and he began to turn his attention toward the making of a
fortune a not unusual desire in Jacksonian America."*"
Gregory proceeded to amass a considerable amount of
money in the illuminating gas industry. He built gas works
in a number of American cities, including Charleston and
Trenton, New Jersey, and it was in the latter city that the
Perdicaris family settled in the years before the Civil War.
In 1 ater life Gregory went to live with his son in Tangier
,
and v^hen he died there in the early 1880 's he left Ion an
inheritance of over a million dollars. Ion received his
early education at the Trenton Academy, and in 1856 he
entered Harvard but left at the end of the first term of his
sophomore year. Later, when he was in his fifties and
sixties, Perdicaris took great pride in having gone to
Harvard, if only for a brief time, and kept in regular cor-
respondence with the class secretary.
The Class of 1360, of which Ion was a part, was one
of those Harvard classes decimated by the Civil War, names
which can now be found on brass plaques lining the walls of
Memorial Hall. It lost about one-third of its graduates in
the conflict, including Robert Gould Shaw, the young
commander of the Army's first black regiment.^
Ion was more fortunate. After leaving Harvard he
studied art in Europe, including a period at the Ecole des
Beaux Arts in Paris. The outbreak of the Civil War found
him in Athens, and in a very curious position. Still a legal
resident of South Carolina, he was given the option of re-
turning to America and serving with the Confederate forces
or losing part of his inheritance. Perdicaris took a third
road, initiating proceedings designed to divest him of his
American citizenship. Forty-two years later this attempt
would come back to haunt both him and Theodore Roosevelt.'^
The next few years were spent by Ion in Europe and
the United States studying, painting, and writing a number of
articles dealing with literary and aesthetic subjects. He
v;as also a serious student of spiritualism and occult
phenomenon — a then quite respectable fad which had swept
the United States and Europe during the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. In the late 1850 s he went to live in England,
studying under and living in the home of the well-known
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electrical engineer Cromwell Fleetwood Varley.
Varley was a fellow of the Royal Society and had
been associated with the development and construction of the
first Atlantic cable. It was their mutual interest in
spiritualism which had brought the two men together; however,
the relationship was suddenly and dramatically ended when
Perdicaris ran off with Varley 's young wife. After the di-
vorce in 1872, Ellen Varley and he were married at Wiesbaden,
Germany. The newlyweds
,
along with Ellen's four children,
then settled for a time in the United States. Family respon-
sibilities seem to have settled Ion down, for he now ceased
his peripatetic life and began to look for a place in which
to establish a permanent residence.
Perdicaris found this haven in Tangier, Morocco;
although he and his family spent a great deal of time
traveling in Europe, Tangier remained home at least for the
summer m.onths , and then, from 1884 on, more or less per-
manently. He loved the old Moorish port "with its ruined
battlements overlooking the horseshoe curve of its silver
beach. " In one lyrical description of Tangier he wrote of
the "white walls of the terraced houses, the mosques and
minarets , " and the "emerald verdure " of the gardens , "now
redolent with the perfume of the orange and lemon, and over-
looked by the v/ooded slopes of the Spartello headland-"
From here one had a view "commanding a wide range of sea and
mountain, whilst the distant peaks of the Beni Hassan range
7
add the lustre of their snow-tipped summits."
Some of his paintings were exhibited at the
Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia during 1876, and one
called Tent Life was critically acclaimed. As vehicles for
a stage-struck step-daughter, he wrote and produced a number
of plays. One was a comedy called Social Questions and an-
other, Nadi ne, was a melodrama. In 1879 he brought the lat-
ter from England to New York where it ran for a week.
Perdicaris persevered, putting the play on the road, but his
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stepdaughter — v/hose stage name was Nard Alymane -- ran
away with the leading man, an alcoholic actor by the name of
Decker. Ton disinherited his stepdaughter, who had married
Decker, went to England, had a son, and sued for divorce.
When Perdicaris took back his stepdaughter he also accepted
gthe child as his own.
In Tangier Perdicaris became an important member of
the foreign community. He had two handsome residences. One
in Tangier, called El Minzah (Beautiful View), was a "villa
standing in extensive grounds, a little outside the city
walls, an ideal house," as one visitor remembered it, "in
which the Orient and the Occident meet in comfort and adorn-
ment." The other was a former royal residence on the
Spartello headland about five miles west of the port. It
was called Aidonia (The Place of the Nightingales), and
rested on a small hill patriotically renamed Mount
9Washington by Perdicaris.
Aidonia was a Moorish styled building painted white
"with green shutters, an open forecourt, red candles on the
dining table, a large telescope on the terrace, and groves
of myrtle, roses and arbutus falling into the sea." Several
monkeys, some tame pheasants, and a demoiselle crane
scampered and strutted about the well-kept grounds. In the
cork woods surrounding the estate Perdicaris often sat at an
easel painting, according to a wry observation by Sir Arthur
Nicolson (British Minister in Tangier), "huge, symbolic
..10
pictures of Virtue pursuing Vice
49
Perdicaris welcomed many foreign visitors, espe-
cially any American who might happen to wander into Tangier.
With over thirty servants dressed in scarlet knee pants and
gold-embroidered jackets he enjoyed "an Edwardian gentleman's
life amid elegant bric-a-brac of Oriental rugs, damasks /and/
rare porcelains
. . .
." Just prior to his kidnapping he
had royally entertained Princess Louise of Schleswig-
Holstein. """"^
One American visitor to Tangier, Linn Boyd Porter,
had on occasion observed an oared boat in the harbor, handled
by sailors in bright uniforms, with a strange flag fluttering
from its stern. He asked his Arab guide what it v;as , and the
guide replied, "English boat." Porter responded that the
flag was not the English "bandera," and asked v;hat nation it
12
represented. The guide calmly answered, "Perdicaris."
Taking an important role in the public life of
Tangier, Perdicaris showed yet another side of his character.
Ke organized and subsidized a sanitary commission in the
1880' s, which turned Tangier "from a pest-hole into a
healthy town." The Tangier Hygienic Commission of which he
was the Vice President was known to the native officials as
the "Street Sweeping Commission," but it was, over and above
its sanitary function, the chief foreign-controlled organi-
zation in Tangier, actually a government within a government.
When he first settled in Morocco Perdicaris engaged in some
casual importing, but by 1895 he had no "active occupation
on account of defective health, other than developing /his?
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properties at or near Tangier . ""'^
As he grew older the aesthete of the 1860 's gave way
to the humanitarian-imperialist of the 1880
' s and 90' s, an
age in which these terms were seldom contradictory, one some-
times rationalizing the other. Perdicaris' humanitarian aims
appear to have been honest, though he was not known for ig-
noring the economic side of imperialism. He was not engaged
in business in Morocco, but he did own a great deal of prop-
erty and had a vested interest in the stability of the
country. A stability which the crumbling power of the
Sultanate could not provide, and which, in Perdicaris' view
could only come from an outside force.
He was a staunch defender of the native population,
and had developed some very deep and close personal relation-
ships with a number of upper-class Moors, particularly the
Wazan family. In the mid-1880 's this stance led to a ser-
ious conflict with the United States Consul in Tangier, an
individual by the name of Mathews; and at one point
Perdicaris found himself thrown into the Kasbah (Fortress) at
Tangier for twenty-four hours, after harboring a native who
had complained to him of extortion at the hands of the
American Consulate.
The experience was such that Perdicaris wrote his
first and only novel, detailing the encounter, and as with
most first novels it is autobiographically revealing. Titled
The Case of Mohammed Benani : A Story of Today and published
in London in 1888, the novel changes the American Consul into
the Russian Consul; Tangier was called Tingizirah; and
Perdicaris renamed Ivan Paulovitch. Perdicaris/Paulovitch
was portrayed as a defender of the natives of Tingizirah
against the claims of money lenders supported by the Russian
Consul, Count Mazenoff (Mathews ). '"^
To resolve the case of one such native Paulovitch
goes to Russia (United States) to bring the problem to the
highest authority. He tells his story to the Foreign
Minister, de Giers (Secretary of State Bayard), and attempts
to obtain an interview with the Czar (President Cleveland).
The matter was finally settled through the good offices of
the leader of the Civil Service Party, Curtieff (George
William Curtis); Paulovitch sees the Czar and the issue is
satisfactorily resolved with the recall of Count Mazenoff.
At one point in the novel Perdicaris describes his alter
ego Ivan, as a "preux chevalier," a "knight errant," and
"one of the most perfect gentlemen social life could shov;."~
The novel was based on actual events, for
Perdicaris did go to the United States and did manage to
have Mathews removed from office. The case caused something
of a stir in the European and American press and gained
Perdicaris some notoriety on both continents. The young
lawyer who helped represent him in America, Samuel Rene
Gummere, would later become with Perdicaris' help the United
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States Consul-General at Tangier.
In his desire to protect the natives — as well as
his own interests — Perdicaris saw the answer in more, not
less, foreign con-rol
. Here the humanitarian becomes the
spokesman for a benevolent imperialism. The rapid breakdown
of conditions in Morocco during the 1880 's and 1890 's pro-
vided the basis for this attitude, and the clearest expres-
sion of his position on foreign intervention can be found in
his writings on Morocco.
In 1386 Perdicaris published a book in London, sup-
posedly authored by a foreign resident, containing a number
of long essays on Morocco by Perdicaris and others. Called
American CI aims and the Protection of Native Subjects i_n
Morocco
,
the work was essentially concerned with the absence
of law and order; and the Moorish administration was con-
demned as being "so defective that it offers no security
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either for property, liberty, or life."
Perdicaris carefully pointed out the benefits to be
derived from intervention. "If Tangier and the surrounding
territory could be rendered secure," he wrote, the growth in
trade would be "highly advantageous to European commerce."
The nation which took the first step in this direction could
"look back with pride and satisfaction /on/ the beneficial
results that cannot fail to attend the consummation" of such
a take-over. At one point in the book he declared that he
was an American citizen and because of local violence was
very concerned with the protection of American nationals in
Morocco — a concern which he would have cause to remember
eighteen years later.
Throughout the 1890 's Perdicaris was a prolific con-
tributor and letter-writer to a number of American and
English periodicals and newspapers. In a series of articles
for The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly he consistently wrote
on the impending collapse of Morocco as an independent power,
expressing the hope for eventual English intervention as he
did not look upon either French or Spanish control with any
. . 20
equ animity
.
By early 1904 he was writing that "/aZny day, any
hour now, may give the Sultan's tottering authority the last
fatal push which will send him at last, all unwilling though
he may be, reeling into the arms of France . . . ."^-^ Little
did Ion realize when he wrote these lines that he would, al-
beit unwillingly, supply some of the force behind that fatal
push.
At the turn of the nineteenth century only three
nations on the continent of Africa had managed to maintain
their independence against decades of European incursions.
Liberia, lying on the inhospitable Guinea coast, kept its
freedom by combining a vague sort of protection afforded by
its association with the United States with a complete lack
of any exploitable resources. In East Africa Abyssinia,
ruled by the warrior-emperor Menelik II, had recently thrown
back an Italian attempt at conquest. The third nation was
Morocco, a vulnerable feudal state lying too close to Europe
to be ignored, with only jealously betv/een the great powers
preventing her partition. The Moroccan Empire by 1900 was
drifting into anarchy and chaos, waiting for European power
politics to decide whose colony she would become.
The French conquest of Algeria in 1830 had presented
a potentially grave threat to Morocco's autonomy. Conflicts
with France in 1830, 1844, and 1851 brought the Sultanate the
bombardment of its seaports and a not too advantageous set-
tlement of her eastern border with Algeria. In 1859 Spain
engaged Morocco in a short, successful war, and by 1873 only
the combination of Morocco's last strong ruler and the defeat
of France by Germany gave the country thirty more years of
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relative independence.
The Sultan who came to power in 1873 was Moulay el
Hassan, and he was to spend over twenty years in the saddle
trying to repress an endless series of rebellions against
his authority. Indeed it took him two months of hard
fighting to gain control of his capital after he came to the
throne. Commanding an army of 40,000 men, he campaigned
through the Atlas Mountains, with the Scotsman Sir Harry
Maclean drilling his infantry and a former French Army
lieutenant directing his artillery. While campaigning in
the Tadla region of the Middle Atlas in 1894 he died, worn
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out like the country he had tried to hold together.
At the age of fourteen Moulay' s son Abd el Aziz,
became Sultan, with the crafty Vizier Ba Ahmed (sometimes
called the "Bismarck of Morocco") and the Sultan's
Circassian mother as the powers behind the throne. Shortly
after Ba Ahmed's death in 1900, French forces from Algeria
began a series of border attacks and backed a serious rebel-
lion within Morocco. Abd el Aziz was young and weak, com-
pletely unfitted for the role which he inherited, and without
Ba Ahmed he could not even begin to grasp the reins of
power.
Sir Arthur Nicolson, appointed the British Minister
to Morocco in 1895, described the then fifteen-year old
Sultan as "not bad looking, but podgy and puffy," just like
"a boy who ate too much." One of the presents which Nicolson
brought from Queen Victoria was that black metal symbol of
British military superiority over these swarthy lesser
breeds, a Maxim gun. The young Sultan was a little nervous
when the gun was first fired but soon became interested.
"He fired off a good many rounds himself and was delighted,"
said Nicolson, "biting his lips to prevent breaking out into
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a broad grin of delight."
As the threat of a European take-over grew, the
Sultan retreated into his Palace at Fez which was equipped
with the latest wonders of European technology. Corres-
pondent of The Times (London) Walter B. Harris, a frequent
visitor at the Palace, provided a ludicrous picture of the
Sultan "playing bicycle-pole with some of his European suite,
which included at this time an architect, a conjurer, a
watchmaker, an American portrait-painter, two photographers,
a German lion-tamer, a French soda-water manufacturer, a
• V. ..26
chauffeur, a fire-work expert, and a Scottish piper.
56
By 1904 Morocco was in a state of anarchy, rebel-
lion spreading throughout the countryside and local bandits
making life unsafe for European and native alike. The royal
prerogative existed only in the towns and cities, and even
2 6then only tenuously.
It was France which had the greatest interest in
Morocco. Except for Spanish enclaves in the north and south,
French colonies surrounded the country on its land borders.
In the late 1890 's France, under the direction of its Foreign
Minister Theophile Delcasse, began to move forward on a
"very circumspect policy" of gaining full control in Morocco
.
French forces , in 1900, first seized the Tuat oasis in the
southwest , and then the fertile Road of the Palms a line
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of oases stretching along the caravan route to Timbuctu
.
But the most important barrier to French hegemony
in the Sultanate lay in Europe, and in December of 1900
Delcasse obtained an agreement with Italy giving France, as
far as Italy was concerned, a free hand in Morocco in return
for the same Italian right in Tripoli. This agreement was
the first official European recognition of the primacy of
.
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France in Morocco.
From 1901 Morocco "ceased to be a backwater in
European diplomacy," and quickly "became one of the main
channels through which, with ever-increasing speed and
volume, the water of policy poured towards the cataract."
Great Britain represented the chief stumbling block to
French control. England's interest in Morocco lay mainly
in Tangier, and a glance at a map shows what the strategic
location of the port meant; for if Gibraltar commands the
Mediterranean and the life line to India, then Tangier com-
mands Gibraltar. Britain could not tolerate a Tangier in
unfriendly hands and in 1901, only three years after Fashoda
France was still suspect.
As conditions in Morocco deteriorated, and French
incursions on the border grew more frequent, a settlement
became increasingly desirable. France was especially con-
cerned over the numerous English advisors around the Sultan
— the so-called Engling Ring — in particular Kaid Maclean,
the commander of the Sultan's army, who, "/"a/rrayed in a tur
ban and a white bernous," would often stride around the
31Palace grounds "blowing into his bagpipes.*'
In 1902 France opened negotiations with Spain for a
Moroccan settlement , and on August 6th of that year the
French Ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, tried to sound out
Lord Lansdowne (the British Foreign Minister) on England's
attitude "in the event of Morocco passing into liquidation."
Lansdowne put Cambon off this time, but as a result of King
Edward's amicable visit to France in 1903, negotiations were
opened between Lansdowne and Delcasse. Lord Lansdowne was
concerned with the status of Tangier as well as the main-
tenance of an "open door" for British investment. Delcasse
gave him assurances on these points and also of German lack
of interest in the country. Whether or not the Germans
lacked interest in Morocco, they were surprised and shocked
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by the signing of the Entente Cordiale; the Kaiser's Foreign
Office had felt that Great Britain and France could never
settle their historical and colonial differences.^^
The accord was signed on April 8, 1904, and gave
Great Britain a free hand in Egypt while France "pledged not
to alter the political status of Morocco"; Britain agreed,
however, that France "should preserve order in Morocco and
assist in all necessary reforms." The remainder of the ac-
cord, including some secret clauses, dealt with Spain's
rights in the Sultanate, as well as various adjustments of
Franco-British territorial problems and spheres of influence
33throughout the world.
It was the term "preserve order" which would give
France the excuse to introduce armed force into Morocco, and
then use this wedge to obtain full control. One month after
the accord was signed the kidnapping of Ion Perdicaris pro-
vided an excuse for the establishment of a French-Algerian
police force and a permanent French naval presence at
Tangier — the first steps in the eventual French domination
of Morocco.
The evening of Wednesday, May 18, 1904, saw the
start of a tangled episode involving the decaying Sultanate
of Morocco, an elderly American expatriate, and the navy of
the United States.
It had been a typically mild late-spring day, and
only a slight haze on the sea interfered with the view of the
Spanish mainland from the Spartello headland. Perdicaris
and his wife had come to Aidonia from Tangier on Monday, ac-
companied by Cromwell Varley, Ion's stepson, with his wife
and two daughters. After dinner on Wednesday they had all
gathered in the drawing room, when about 8:30 P.M. they were
interrupted by a series of loud screams emanating from the
34
servant's quarters.
Perdicaris and Varley rushed out, thinking at first
that it was a squabble among the servants, for Perdicaris had
in his employ a German housekeeper from Switzerland and a
French chef, "a fiery ex-Zouave," who v/ere feuding. The chef
had recently come to blows with the housekeeper after being
"irritated by some insulting allusions to the French defeats
at Metz and Sedan," and when the German butler Albrecht ran
past him in the hall Ion thought that the "zouave has been
35too much for the Fatherland all long the line."
What he and Varley found in the servants' hall was
not a group of enraged domestics but a party of armed Moors,
who Perdicaris at first assumed were members of his household
guard. Then he noticed that some of his servants were bound
and helpless. When he asked the identity of the armed men
they only smiled blandly. Next Albrecht came running back,
closely followed by Moors who were beating him with their
rifle butts. When Perdicaris attempted to interfere he was
also seized and clubbed, and his arms bound behind his back.
Varley was repeatedly struck by rifle butts and received a
knife slash across the hand when he tried to seize one of
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the intruders by the throat
The two bound men were pushed out of the house and
down the hill toward the stables. As they passed the guard-
house where the government had stationed a few soldiers, Ion
saw by lamp-light "our guards, our gardners, and the other
native servants under cover of the rifles of another party
of mountaineers
. • . The government soldiers were
arguing with one of the bandits who stood apart from the
rest, and here Perdicaris recognized the leader of his as-
sailants the infamous brigand Mulai Ahmed ben Mohammed,
37better known as the Raisuli.
In a Morocco teeming with petty bandits Raisuli had
already won a notorious name for himself. His ancestry, ac-
cording to Walter B. Harris , was of "particularly ancient
and holy lineage," and as a young man he had studied law and
theology in Tetuan. He later turned to banditry and gained
a reputation as a cattle-stealer. Captured by treachery, he
had been imprisoned at Mogador for a number of years. Here
he was chained to the wall of a dungeon, and the scars left
by the chains on his wrists and ankles were a perpetual re-
minder to him of the men who had put him in prison. One of
these men was the Governor, or Pasha, of Tangier, Raisuli'
s
38bitterest enemy
.
Released in 1894 in a general amnesty granted by the
new Sultan, an embittered Raisuli returned to the mountains
of northern Morocco and to his career as a brigand. Over
the years the Moroccan government had sent troops after
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Raisuli, but they had never managed to run him to ground.
In 1903 a particularly strong effort to take him was mounted.
It almost succeeded, but Raisuli seized Walter B. Harris
while the correspondent was covering the campaign and held
him for ransom. In return for Harris the brigand obtained
not only the withdrawal of the government troops but also
the return of some of his men who had been captured. When
Moorish forces began another campaign against Raisuli in 1904
he reacted, as he said later, by searching out another
European, "an important man who would make the world realize
39
my wrongs." His choice was Perdicaris.
Raisuli was in his late thirties, well built but
i
short and heavy looking. He had a meager beard and a shaven
head, "with the exception of one long scalp-lock, which,
neatly plaited, he /wore/ tucked under the folds" of his
turban. Harris described him as having strikingly white
skin, with very red lips which "gave him almost an effemi-
nate look." He had under his command between 400 and lOOO
tribesmen, and possessed a renown for great cruelty. At one
time a nobleman who was m.arried to Raisuli 's sister an-
nounced his intention of taking a second wife. The sister
complained to her brother, and an enraged Raisuli "proceeded
from the mountains to his brother-in-law's house, where he
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broke in by force and shot the girl and her mother."
Perdicaris was familiar with the reputation of
Raisuli, and, as wrote later, the name "was indeed one with
which to conjure." Ion accepted the brigand's assurances of
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safety provided he and Varley did not attempt to escape.
Then, mounting horses brought from the stables the two men,
along with their captors, moved off, carefully circling
41
Tangier and struck out east towards the mountains.
CHAPTER IV
"WARSHIPS WILL BE SENT"
In 1867 Mark Twain left the United States for a
cruise of the Mediterranean and the Holy Land. His steamer
touched at Tangier on the way over, and Twain's adverse re-
action to the small port town was summed up in a bit of
gratuitous advice he gave to the American government. "I
would seriously recommend," he wrote tongue-in-cheek in The
Innocents Abroad, "that when a man commits a crime so heinous
that the law provides no adequate punishment for it, they
make him Consul-General at Tangier." With Samuel Rene
Gummere ' s appointment to the post in 1898 the government had
not exactly taken Twain* s suggestion, but the relative ob-
scurity which the famous traveller found had changed little
in the intervening years. The representative of the United
States to the Sultan of Morocco was not one of those posi-
tions avidly sought out by fevered hoards of Washington
pi ace-seekers
.
Gumm.ere had been born in Trenton, New Jersey in
1849, the son of a well-known and respected lawyer. The
family was descended from a certain Johann Gomere, a
Huguenot who emigrated from French Flanders and settled in
Pennsylvania in the early eighteenth century. Gummere, as
had Perdicaris, received his early education at the Trenton
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Academy. He graduated from Princeton in 1870, was admitted
to the New Jersey Bar in 1873, and worked in his father's
law office for a number of years. He experienced his first
taste of the diplomatic life when he served as secretary to
the American Minister at The Hague from 1881 to 1884. Both
the Perdicaris and Gummere families were well acquainted
with each other and Samuel, who was an inveterate European
traveller, often stayed with Perdicaris in Tangier. Gummere
helped represent him in the United States during the Mathews
affair, and as a result Perdicaris used his influence to
clear the way for his friend's appointment as Consul-
Gene ral . ^
A bachelor, Gummere has been described as a diplomat
of some polish and ability, as well as a "brilliant conver-
sationalist and reconteur." Another, somewhat caustic ap-
preciation was later given by Commander Dorn of the Castine
,
who "did not take /a/ fancy to" the fifty-five year old
Consul. Dorn particularly did not think much of his overly
fastidious style of dress, as well as his affected English
accent. He found him a man "swelled /up/ with /.hi_s/ own
/sense of/ importance."'^
Gummere was also a child of his age and quite
willing to make use of force in order to increase the in-
fluence of the United States in the Sultanate. Less than a
year after taking his post in Tangier he was asking the State
Department to send an American warship in order that certain
outstanding problems be settled with Morocco. He eagerly
pointed out that German and British claims against the
Sultanate were quickly settled by naval visitations, and
that this "only goes to prove what was told me by some of my
colleagues shortly after my arrival here that only in this
way can claims for damages be collected." State approved
the request and sent it on to the Navy Department which in
turn despatched a warship to Tangier, where Gummere was able
to make use of its presence in obtaining a settlement."^ It
was a lesson well-learned, and in 1904 he would make good
use of it when faced with a greater challenge.
Gummere was dining with some of his friends in the
diplomatic community on the evening of May 18th, when around
nine o'clock he received word of the events at Aidonia. The
brigands had not thought to cut the telephone line to
Tangier, and a housekeeper had immediately called for help.
Gummere first contacted the British Minister, Sir Arthur
Nicolson, and then rushed to see the Lt. Governor of Tangier,
as well as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and asked them
that government troops from the city garrison be sent out
after the fleeing bandits. Ke then gathered together his
own three guards and an interpreter and hurried to Aidonia
where he tried to calm the Perdicaris household. There was
to be no sleep for the indefatigable little Consul that
night, and by the morning of the 19th he was back in Tangier
conferring with Nicolson as to the best way they should pro-
5
ceed in the crisis.
Cromwell Varley was a British subject and this
brought Arthur Nicolson into the affair. Nicolson was the
senior member of the diplomatic community, and since it was
Great Britain which has the greatest interest in the strate-
gic future of Tangier he was a valuable confidant for
Gummere. The latter considered himself "fortunate in having
the aid /and./ the trained experience" of Nicolson, "with
whom /_he was^/ co-operating in every particular."^
At fifty-five Sir Arthur Nicolson was the same age
as Gummere, but unlike the American he had behind him a
lengthy career at important diplomatic posts. The youngest
son of a knighted British admiral, Nicolson was originally
intended for the Royal Navy , but after brief service as a
midshipman he had gone on to Rugby and then to Brasenose
College , Oxford. Entering the Foreign Office in 1870 , he
rose steadily in the service at such varied posts as Berlin,
Peking, Constantinople, and Athens. Between 1885 and 1888,
as Secretary of Legation in Teheran, Persia, he played an im-
portant part in the revival of British influence in that
country. He followed this with service as Consul-General in
Budapest, and later as legation secretary in Sofia and
Constantinople. In 1895 he was appointed as British Minister
to the Sultanate of Morocco. His son Harold was later to
describe him as "neither imaginative nor intellectual; he was
merely intelligent, honest, sensible, high-minded and
7
fair. "
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Both Gummere and Nicolson agreed that the situation
was serious. Acting in concert they immediately despatched
on the 19th a strong message to the Grand Vizier at Fez de-
manding that orders be sent to the Sultan's Minister of
Foreign Affairs at Tangier, Sid El Hadj Mohamed Ben Arby
Torres, that "all demands made by the bandit chief should be
accorded at once The same morning they held a hur-
ried consultation with Torres, and found him very upset and
well aware of the "gravity of the situation." They received
from him a promise of all possible aid in order to free the
two men.
Around noon on the 19th two messengers came into
Tangier from Raisuli with a letter from Perdicaris to his
wife. The letter was a brief one informing her that he and
Varley had not been treated badly, and asking that some
clothing and other necessities be packed and sent to them
with the messengers. In questioning the two men it was
learned that the captives were at a place called L'homs in
the Benider Mountains east of Tangier and would soon be car-
ried further back into these rocky fastnesses. There was
no communication from Raisuli on his demands, a state of af-
9fairs which Gummere found rather ominous.
In his initial despatch to the State Department
Gummere requested that a warship be immediately sent to
Tangier to enforce demands upon the Moorish government. He
also hoped that this vessel would "be of sufficient size and
importance to impress /the/ natives." The situation, he felt,
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was very serious and he considered it of "immense importance
to have a war vessel here to show what gravity my Government
consider the situation and support me." He saw the standing
of the United States in Morocco as a somev;hat less than im-
portant one, and impressed upon State that only strong meas-
ures would gain the respect of the Moors. "'"^
Nicolson notified the British Foreign Office of the
steps he and Gummere had taken, and that the latter had re-
quested a warship. The Foreign Office replied that Nicolson
should let them know if he felt British naval units v/ould be
desirable, but cautioned that as "a general rule such demon-
strations tend rather to make negotiations for release of
captives more difficult." Nicolson agreed, "for the present
at any rate," especially since the Americans were sending a
vessel. However, on the 20th a small torpedo boat was sent
over to Tangier from Gibraltar to serve as a despatch
vessel
.
Gummere' s report of the kidnapping reachad Washington
in the late morning of the 19th. Secretary of State Hay was
absent from the capital, and Assistant Secretary Loomis
could present little opposition to whatever action the
President would decide to take. The diversion of warships
to Tangier was a serious decision and could not have been
made without Roosevelt's direct approval, as witnessed by
the President's quick reaction in 1903 to what he mistakenly
thought was an unauthorized change in the itinerary of the
Battleship Squadron. In the past Hay had often helped to
dampen Roosevelt's enthusiasms by acting as a break upon the
exuberant President. Henry Adams saw Hay as playing a
Seneca to Roosevelt's Nero, a role with which the President
was, like Nero, becoming increasingly uncomfortable. It was
quite possible that Hay might have managed to soften
Roosevelt's action, but he had left Washington on the 13th
to represent the President at the St. Louis Exposition and
would not return until the 23rd. "'"^
The President quickly decided to make use of one of
the squadrons heading for Europe. Loomis referred Gummere '
s
request for a warship to the Navy Department on the same day
as he received it. The next day, the 20th, Loomis and
Admiral Taylor held consultations, and orders were cabled
ahead of Chadwick to Tenerife directing him to take his en-
13tire squadron to Tangier.
The State Department sent Gummere a despatch in-
forming him that "warships will be sent" to Tangier as soon
as possible. Gummere was undoubtedly reassured by the in-
crease in naval strength which was to be put at his service
— he had asked for one vessel and now he was to get at
least two. He little realized that he would shortly see the
small harbor of Tangier filled with seven of his country's
fighting ships. In addition State told the Consul that the
warships would arrive in "two or three days." Here the
Department badly miscalculated the time element for
Chadwick' s squadron was still struggling across the Atlantic,
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unaware of what was happening in Tangier, being held back by
its two slow and balky gunboats . '"^
Political pressure quickly arose in the United States
over the outrage, although its effect on the President's de-
cision to send Chadwick's squadron can only be conjectured.
The name of Perdicaris was well-known in New Jersey and both
of that state's senators wired the State Department asking
it to do all it possibly could to secure his release.
Senator John Kean referred to Ion as "his intimate personal
friend," and Senator Dryden urged that vigorous measures be
taken and demanded the "punishment of his captors." Another
telegram expressing concern came from Nev\? Jersey
Representative W. N. Lanning. "'"^
The reaction of the American press was, with some
exceptions, in full accord with the administration's action
in sending warships to Tangier. It was still the age of
Hearst, Grozier and the yellow press, and both reporting
and editorial comment mirrored that muscular imperialism to
which most Americans subscribed at the turn of the century.
The Clevel and PI ain Dealer, in an editorial titled "Teaching
Morocco A Lesson," called for sending guns and men instead
of a ransom. The government of Morocco "must be taught at
this late date," warned the Plain Dealer , "the lesson which
other Barbary states learned from American gunners more than
a century ago." The heroic shades of Decatur, Preble, and
Bainbridge were consistently drawn upon as an historical
reference point by many newspapers. It vvas felt that what
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the young American navy had done to the Deys of Algiers and
Tripoli in the early 1800»s, it should be quite willing to
do in 1904.
The Boston Globe
,
while admitting that "Ion
Perdicaris isn't exactly what you would call a Yankee name,"
affirmed that he was an American citizen and fully deserved
the protection of his country. In New York, The World felt
the abduction had laid Morocco "fairly open to a dose of the
blessings of civilization from the mouth of a thirteen-inch
gun." The Washington Times caught much of the popular mood
when it reacted to the decision to use naval force by de-
claring that, "if the lawless people of Morocco need a les-
son on the danger of monkeying with the Anglo-Saxon they
will probably get it." Like the Globe
,
the Times also made
note of Perdicaris • dubious heritage but affirmed that he
"was born in this country, and is better entitled to the
protection of the Stars and Stripes than are a good many mem-
17bers of Tammany Hall."
Roosevelt's action drew some muted protests in the
press, mainly from newspapers with Democratic sympathies.
The chief newspaper in Perdicaris* home town of Trenton, the
Daily True American
,
urged that before the United States pro-
ceeded to the use of force it should wait for all the facts
to be presented. It also said that Perdicaris' residence in
Morocco "was a known risk," and this must be given due con-
sideration by the government. The newspaper had full
sympathy for the plight of its native son, but the situation
was so complicated "as to make any rash act most mom.entous
.
Nothing would be secured by threatening Morocco, and instead
of force the ransom should be paid by Perdicaris who was
quite wealthy, and not the United States.^®
The central character in the affair remained un-
aware of the widening diplomatic ripples caused by his ab-
duction. As the horsemen struck cut across the plain of
Bubana toward the mountains, Perdicaris remembered thinking
how unfamiliar the land was at night. He recalled the many
games of polo and the steeple-chases he had engaged in on
this plain, but now in the dark it was all strange and new
to him. There were, he wrote, "no applauding public; /but/
only the black night, /and/ the wild mountaineers striking
our horses with their guns and dragging us over rocks and
19
across streams . . . ."
As dawn broke the party halted for a brief rest.
Perdicaris approached Raisuli and asked that he be allowed
to communicate with his wife in Tangier, explaining that he
needed certain medicines and heavier clothing. Without re-
plying the bandit chief took paper and pencil from beneath
his cloak and gave them to Ion. Perdicaris wrote down what
he needed and the note was taken back to Tangier by a some-
what reluctant messenger, but only after Perdicaris promised
Raisuli that he would not be arrested. Ion also wrote a
second letter to be taken to the Wazan family asking that
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they help obtain his release.
Before starting out again Raisuli had his two cap-
tives dress in Moorish turbans and haiks (cloaks) so that
they would not draw undue attention. As the party rode on
the heat steadily became more oppressive and both Perdicaris
and Varley suffered acute discomfort. About one in the
afternoon they stopped to dine on a "few very gritty dried
figs /^and/ a little hard and pungent /""goat/ cheese."
Perdicaris was sickened after a few mouthfulls and was only
too glad to mount his horse and be off.^"'"
They now began to climb the rocky foothills into
the mountains — a district inhabited by the Beni M'Saour,
the Beni Idder, and the Beni Arroze. These three Kabyles,
or tribes, had for some time been united into a successful
military confederation against the Fez government and were
friendly to Raisuli. The ground became steeper and more im-
passable wdth each mile, and as they passed through the small
miserable villages which lay along the primitive road ragged
women and children would emerge from wretched huts to hoot
and jeer at the two captives. By now the elderly Perdicaris
was extremely fatigued, and his condition was not helped
when he fell from his horse while scrambling up the side of
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a ravine.
Late that evening, about ten or eleven, the weary
procession reached its destination a small mountain vil-
lage called Terdants, "perched upon a spur or extended flank
of Mount Nazul , " about forty-eight miles from Tangier.
Perdicaris was in great pain as a result of the fall and
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could not lift his damaged leg "which was swollen from the
calf to the waist." Both men were roughly shown into a
small, primitive hut containing two rooms with a dirt floor.
Neither got much sleep that first night at Terdants, and be-
cause of his injury Ion was forced to stay in bed for two
full days.^^
The second morning after they arrived Raisuli,
alarmed at the state of his elderly captive's health, visited
the hut. The brigand was assured by Perdicaris that he was
now feeling much better, and Raisuli then told him what he
intended to demand for his release. Even though he promised
Ion that he would not be harmed, and that the goods and
horses taken from his house would be returned, Perdicaris
later wrote that "he felt his heart sink" at what Raisuli
was demanding. He was sure the conditions would never be
granted and told the bandit, " /w/hy not ask to be proclaimed,
out and out. Sultan of Morocco." He then wearily settled
. . 24down for what he envisaged would be a long captivity.
Back in Tangier both Gummere and Nicolson were still
attempting to establish some basis by which to negotiate the
captives' release. On the 19th Torres, with their backing,
despatched a relative of Raisuli to find out what the brigand
wanted. In the early morning hours of the 22nd the man re-
turned with letters from Perdicaris, as well as Raisuli 's
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terms for the return of the two men.
The first of these demands was for the release of a
large number of Raisuli's men held in Moorish prisons. sec-
ond, the Governor of Tangier, Abd el Saduk — the brigand's
cousin and old enemy — was to be dismissed. Third, the
government troops which had already been withdrawn into
Tangier from their campaign against Raisuli in the country-
side were to be sent to Fez. Fourth, a large ransom of about
$70,000 was to be paid, raised from the sale of properties
belonging to Abd el Saduk and his family. The brigand would
not accept payment from any other source. Fifth, and most
importantly, the Sultan was to cede two districts to Raisuli
for him to govern as an almost independent fief. Finally,
there were two other demands relating to free passage for
some of his men back to their villages, and the arrest of
2 6three of his other enemies.
Perhaps the most disturbing factor in the letter
was a request for American and British guarantees of the
Sultan's compliance with the terms. Raisuli knew quite well
that if he released the two men without a great power guar-
antee of some sort there would be nothing to prevent the
Moorish government from reneging on its promises. This
question of a great power guarantee was to be a major stick-
ing point in all further negotiations, as both the United
States and Great Britain consistently refused to make this
concession. Neither had any wish to be in a position of
backing such a threat to the Moroccan government, as well as
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becoming so deeply involved in Moorish internal affairs.
Nicolson informed the Foreign Office that if Raisuli
were to be given all of what he wants "he would practically
become a ruling power in this part of the country." Ke
thought the demands exorbitant, but felt that "without ad-
mitting them all, an arrangement /was/ possible." He con-
ferred with Gummere and Torres and together they decided upon
the tactic of a counter-proposal to Raisuli. The services
of the Wazan's were enlisted and the two young Shereefs of
that family were sent out with the offer. The Wazan family,
as we have seen, had enjoyed an amiable relationship with
Perdicaris, and it was mainly that which persuaded the two
young men to enter the affair as intermediaries. The Wazan's
possessed religious and social prestige and commanded great
28
respect even though under French protection.
The counter-proposal offered less than what Raisuli
wanted. It mentioned no territorial transfer and gave no
great power guarantees, except for a pledge of an American
and British-backed pardon. It demanded that the two
prisoners be returned to Tangier by the 26th. The reply came
on the 24th when a letter was received from Muley Ali, the
eldest of the Wazan brothers. He said Raisuli not only re-
jected the counter-proposal, but also revealed that he had
added two new demands -- including one of more territory --
29
for his captives' release.
A letter was sent to Muley Ali the next day pointing
out that it would be in Raisuli 's interest to release the
prisoners, and again offered a British-American guarantee of
pardon. Nicolson felt the brigand's acceptance of it would
now be improbable, and he was proved correct in this when Al
replied on the 26th that Raisuli was inflexible. Ali added
that Raisuli was in daily communication with persons in
Tangier, and he suspected they were urging him to resist.
The bandit had also received letters from many tribal leader
exhorting him to use his prisoners to help gain the release
of their men from the Sultan's prisons. Ali ended by saying
that he would stay at Terdants in order to "prevent as much
as it will be in my power any bodily harm being done to the
captives." He urged that Raisuli 's demands be met.^°
Nicolson was baffled by this turn in events and
wrote the Foreign Office that he could see no end to
Raisuli 's demands, for "/I7n all probability as time passes
/the^/ will increase." The brigand was a desperate man and
quite willing, Nicolson felt, to carry out his threat of
killing the men. As for the demands. Sir Arthur saw them as
"difficult for any Government to accept, and are beyond
all . . . reason." He then requested instructions on how
he should proceed, and whether Raisuli should be offered a
31guarantee
.
Faced with the failure of their diplomacy as far as
Raisuli was concerned, the two diplomats turned toward the
central government in Fez. They had previously written to
the Grand Vizier on the 19th demanding that orders be sent
to Torres giving him full authority to meet the demands of
Raisuli. The American Vice Consul-General Hoffman Philip,
78
near Fez on a shooting expedition, was contacted and ordered
by Gummere to make a direct approach to the government. On
the 25th Gummere received a despatch from Philip telling him
that he had not only seen the Grand Vizier, but had been
given a special audience by the Sultan. Abd el Aziz ex-
pressed his outrage at the incident and directed Philip to
inform Gummere that "he would acquiece in every demand, in
1,9
every detail . . .
Even with this vague verbal acquiescence there re-
mained two central and difficult problems. First, Raisuli's
demands had now been increased and neither Gummere or
Nicolson was sure how Fez would re act to the change —
especially the idea of handing over even miore territory.
Second, the bandit continued to demand a great power guaran-
tee from the United States or Great Britain . By the 27th
matters were stalemated and both sides settled down to a
waiting game with the Moroccan government in the middle.
The situation of foreign residents in Tangier was
growing incre asingly precarious in the days after the abduc-
tion. Most of the foreigners living outside of Tangier
poured into the city seeking protection. Walter B. Harris,
writing in The Times (London), reported that "several people
have received warnings of future outrages," and that the
"demeanour of the natives towards Europeans seems daily to
33become more arrogant."
Gummere informed Washington of the declining situa-
tion in Tangier, calling it not reassuring, and adding that
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he had "a well grounded suspicion" that other outrages were
in the offing. He was almost desperate in his need of a
warship. He hoped that the State Department would "pardon
his insistence on this subject," but "nearly double the
time" had elapsed since the Department had said a warship
would arrive. "No vessel has been heard from/' he plain-
tively cabled, and "I am growing more and more anxious. "^^
The reaction in Washington to the stalemate in nego-
tiations and the apparently deteriorating situation in
Tangier was a decision to make an even stronger show of naval
might. In London, the Foreign Office also hardened its atti-
tude .
Lansdowne cabled Nicolson on the 28th that the
British government could not press the Sultan to bow to the
demands, but he asked him to inform Torres that the Moroccan
government would "be held responsible if any harm befalls
/a/ British subject. " It was felt that the Sultan could af-
ford to make considerable concessions, but His Majesty's
Government would not demand the Sultan make these conces-
sions only hold Morocco responsible if any harm came to
Varley. To back up this new diplomatic approach the Foreign
Office offered to send a warship, but Nicolson felt it would
35
not be needed at this time
.
In Washington a similar decision v/as being made on
that same day. The President held a Cabinet meeting in the
morning where Hay told Roosevelt that Raisuli's demands were
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preposterous and the idea of guaranteeing them "impossible
of fulfillment." Roosevelt agreed and it was decided to
augment the naval force being sent by including Jewell's war
ships as well as Chadwick's. The primary reasons for the in
crease in force, Hay wrote Moody, were "the disturbed con-
ditions in Morocco and the unsatisfactory progress of the
negotiations By now Hay was in complete agreement
with Roosevelt as to the necessity of a naval demonstration,
confiding to his diary that "a nation cannot degrade itself
to prevent ill-treatment of a citizen. "^^
Morocco was caught in the middle. If it did not
act it would have to face the threat of British and American
intervention — if it did act and gave Raisuli what he
wanted it would create a powerful internal threat to itself.
In addition, the affair was beginning to assume larger pro-
portions not only in Fez, Washington and London, but also in
Paris
.
Initially French interest in the kidnapping was
minimal , but as the crisis lengthened without any settlement
in sight, and with the arrival of American naval units immi-
nent, French concern began to deepen.
At first the French Minister in Tangier, Saint-Rene
Taillandier, thought that the situation might result in an
increase of French influence in Morocco. In Paris the semi-
official newspaper Le Temps editorially agreed with this
view. Taillandier also began meeting regularly with Gummere
and Nicolson, and it was he who cleared the way for the
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Wazan brothers to act as intermediaries.^"^
The French Minister was soon sounding out his col-
leagues on the idea of establishing a local European con-
trolled police force. He said he was in contact with his
government about this possibility, using the "infusion of a
few experienced Algerian elements" as its backbone. By the
24th Le Temps was calling the kidnapping a grave incident,
saying it showed "the necessity of assuring the assistance
of France to put an end to the anarchy and unrest which are
38laying waste the region."
The French position was quite well understood in
Washington and at the same Cabinet m.eeting which decided to
send a second squadron to Morocco, Roosevelt ordered Hay to
cable our ambassador in Paris and have him officially re-
39quest French good offices . The President was covering
both of his flanks with this maneuver. It was Rooseveltian
diplomacy at its best with both the big stick and the soft
words. The President was being very careful and was giving
himself as many options as possible. He could either con-
tinue to apply an increasing measure of force , or , if
European reaction became hostile, dump the entire matter in
the lap of the French.
However, some saw another reason behind the American
request of French good offices. The Times of London re-
ported that the request had actually been initiated by a
feeler from the French government. The New York Tribune
stated flatly that it was French overtures which prompted
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the appeal, and that the catalyst was the President's de-
cision to send warships.
Whatever the origin of the American request for
good offices, the prospect of French involvement was well
received in the nation's press. The Sun (New York) praised
the action, as well as Hay's good sense in bringing France
into the affair. It wrote of the "age-long friendship be-
tween France and her foster child," and felt French assis-
tance was "the quick, the easy and, probably, the only means
of solving the Perdicaris problem."^-'"
The crisis entered a new stage after the events of
the 28th. It was no longer simply a local matter, but in-
stead began to take on international implications. A fleet
of American warships was heading for Europe, and part of
that armada anticipated daily in Tangier. IVhat was to be
expected from them? Was the sending of warships to Morocco
simply a way in which the President was attempting to placate
public opinion as American Ambassador Porter in Paris assured
y
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a worried Delcasse; or was there something more to it?
From, his post in Madrid Jules Cam.bon, the French
Ambassador to Spain, apprehensively observed the development
of the crisis and the despatch of American warships. He
feared, he wrote Delcasse on the 29th, "the tendency which
the United States has shown at times to get into
Mediterranean questions," may be a cause for alarm, and "may
go contrary to the ideas and influence of which France has
A ^
made herself the promoter." Cambon was not alone in his
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ruminations, and the events of the next few weeks would
cause them to be echoed in the foreign offices and chancel-
leries of Spain, Germany and Russia.
CHAPTER V
EUROPE LOOKS ON
Chadwick's warships, strung out in a long line,
steamed toward Tangier at their top cruising speeds. Leading
the way was the flagship Brooklyn
,
her powerful engines
moving her far ahead of the next vessel astern. On May 30th,
some sixty-five hours after clearing the harbor at Santa
Cruz, Chadwick's white flagship emerged from the early
morning mist off Tangier and anchored in the harbor. By mid-
afternoon the Atlanta arrived, followed in the early evening
by the two gunboats, Castine and Marietta .
As each of the warships slid into the anchorage
their guns boomed salutes which were answered in turn by the
Moorish shore batteries. All day long the sound of cannon
seemed to echo over the old port — an experience which
Gummere found impressive and reassuring.
^
Soon after the Brooklyn anchored Gummere came
aboard for a long conversation with Chadwick. When the
Consul-General had fully explained the situation both men
agreed that "no further steps should be taken" until the at-
titude of the Fez government was known concerning Raisuli's
new demands. Chadwick and his staff came ashore in the
afternoon, and, along with Gummere, went to visit Torres.
They impressed upon him the gravity v/ith which the United
84
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States viewed the situation, and urged him that there be no
relaxation in his efforts to secure the release of the cap-
3tives. As the old Moorish diplomat looked out over the har-
bor, the presence of a squadron of powerful warships under-
lined the seriousness of the situation far more than could
Gummere's threats and demands.
Chadwick continued his busy day by meeting with
Nicolson and then Mrs. Perdicaris. To calm Gummere's fears
of a Moorish attack upon him or the Perdicaris family he
ordered ashore four Marines, bearing sidearms but not rifles
Two were detailed to Gummere's residence and two to El
Minzah. Also two navy signelmen were stationed at the
Consulate, "in order to be able to communicate v/ith the ves-
4
sels in case of attack and need of assistance."
To Roosevelt and Hay Rear Admiral Chadwick was a
known and respected quantity, and they would look to him
rather than the untried Gummere for a true picture of events
in Tangier. Chadwick' s initial impressions v;ere sent to
Washington the next day. The situation was, he reported,
"a very serious one." He cautioned that the only thing
possible for the United States to do was to wait on events,
5
while "pressuring the Sultan to accept" Raisuli's demands.
The next two days brought more naval activity to
Tangier. On the morning of the 31st the British despatch
vessel Surprise arrived from Gibraltar carrying on board
Rear Admiral Sir William Cecil H. Domville. Domville com-
manded that part of the British Mediterranean fleet at
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Gibraltar (the other units were engaged in maneuvers off the
coast of Italy)
,
and he was soon ashore conferring with
Nicolson about the situation.^
On June 1st Jewell arrived with the European
Squadron, bringing the total American strength to seven war-
ships. Although both Chadwick and Jewell were rear admirals,
Chadwick was senior and thus took overall command while the
squadrons remained at Tangier.
For most foreign residents the arrival of the war-
ships gave them that feeling of solid security lacking since
the 19th. Gummere was much relieved, stating that the naval
moral support was of immense importance to his bargaining
position. Nicolson also valued the arrival of the Americans.
The town's Europeans were somewhat reassured, he told the
Foreign Office, as they felt that the vessels could give
them protection by sending landing parties ashore in case
7
of serious trouble.
Al-Moghreb Al-Aska , a Tangier weekly newspaper pub-
lished by and for Europeans, greeted the arrival of American
warships with pleasure, sorry only that the stay of the
Americans could not be of a more permanent nature. It
openly called for the United States to join with Great
Britain and help to civilize Morocco. "Perhaps no better
ornament could crown the pillars of Hercules," said Al-Aska,
"than the Star-spangled banner, and the Union Jack.
The warships were also welcomed from a somewhat
more unexpected quarter. One day while walking and
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conversing with each other, Raisuli and Perdicaris were ap-
proached by a breathless messenger who described to his chief
the arrival of "eight frigates" which had entered the bay one
after the other. He said the town was mkloub
.
or "upside-
down," and added that all feared an imminent bombardment.
Perdicaris watched Raisuli closely for he feared the news
would cause the brigand to move him and Varley deeper into
the mountains. Surprisingly, Raisuli broke into a wide grin
and turned to Perdicaris to congratulate him. Ion replied
that he did not understand, and Raisuli good naturedly an-
swered that the presence of these ships would now compel the
Sultan to grant his demands — "and then," he promised, "you
9
will be able to return to your friends."
In the United States governmental vigor in having
despatched the warships ten days earlier had produced enormou
headlines, after which the story gradually faded from front
pages. The arrival of the squadrons in Tangier touched off
a new wave of journalistic enthusiasm.
Hearst's Evening Journal (New York), in a baroque
mixture of bombast and misinformation, informed readers on
June 1st that the "U. S. Threatens To Bombard Tangier" and
that "Fifteen American Warships Will Turn Their Guns On
Morocco." In a more responsible but no less festive vein,
the Nev%^ York Tribune heralded the arrival with a large front-
page picture of the Brooklyn
,
including an insert of Admiral
Chadwick. The Tribune called it "the largest representation
of the American navy that has ever visited a foreign
port
. • . .
The American navy, thundered the newspaper,
had returned to "the scene of some of its earliest glories,"
there to deal "with a brigandage on land no less detestable
than piracy at sea." The Tribune added that not even the
"Little Americans" a reference to the anti-imperialists -
could argue against the validity of our response in this
10
case.
The New York World, a political opponent of
Roosevelt and suspicious of his motives in Morocco, joined
the outbreak of martial speculation. It found Roosevelt
"anxious to stir up a fight of some kind," hoping it would
aid him at the polls later in the year. A front page head-
line proclaimed: "U. S. Cavalry May Be Sent To Morocco."
The reason for the need of army cavalry, said the World
,
was that the marines from the fleet had no experience with
horses and would not be effective in the coming campaign.
The World believed that the invasion of Morocco "will be a
strictly friendly one so far as the Sultan is concerned."
The story optimistically assumed that the Sultan's army
would probably co-operate with the American invasion force,
"and act as guides.""^"*"
The American warships, however, had a much larger
audience than the residents of Tangier and the American
reading public. The Perdicaris incident and its naval after
math brought excited speculation to the press of Europe —
particularly in Spain and France, the two powers which had,
along with Great Britain, the greatest interest in the
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future of Morocco.
In Madrid the arrival of the two squadrons created
a sensation, and Le Temps (Paris) reported that Spanish of-
ficials considered the United States naval presence "unwise
and liable to aggrevate the situation." Spain feared not
only American intervention but an international one. The
latter, she felt, would upset the balance of power in the
12
region. In a Europe of hungry colonial powers, Spain might
lose her preferred position in Morocco once the door was
opened to outside intervention.
On June 2nd a request was made in the Spanish Senate
that the government despatch a warship to Tangier. Maura,
the Foreign Minister, while not committing himself to a naval
demonstration promised that measures would be taken to defend
Spanish subjects in Morocco — and, by inference, Spanish
colonial rights. Cambon told Delcasse on the 6th that rumors
were sweeping through Madrid of the imminent seizure of
Tangier, or some other Moroccan port, by the United States
^ ^ • 13for use as a coaling station.
It had only been six years since Spain had suffered
a disastrous defeat at the hands of the United States, and
the sensitivity of Spain to such a gathering of American
naval power so close to her shores was bound to excite an
adverse reaction. The rumors were vehemently denied by the
State Department, as well as by Ambassador Choate in London.
The Spanish Ambassador to the United States, Don Emilio de
Ojeda, publicly declared that as far as he knew the American
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government had no desire to seize a port in Morocco. Finally,
the Army and Navy Journal reacted to the rumors by calling
them "both ludicrous and deplorable." It was, said the
Journal, "a gross representation of the humane purpose" for
which the naval demonstration was instituted."'"'^
Another rumor which originated in Madrid and made
the rounds of other European capitals concerned a supposed
exchange of notes between the great powers. The notes would
affirm, reported Le_ Temps
,
that the United States would be
allowed to take only those actions needed for the release of
Perdicaris; the notes were also said to assert that the great
powers would not consent to an extended intervention."'"^
If the exchange of notes and the American desire
for a coaling port were a fiction, the concern on the part
of the Spanish government to end the stay of American war-
ships in the area was not. Ambassador Ojeda, while praising
the careful handling of the affair by the United States
government, precisely pointed out that he expected the pur-
pose of the naval demonstration be limited to the release of
16
Perdicaris and Varley, and nothing else.
Spanish concern was underlined in a more dramatic
way by the well -publicized movement of naval units toward
the Straits area. As a result of 1898, Spain had few major
naval units remaining, but during the first two weeks of
June these ships were suggestively concentrated at Cadiz
--
a port which lay only a day's hard steaming from Tangier.
On the morning of June 5th a squadron of three armored
vessels cleared the harbor at Malaga bound for an unknown
destination. Led by Spain's only battleship, the Pel ay
o
(known af fectionally as "El Solatario"), the squadron con-
sisted of the new armored cruiser Cardinal Cisneros and the
coast-defense ship Numancia
. At first, it was reported that
this force was bound for Tangier, but on the 6th Foreign
Minister Maura publicly stated that the warships were to go
to Cadiz. Nevertheless the meaning of the move was quite
clear, and on the 8th it was underscored by the despatch of
1 7
a second squadron to Cadiz, this time from Cartagena.
French anxiety would also lead to diplomatic and
naval maneuvering, although not so blatant as the Spanish.
The French government was uncomfortable with the situation
and it was generally felt she would view favorably the quick
departure of the American warships. L_e Temps wondered if
such a formidable demonstration of naval power was really
appropriate. A front page editorial stated that "the pres-
ence of the American fleet complicates the situation," and
1 Q
that it would not aid in a settlement. Since Le Temps was
generally considered to be an outlet for official opinion,
its editorials were seen as a reflection of the government's
views
.
Delcasse, on May 31st, played down exaggerated
rumors that France was planning a naval demonstration or
other radical action at Tangier. He called these rumors
purely fanciful. Yet, as can be seen in his correspondence
with Taillandier on the 9th of June, Delcasse saw the
necessity for French participation if any landing at Tangier
by the United States or Great Britain was attempted. The
day after he broached this possibility with his Moroccan
envoy, unconfirmed reports circulated in Paris that French
Minister of Marine Pelletan was in communication with Vice
Admiral Gigon at Loulon as to the possibility of sending one
1 9
or two warships to Tangier.
In the United States the authoritive Army and Navy
Journal again took editorial note that the appearance of
American naval might on a large scale had "provoked a good
deal of speculation in continental Europe." It scoffed at
rumors that the fleet had been ordered to the Mediterranean
in connection with the Russo-Japanese war or to seize a
coaling port. The Journal stressed that the plan for the
cruise had been made several months before and that the
American government had pointed this out informally to the
20great powers.
If some of the European powers could be said to have
had one eye on events in Morocco, the other was undoubtedly
drav/n to an occurrence some four hundred miles to the north-
west. At Lisbon, Portugal, another American force was en-
gaged in a different aspect of Rooseveltian naval diplomacy
not the gunboat diplomacy of threat as seen at Tangier
but the prestige diplomacy of display; not the naked fist
but the velvet glove.
It was a clear and pleasant first of June as
Barker's battleships steamed up the Tagus River in a single
column. Anchoring off Lisbon the three ironclads (the Iowa
arrived three days later) and the Portuguese forts and bat-
teries on the shore exchanged thunderous salutes. American
sailors often referred to duty of this sort as a "permanent
yachting party," and events of the next two weeks would not
7 1disappoint that belief.
Soon puffing steam launches filled with officers
in spotless dress white uniforms and cumbersome ceremonial
swords were shuttling between the battleships and the shore.
Barker and his captains made their first call at the American
Legation and met with the Minister, Charles Page Bryan.
Bryan was a former journalist turned diplomat. A political
power in Illinois, he had started out in the foreign service
at the top. In 1897, at the age of forty-two, he had been
appointed by President McKinley as the American Minister in
China. Bryan followed this with service as Minister to
29
Brazil, Switzerland, and, beginning in 1904, Portugal.
Bryan and Barker then called on the Prime Minister
©f Portugal and members of the Cabinet, as well as the Civil
and Military Governor. Later that afternoon at the Arsenal
the Americans attended a ceremony in which the young second
son of the King, the Infante Don Manuel, was enrolled as a
member of the Naval School. After the ceremony Barker and
his naval contingent were presented to King Carlos and Queen
Amelia by Bryan. In the harbor the battleships were dressed
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in honor of the occasion, and while sailors in dress whites
lined the rails, hundreds of multi-colored signal flags were
raised, and for the second time that day the battleships were
engulfed in white billowing smoke as their guns roared out
the appropriate salute. ^"^
There ensued in the following days a glittering
round of balls and official ceremonies, at which Barker was
often accompanied by his wife who had sailed in a passenger
liner to be with him in Europe. At one gathering the Queen
charmed the Admiral and his wife by telling them proudly
that her father, the Count de Paris, had been a member of
General McClellan's staff during the Civil War.^"*
On the 8th Minister Bryan gave a Grand Ball at the
American Legation which was attended by the King and Queen
and most of the court. United States Marines from the bat-
tleships in full dress uniforms of red and blue, with spiked
helmets in the Prussian style, stood at attention on the
broad stairway leading from the entrance hall to the first
floor. As each member of royalty entered officials of the
Portuguese Cabinet and the American Legation escorted them
up the stairway. Liveried attendents with lighted candela-
bra proceeded a stately procession led by the Queen Mother.
Providing a suitable background a navy band sounded bugles
and drums, gave four ruffles, and then played the Portuguese
and American national anthems. Bryan was very proud. This
was the first time in some years that the royal family had
attended any legation ball — a signal honor for both Bryan
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and the United States.
On the 11th King Carlos with his Minister of Marine
and other officials visited the squadron. Approaching in an
ornate State Barge, the King was greeted by a salute of
twenty-one guns as he came alongside the Kearsarqe
. After
breakfast in the wardroom and a toast by Barker in which he
saluted the King, "as the mariner who maintains the tradi-
tional maritime glory to which Portugal is indisputably en-
titled," Carlos inspected the ship. He expressed himself as
"much pleased with the condition of the ship and crew," and
later stood with Barker on the Quarterdeck as the ship's
company marched past. Barker fancied that the King as a
former naval officer "understood and appreciated what he
saw. " When the King departed in the afternoon he was cheered
by the men of the Kearsarge and the other battleships, and
with the rails manned and the Portuguese ensign at the main,
each ship fired a twenty-one gun salute. The King would
later tell the British Minister, Sir Martin Gosselin, that
while the battleships were "fine specimens of their type,"
26
he found them lacking m homogeneity.
"In order to cultivate more carefully the friendly
relations" existing between Portugal and the United States,
Barker held another reception on board the Kearsarge , this
time for the "leading people of Lisbon." At least a thou-
sand "gentlemen and ladies" crowded onto the battleship,
filling the compartments and passageways, and looking be-
musedly, or, in some cases knowingly, at the great guns and
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gleaming machinery. The Kearsarqe was awash, as Barker later
remembered, with "Dukes, Duchesses, Counts, Countesses,
Admirals, Ministers, Bishops, and Cabinet Officers." By the
time the squadron left Lisbon it was little wonder that in-
stead of being refreshed by the visit the men "were pretty
71
well tired out .
"
Bryan was elated with the Portuguese response, and
wrote Hay of the "very favorable impression on the v/hole com-
munity created by the warships and their officers." The
visit had, according to Bryan, "added greatly to the prestige
of our country in Portugal." Roosevelt's personal interest
in the visit and its happy results was indicated by a much
28
appreciated telegram from the President to King Carlos.
The success of the sojourn was mirrored in the
Portuguese press. For the Liberal the visit was a star-
tlingly vivid revelation of how in so short a time the United
States had entered into the international life of the great
powers. "The world moves," said the paper, and Europe
should not be surprised at "this march of American power."
Although the visit was a peaceful one, the Liberal '
s
edito-
rial made clear that the fleet's call at the strategic
estuary of the Tagus would have its effect on the great
29powers
.
Another newspaper, Novidades , acclaimed the visit
in glowing terms, and saw it as strengthening "the bonds of
friendship betv;een the great Republic, and this smallest
pov7er of Western Europe." Tarde, also applauded the visit
and its effect. It reported that the King had come back to
Lisbon from his country palace at Cezimbra expressly to see
the battleships. Both nev/spapers printed in full Roosevelt's
telegram to King Carlos, as well as the King's reply to the
30President.
But events at Tangier and their effect on Europe
added a note of seriousness to the Portuguese sojourn. The
Lisbon correspondent of the Madrid daily Impartial reported
on "rumors of the gravest character," which if unconfirmed
were "nevertheless received as true by well-informed persons."
The United States was in the process, according to these ru-
mors, of obtaining the lease of a naval base in return for
America's payment of part of Portugal's national debt. The
Portuguese government had been reported as having refused
this offer, as well as one for a coaling station on the coast
of Portugal itself. Yet the cordial reception given to the
battleships, the story went on, lent "credit to rumors of
certain understandings whereby the North American Government
31
will secure important advantages."
Later the semi-official Berlin Post picked up the
rumor and saw in it the beginning of a portentous endeavor
by the United States "to obtain influence in the
Mediterranean." The New York Times reported that "one of the
highest authorities in the Administration" — probably Hay —
had denied such allegations. "We may be negotiating for a
coaling station in the Mountains of the Moon and for a
training station on Mount Atlas," the Time s quoted the
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unnamed source, "but we are not after any of the Azores or
any part of Portugal any more than we are after a coaling
station in Morocco. ""^^
The Perdicaris incident also affected the itinerary
of the Battleship Squadron. Both Chadwick and Jewell were
sending regular reports on the developing situation to
Barker. On the 6th of June Barker was ordered by the Navy
Department to remain in Lisbon until the 16th, and later the
stay was extended until the 18th. The visit to Villefranche
was scrapped, and by the 12th the possibility of Barker
going to Tangier made exciting reading in American news-
papers. The Navy Department decided that, instead of pro-
ceeding directly into the Mediterranean after leaving Lisbon,
Barker's ships would steam to Gibraltar — a few hours from
3 3Tangier -- and wait on events.
For the officers of the Battleship Squadron the
anticipation of a coming clash in Morocco was a welcome one.
It was felt that even if the affair was settled without the
use of force, the navy would have to remain in Moroccan
waters to collect the expected indemnity. Portuguese Rear
Admiral Amaral , the commandant of the Navy Yard at Lisbon,
was telling American officers that the best way to settle
the situation was for the United States to pay the ransom and
then compel Morocco to double the amount, or face the seizure
34
of one of its ports.
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While Europe puzzled over American naval concentra-
tions on both sides of the Straits, the situation in Tangier
had settled down to a stand-off. Weary messengers travelled
constantly between Tangier and Raisuli's camp, and between
Tangier and Fez, but little progress was evident.
The day before Chadwick's arrival the younger of the
Wazan brothers returned from Raisuli's stronghold, telling
Gummere and Nicolson that the brigand was now insisting that
all of his demands be immediately met. If they were not he
would kill the two captives. He set a time limit of two
days for a satisfactory reply. The two diplomats quickly
informed Raisuli that they must be given more time as ap-
proval of the demands must first come from Fez before Torres
could act on them. They also pointed out to Raisuli that if
he killed his captives he would have to deal not only with
the Sultan but with two of the great powers . Gummere
poured out his frustration to the State Department over this,
saying that everything depended upon Raisuli's whim and that
any false step on his or Nicolson' s part would lead to the
35deaths of the captives.
At a Cabinet meeting on May 31st Roosevelt, Hay and
Moody discussed this turn of events. They viewed Chadwick's
initial despatch as inconclusive, and Roosevelt and Moody
agreed with Hay that a guarantee to Raisuli by the United
States was out of the question. To deal with Raisuli's
latest threat Hay read to the Cabinet the draft of a sharp
despatch he was going to send Gummere. Later in the day a
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despatch was received from Ambassador Choate in England
which gave some hope for a settlement through British and
French efforts, and because of this Hay toned down the tele-
gram. As sent it called for Gummere to inform the Moroccan
government that if Perdicaris was killed the United States
would demand the same fate for Raisuli. It implied that if
the Sultan could not carry this out the American government
would be quite willing to do so. The next day at a noon con-
ference Roosevelt and Moody chided Hay, saying "they wished
/his/ first draft had gone, as it would have sounded better
on the stump"; however, they felt the second would serve the
36purpose.
Even the toned-down despatch created a flurry in
the nation's press when it was publicly released. "Awful
Vengence Threatened By Hay," headlined the New York World .
If Perdicaris was harmed, "the United States will hunt
//Raisuli/7 to his death, whether it takes weeks or months or
years." The Boston Globe '
s
front page proclaimed, "Secretary
Hay To Fraissuli _/sic_/: Must Not Harm Perdicaris: Capture
And Death If Ke Does." The Washington Times somewhat more
3 7
colorfully stated: "Raisuli's Head For Perdicaris
Beyond the supposed political effect of the des-
patch and the exaggerated newspaper interpretation of it,
lay a potentially serious problem. Roosevelt was gambling.
How could he predict the Sultan's compliance to the demands?
Who could guess Raisuli's response to the threat against his
life? Was he cowardly or proud, reasonable or insane? And
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what if the elderly Perdicaris died of natural causes while
in captivity? In a largely unpredictable set of circum-
stances, Roosevelt had engaged his own reputation for "pluck-
as well as the honor of the United States Navy. He had
drawn the attention of the world to his fleet by committing
it at the focal point of the Perdicaris trouble. With his
easy-going approval of Hay's toned-down despatch he had dis-
carded the last of his options. His hand was pat. There
was no question of backing down. War, involvement in
Morocco, complications with Europe -- all awaited the whim
of a daredevil Moroccan bandit.
In Tangier no quick solution to the problem had
presented itself. Gummere and Nicolson, as well as Torres,
still waited on Fez for official approval of Raisuli's in-
creased demands. Joined by the Italian cruiser Dogali on
June 3rd the seven American warships lay quietly in the har-
bor: "/L/ean white ships," wrote the special correspondent
of the London Daily Mail
,
Edgar Wallace, "flying a flag that
has absolutely no right to be within 3,000 miles of Tangier."
Nicolson was apprehensive over what the Moorish
government might decide. He told the Foreign Office he could
not "say what might happen if the terms are refused ....
or if negotiations are prolonged." He felt Perdicaris and
Varley were in no immediate danger, but he was not sure in
which direction the Fez government would decide to go. He
informed Gummere and Taillandier that he was seriously con-
sidering asking the Foreign Office to send over a warship
102
from Gibraltar, and he warned the French Minister of the dis-
tinct possibility "of landing men for the protection of the
British colony." Nicolson realized that certain risks might
follow from such an extreme act, but he felt the alternative
would invite greater dangers. Taillandier was vigorously
opposed to any measure which would mean American and British
marines landing in Morocco, and protested strongly to
39Nicolson.
On the 5th Nicolson, feeling events were at a criti-
cal stage, asked for a warship. The Sultan's reply was due
in a day or two and if it was a negative one, force might be
needed. On the morning of the 7th the Prince of Wales
weighed anchor at Gibraltar and steamed for Tangier. Under
the command of Captain G. A. Callaghan, the black and buff
painted battleship was one of England's newest and most
powerful warships. As she entered the harbor at Tangier
late that same morning the guns of the American ships
crashed out their answer to the Prince of Wales thirty-four
gun salute — twenty-one for the American flag and thirteen
40
for Chadwick.
The United States Consul in Gibraltar reported an
even more important development to the State Department. The
British warships under Admiral Domville which had been
scheduled to join the rest of the Mediterranean Fleet at
Rapallo, Italy, had been "ordered to remain in port until
.,41further orders .
"
10 3
The situation temporarily eased on the 8th when a
letter was received by Torres from the Grand Vizier, Sid
Abdelkrim Ben Sliman, agreeing to give in to Raisuli's de-
mands. The Grand Vizier said the Sultan had acquiesed in
order "to please the two great Nations and the families of
the captives." Torres was instructed to see that all the
demands were carried out as quickly as possible. The Grand
Vizier also ordered Torres to ask for the removal of British
and American warships from Moroccan waters. The Moorish
government, reported Gummere, "hopes that we will send away
the vessels so the people will be calmed." Gummere refused
this request, as did Nicolson, saying that the warships were
sent to show the gravity v;hich each nation felt as to the
affair, and they would not be removed until the captives
were released.
Torres told Nicolson and Gummere that he doubted
Raisuli would be satisfied even now, and asked Nicolson for
suggestions on how compliance with the terms could best be
brought about. Both diplomats emphasized that this was
strictly a m.atter between Raisuli and Morocco, and that they
would not interfere in any manner. They could only reiterate
that their governm.ents would hold the Sultanate fully respon-
sible if anything happened to the captives. Torres, Nicolson
wrote, was "much depressed and agitated" over how to meet
all the demands. He refused to send his son to act as an
intermediary as the Vizier had asked him to do, fearing
Raisuli would take him captive. Torres' chief problem was
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how to deal with the Sheikhs the bandit demanded be arrested.
They were pov^erful tribal figures with many well-armed fol-
lowers, and the matter must be carefully negotiated with
them. Torres felt he would not be able to inform Raisuli of
complete compliance with the demands -- except, of course,
the great power guarantees — until at least the 13th, a
time lag which Gummere found very dil atory . "^"^
While waiting for Torres to comply with the demands
two minor events occurred which briefly caused a flurry of
excitement. The first took place when Perdicaris was re-
ported ill and plans were immediately made to send a ship's
doctor from the squadron to aid him. Fortunately, word came
that Perdicaris' condition had improved. Yet the incident
was proof of what a frail reed the negotiations rested
upon — the old man's death, even of natural causes, could
have instigated American intervention. By now even Nicolson
was telling the Foreign Office that more vigorous measures
than warships were necessary (Gummere was also dunning the
State Department for stiffer action). Nicolson suggested
that Great Britain consult with France on using stronger
44
methods
.
The other episode, while trivial, measured the state
of the tension in the United States. On June 8th Chadwick,
at Gummere 's request, placed a Marine guard at the Belgian
Legation just outside Tangier. The reaction in America was
instantaneous. "American Marines have landed in Africa,"
trumpeted the f^Few York Tribune . "It was the first display
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of American force in Africa," echoed The World
, "since
Stephen Decatur, just a hundred years ago, whipped the
Barbary pirates into submission." The front page headline
of the Washington Post was simple and to the point: "Our
Marines Land." The Belgian ambassador to the United States,
Baron Moncheur, could only express that he was greatly sur-
prised at the entire event.
A somewhat red-faced explanation came the next day.
Only two Marines had made up the landing force. The v/ife of
the absent Belgian Minister was an American, the daughter of
a certain General Story, a high Army official in Washington.
She had received threats from some Moors and Gummere decided
that she needed protection.
Reports of busy naval activity on America's east
coast were associated in the press with the increasing seri-
ousness of the Perdicaris affair. "Hurry Orders To Missouri ,
"
headlined a report from Newport News in the New York Tribune
on the 11th of June. Cowles' battleship lay at dock
"awaiting the arrival of a naval collier which is loading
ammunition at New York." The Tribune reported that the
Missouri had taken on a considerable amount of ammunition in
the past few days
,
and the supposition prevalent around the
naval base was that the battleship "is to carry a large sup-
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ply of ammunition to Barker's squadron."
That same day the Philadelphia Public Ledger re-
ported that officers at the League Island Navy Yard were
giving serious credit to a rumor sweeping the base that the
106
new cruiser Denver
,
lying "fully equipped for a long voyage,"
was going to be sent to join Chadwick's squadron at Tangier.
The Ledger also intimated that the auxiliary cruiser Yankee
48
would sail with the Denver >
On June 14th the situation in Morocco took its most
serious turn yet — Raisuli again increased his demands!
Even before Torres had managed to satisfactorily settle all
the previous conditions, the brigand's appetite had gotten
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the better of him.
CHAPTER VI
"PERDICARIS ALIVE, OR RAISULI DEAD"
The new crisis in negotiations began on the evening
of the 13th when Torres received a letter from the elder
Wazan brother in which Raisuli was reported to have again
demanded great power guarantees. These guarantees were to
be written and signed by both Gummere and Nicolson. The
brigand, Muley Ali wrote, feared that if he let the captives
go without the guarantees he and his men would be molested
by the Moorish government, and unable to till their fields
in peace. Raisuli insisted that the Sheikhs be arrested and
their "detention in prison guaranteed" by Gummere and
Nicolson
.
On the 14th Torres received a second letter, this
time directly from Raisuli. In it the requirement for the
arrest of the Sheikhs was repeated, and two more new demands
insisted upon. The first was for the release of additional
prisoners from the government's dungeons; the second, that
four more districts around Tangier be turned over to him.
Torres on behalf of his government agreed to the new demands
only pointing out that he did so conditionally as he still
had to get confirmation from Fez. As for the Sheikhs,
Torres arrested one of them on the 15th along with two of hi
brothers, but told Raisuli that if he wanted to arrest
the
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others he had the authority to do it himself as the govern-
ment was incapable of doing so.^
Gummere wrote the State Department that Raisuli was
probably going to insist upon receiving great power guarantees
before he released the captives, and since neither the United
States or Great Britain would do so the question of what to
do then must be considered. He said the Moroccan government
was impotent, and its army laughable and in no position to
punish Raisuli. The only option open other than direct force,
Gummere wrote, was a firm warning by the United States that
Raisuli release the prisoners. If the warning went unheeded
the ^'threat of punishment must be fulfilled to the letter or
the lives of all Christians in this country will be jeopard-
ized.
In Washington the news of the new impasse created
consternation. Hay' s reaction to the increased demands was
an observation in his diary on the 15th that Raisuli had a
bad case of megalomania. To Roosevelt Hay was just as blunt.
"You see," he wrote in a note to the President on that same
day , "there is no end to the insolence of this blackguard.
"
Both men agreed that there would be no American guarantee.
"Of course/' Roosevelt wrote Hay, "it would be out of the
question to surrender to the demands of those Moorish bri-
gands." He felt that the United States had "gone just as
far as we possibly can go for Perdicaris. Our position must
now be to demand the death of those that harm him if he is
harmed.
109
Strong words, but a basic question remained unan-
swered: just V7hat action was the American government pre-
pared to take in backing up its position? On the 15th
Roosevelt wrote Hay that he thought it might be advantageous
"to enter into negotiations with England and France, looking
to the possibility of an expedition to punish the brigand,"
If Morocco was unable to do it. On the very next day, the
16th, Rear Admiral Chadwick began drawing up a plan for the
seizure of Tangier.
There exists no record of Navy Department orders to
Chadwick concerning a landing operation at Tangier. There
is, however, a good possibility that he received such orders
— at least on a contingency basis — on the 15th or the 16th.
On the other hand, he may have gone ahead on his own in re-
action to Raisuli's increased demands. Whatever the reason,
the fact remains that Chadwick, after sitting in the harbor
at Tangier for over two weeks, now began serious preparations
for military intervention.
To be sure, Chadwick had landed a few marines and
navy signalmen, and a plan had been developed between the
Admiral and Gummere on a series of provisional signals, using
flares, to warn of trouble in Tangier. On board the warships
"marines and one company of bluejackets /were_/ made ready for
landing if it should be necessary." But beyond these meas-
ures little else had been done to prepare for serious action
before the 16th.
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On that morning Chadwick appointed a Board con-
sisting of Commanders W. H. H. Southerland ( Cleveland ) . Henry
Morrell (Marietta), and E. J. Dorn (Castine) to "collect
strategic information and prepare without delay a plan of
military operations of a foreign power in Morocco." The plan
was to be set up in such a way "as to be immediately avail-
able for use in case of necessity." Finally, Chadwick
ordered that great secrecy be observed in gathering this in-
formation. Copies of the order were sent to Admirals Barker
7
and Jewell.
As ultimately established the plan called for a
seizure of the port by a force of over twelve hundred armed
sailors and marines, further equipped with five three-inch
field guns, and fourteen machine guns. The landing force was
to be divided into two brigades — one from the South
Atlantic Squadron and one from the European Squadron. The
initial landing v;as to be made by the South Atlantic Brigade,
its marines seizing the Custom House and main pier. In the
harbor the warships were "to be prepared to shell batteries
at Customs Pier and at north-east battery in case landing is
opposed .
"
Chadv7ick began to take other preparatory steps in
addition to the war plan. He asked Nicolson to recall the
Prince of Wales from Gibraltar (she had gone there on the 13th
for some repairs). Nicolson agreed with Chadwick, "espe-
cially," he said, "as trouble may be caused when the guaran-
tees to Russouli /s"ic7 are refused." Chadv/ick also sent a
Ill
hurried request to the United States Government Despatch
Agent in London asking him to send "immediately two copies
/of7 Stanford's map /of? Morocco," a topographical study
compiled by the British Intelligence Department. By the
18th he was requesting from the captain of the Brooklyn his
plans on the composition of the landing force, as well as
the "/n/umber and type of guns /with field mounts/ available
for light field artillery."^
While Chadwick was putting together his plan for a
landing, an occurrence in Tangier added to the instability
of the situation. On the morning of the 16th two small
chartered steamers, the Spanish Millan Carrasco and the
French Moselle
,
pulled into Tangier after a voyage up the
coast from Casablanca. On board were some three hundred
Moorish infantry and seventy cavalry. Nicolson had been
notified of their departure by the British Consul at
Casablanca and had gone to Torres demanding that the move-
ment be halted. Torres complied and Chadwick was just about
to send out the Marietta to stop the ships at sea when they
steamed into the harbor. "'"'^
One of Raisuli's first demands had been that the
government troops in the Tangier area be removed to Fez.
This had been done, but the new influx of soldiers could
threaten the negotiations by destroying Raisuli's belief in
the good faith of the Moroccan government. Torres sent a
message to Casablanca ordering a halt to the sending of more
troops, two hundred of which were rumored to be embarking.
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The Moorish soldiers already landed were, in Chadwick's
words, "a mere rabble in appearance." Walter B. Harris of
"^he Times was even more caustic in his description, calling
them "evil-looking, filthy specimens of the worst type of
Moorish soldiers, whose reputation during the time they have
been camping uselessly at Casablanca has been of the worst ."
Chadwick felt their arrival might cause a serious
complication in the negotiations, while Nicolson saw the
situation as having been needlessly aggravated. The ques-
tion then arose as to why the troops had been sent. At first
Nicolson thought orders to send the men had been drafted by
the Fez government under the supposition that the captives
would have been released by this time. Soon, however, more
significant motivations were being suggested. Harris re-
ported in The Times that a high Moorish official in Tangier
had told him that the French Legation in Fez had "urged and
practically insisted upon this course" to the Sultan and
Grand Vizier, "in order to lessen the chance of the disem-
12
barkation of American and British marines."
Both Nicolson and Gummere agreed that French diplo-
macy was behind the landing. Nicolson in a confidential des-
patch told the Foreign Office that inopportune pressure by
the French had evidently caused Fez to move in the troops.
In Washington Hay called in Jules Jusserand, the French Am-
bassador, and asked him why this army of Moroccan "tatterde-
malions" had been sent to Tangier. Jusserand professed
ignorance of the entire matter.
Despite the presence of the soldiers some progress
in negotiations was being made. Raisuli had apparently de-
cided to ignore the Moroccan landing and accepted the terms
offered for the ransom part of the settlement. All of the
brigand's other demands had been more or less acceded to, ex
cept for the great power guarantees, and, probably realizing
that he was never going to get these, he had decided to set-
tle.
Raisuli demanded that the money, as well as the men
being freed by the Moroccan government, be brought to his
village at Terdants where the exchange would take place.
Gummere and Nicolson strongly objected to this plan, feeling
that Raisuli would simply take the ransom and the freed
prisoners without releasing Perdicaris and Varley. Torres
sent a message to the brigand on the 17th proposing the ex-
change take place at a neutral village six hours, or eight-
een miles from Tangier. Zellal, the chief of the tribe
living in the area — the Beni Msur — was friendly to
Raisuli, and his land would probably be acceptable as an ex-
change point. Raisuli agreed, but hopes for a quick settle-
ment were dashed when Zellal, fearing repercussions, refused
14
to have anything to do with the exchange.
This new obstacle, imposed at such a promising time
infuriated Gummere. He sharply told Torres that he and the
American government "were very much dissatisfied with the
manner of negotiations," and it was ridiculous that Morocco
"had no authority over a petty chief." Gummere informed
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Torres he would be held responsible for every hour's delay.
Torres, although much bewildered by this turn of events, pro-
mised to send out a negotiator and attempt to persuade Zellal
to change his mind."'-^
Meanwhile, the Battleship Squadron had left the
Tagus on the 18th and steamed south for Gibraltar. Early
next morning, a Sunday, the four battleships were sighted
from the mainmast of the Prince of Wales as they sailed close
by Tangier heading east towards the Straits. Barker took the
opportunity as he passed to use his wireless to inform
Chadwick on the Brooklyn and Jewell on the Olympia of his
presence. Chadwick told Barker that Raisuli could be ex-
pected to release the captives in a few days; however, this
was before Chadwick had heard of Zellal 's refusal.
On reaching Gibraltar Barker found the cruiser
Clevel and from Jewell's squadron in the harbor coaling.
After a series of salutes, official visits were exchanged,
and stores which had been awaiting the arrival of the battle-
ships were taken on board. On the evening of the 21st
Barker and his captains dined with the Governor of Gibraltar,
Field Marshal Sir George White, the hero of the seige of
Ladysmith. Barker found most informed opinion on the Rock
entertained grave fears for the captives, feeling that they
would "not be released as soon as expected." Nevertheless,
Barker decided that, unless orders to the contrary arrived,
he would leave Gibraltar on the morning of Wednesday, June 22nd
No orders came from Washington. There were more
than enough warships crowded into the small harbor of Tangier
to deal with any possible emergency, and the battleships
could return if needed. The Roosevelt administration had
other uses for battleships at the eastern end of the
Mediterr ane an
.
The most critical point in the Perdicaris affair was
reached on the 21st. Gummere sent to Washington that after-
noon his most gravely worded despatch. He was convinved, he
stated, that Moroccan authorities were delaying the release
of Perdicaris and Varley. Gummere accused them of "double
dealing and treachery," and felt the United States was being
put in an undignified and humiliating position. If Zellal
refused to let the exchange take pi ace Gummere said he wanted
authority to present an ultimatum to the Moroccan government.
Specifically he advised the landing of marines and the
seizure of the Custom House. Gummere ended his despatch by
saying that Rear Admiral Chadwick agreed, and "cables to
same effect . "''"^
But Chadwick did not agree, and it was perhaps this
lack of agreement which prevented Gummere 's threat from being
carried out. On the morning of the 21st Commander Dorn on
the Castine w^as notified by the watch that a signal from
Chadwick had been received ordering him to immediately come
aboard the Brooklyn . When he arrived Dorn found Chadwick and
the other captains of the two squadrons gathered in the
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wardroom. The Admiral then showed them the text of a tele-
gram in cypher which he said he was going to send to
V7ashington.
The telegram, according to Dorn, informed the
Roosevelt administration that Chadwick felt the "negotiation
/were/ being thwarted by the authorities," and that he,
Chadwick, considered "it advisable to seize the Custom House
as /an/ indemnity for every day's delay in /the/ delivery of
the captives." He then told Dorn that he was to command the
battalion of bluejackets and marines which would land. A
happy Dorn hurried ashore "to lay out the principal points
to be seized," and soon established "a clear enough idea of
the surroundings" in which he and his landing force would
have to operate. To be chosen to lead this expedition was a
feather in Dorn's cap, and if carried out successfully it
20would be a great advantage to his career.
When Dorn came back on board the Castine in the lat
afternoon he was surprised to receive a signal from the
Brooklyn ordering his gunboat to Gibraltar the following day
for stores. Early the next morning a confused and dis-
appointed Dorn went over to see Chadv/ick. When asked about
the drastic change in plans Chadwick told Dorn he "had not
sent the /Tirst/ despatch but another /onej , much milder" in
its assessment of the situation. Chadwick said that after
dismissing the meeting he had taken a short mid-afternoon
21
nap, and on awakening decided to change his mind.
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Chadwick's decision was fortunate. It is quite
probable that if he had sent the telegram to Washington im-
mediately after speaking to Dorn he would have been locked
into a course of action, and the seizure of the Custom House
could have taken place on the 22nd — the same day word came
that Zellal had agreed to the use of his village as an ex-
change point. Chadwick had been given a great deal of leeway
by Roosevelt and Hay, and his judgement was respected by both
men. Gummere, on the other hand, v;as an unknown quantity,
and his recommendation to use force without being backed up
by Chadwick simply did not carry enough weight. However, if
Chadwick's first assessment had been sent it probably would
have been accepted by the President, resulting in a landing
at Tangier and opening up an entirely new situation.
Half a world away, at the very same hour that
Chadwick told Dorn of his intention to seize the Custom House,
the Republicans opened their Convention in Chicago. The
nomination of Theodore Roosevelt by the party to be their
standard bearer in the election of 1904 was a foregone con-
clusion. As the Republican faithful gathered in the windy
city on the weekend of June 19th they came for a coronation,
a coronation to the "undisputed inevitably" of Theodore
22Roosevelt
.
Some in the party's leadership did not look kindly
upon the President. He was his own man and, travelling in
his own diirection, so unlike the more amenable McKinley.
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Hov^ever, just four months prior to the Convention Mark Hanna,
the "Kingmaker," had died, and this had left no one to rally
around in opposition to Roosevelt. So the nomination was in
the President's pocket, and he bestrode the Republican Party
like a latter-day Gulliver. The Republican delegates were
left, reported The Times (London), "idly watching the lake
from piazzas, and wondering why they came to Chicago. "^^
On Tuesday, June 21st, the Convention opened. The
Chicago weather seemed only half-hearted in its approval of
the affair, and there was a "suggestion of rain in the air
and the sun had a struggle with clouds banked up over the
lake." The site for the Convention was Chicago's Coliseum.
From a distance it looked like a great medieval fortress
somehow mysteriousJy transported to the middle of this raw
and bustling American city. Stone towers and castellated
walls decorated the outside while drawbridges led into its
24dim and humid interior.
Reporters found few of the customary hoard of ven-
dors of badges and souvenirs who usually inundated the streets
on such occasions. Those who had come were not doing well.
"All the merchants are waiting for St. Louis (site of the
Democratic Convention)," said one vendor, "we'll make up for
it in St. Louis." For sellers of campaign buttons and other
such paraphernalia two or three candidates for the nomination
were needed in order to show a profit. One of the more popu-
lar souvenirs being sold on the streets was an inch square
biography of the President titled The Candidate . As they
hawked the diminutive volume the vendors would call out:
"Smallest life of the greatest man. Put Roosevelt in your
vest pocket ."
Inside, the Coliseum was a great rectangular steel
girderedhall capable of seating nine thousand people. A
single gallery ran around the periphery of the hall, and
hanging from it was a continuous strip of red, white and
blue bunting, adorned at intervals with pictures of
Roosevelt festooned with small American flags. From a tem-
porary stand the First Regiment Band of Pullman, Illinois,
crashed out patriotic marches. At one end of the hall was
strung a large flag decorated with an American eagle and the
Great Seal of the United States. Above it a placard proudly
stated: "Under this banner both Harrison and McKinley were
twice nominated." Near the roof a great black banner, in-
scribed in gold, read: "Home Market Club, Boston. American
2
wages for American workmen. Protection for American Homes."
Political etiquette of the period called for the
President to stay away from the Convention and be officially
informed of his selection later. This did not much hamper
Roosevelt, for in the basement of the Coliseum the chief of
the White House telegraphic force had set up a direct wire
to the President's Office Building in Washington. The
President was ensconced in his apartment in the southeast
corner of this structure, and could therefore "feel the pulse
of the convention as it proceeds, in addition to learning of
the more important transactions in committee rooms and
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hotels as they are completed
- "Convention Dull And Delegates Wish To Go Home ,
"
read the front page headline in The Sun (New York) after the
Convention's first day. There were great patches of empty
seats said the Sun, and applause at the first mention of
Roosevelt's name was formal and brief. The greatest cheer
came when a large painting of Mark Hanna was unveiled. When
the same was done for a smaller portrait of the President the
reaction, declared The World (New York), fell flat.^^
The image being presented over the telegraph must
have been an appalling one for Roosevelt. Although the
nomination was assured, the election was not, and it was ob-
vious that something had to be done to put a bit of life into
the delegates and gear them up for the coming campaign. The
arrival of Gummere's alarming despatch gave Roosevelt his
opportunity
.
The next day of the Convention, the 22nd, featured
two of the Republican Party's biggest stalwarts. First came
a fighting speech by "Uncle Joe" Cannon, Speaker of the House
and the Convention Chairman. After some intervening politi-
cal addresses Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts ap-
proached the speaker's lecturn. "Tall and slender, dressed
all in black," and looking like the statesman and scholar he
was, Lodge began reading the Republican platform "sprinkled
with words that had the broad 'A's' and twang of Yankee land."
One of the planks in the platform was a vigorous call for the
protection of American citizens in foreign lands, and it
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brought a loud cheer from the hall.^^ A perfect background
for what was to follow.
When Lodge finished he moved that the platform be
adopted. Cannon put the question to the delegates, "and
after a rousing vote in the affirmative, declared the report
unanimously adopted." It was now three in the afternoon and
the proceedings were just about to be adjourned for the day
when Cannon moved to the lecturn and began reading aloud
from a copy of a telegram Hay had just sent to Gummere. This
government, said Cannon as he finished reading it, wants
30
"Perdicaris alive, or Raisuli dead."
The announcement was greeted with wild cries and
cheering, the delegates rising to their feet, clapping and
stamping with loud abandon. This act of Cannon's closed the
Convention's second day, and the delegates surged out into
Chicago's streets in a fighting mood. All that evening the
delegates talked about the telegram. The platform and the
speakers of the day had been forgotten, and only the
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President and Hay stood at the center of attention.
"It was good, hot stuff, and echoed my sentiments,"
said Congressman John W. Dwight of New York. "The people
want an administration that will stand by its citizens, even
if it takes a fleet to do it." Senator Depew called the
message magnificent, and Representative Sereno E. Payne,
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, felt that
there was "no use fooling around with those people any
longer .
"
j2
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One delegate, W. A. Elstun of Moline, Kansas, when .
approached by a reporter and asked if he liked the telegram
replied: "Bet your bottom dollar I like it. Roosevelt is
behind that cable message to that fine old body-snatcher
Raisuli. Out in Kansas we believe in keeping the peace but
in fighting against wrong." A member of the national com-
mittee later commented that the Convention would go down in
history as the "catch him dead or catch him alive conven-
33tion. "-^-^
Reaction in the nation's press was predictably split
along party lines, for the telegram was quickly recognized as
primarily a domestic political ploy. The Daily True American
(Trenton) called the message boastful, and "evidently coined
to fit a party gathering." It felt that the State
Department "should have been above playing to the galleries
in a partisan convention." The World (New York) humorously
headlined the story: "Convention Yells At Cry For BL-O-O-D!"
It factiously pictured the delegates screaming "Fee, Fi , Fo
,
Fum, give me the blood of a Mussulman." The World also com-
posed its own series of telegrams from famous figures in a
parody of Kay's message. One went to the Mayor of
Indianapolis from Hay and read: "Produce the miscreant who
stole Senator Beveridge ' s railroad passes. Use an axe on
him. Put the mutilated remains in a cask and let me have
1.34them.
"
The Springfield Republican saw the telegram as more
a political expedient than a valid diplomatic initiative.
It reminded the newspaper of the fiery queen in Alice in
Wonderland. " • Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead' — doesn't
it thrill you? Mr. Perdicaris might not approve of such
sentiments regarding his charming host and friend, but then,
Mr. Perdicaris doesn't understand the exigencies of our
politics. "^^
Historians have tended to emphasize the telegram as
a strictly domestic political move with little or no relation
to events in Tangier. Luella Hall, for example, goes so far
as to write that Perdicaris and Varley had already been re-
leased before the despatch reached Tangier. In the part of
the telegram not read to the Convention, Hay ordered Gummere'
not to "arrange for the landing of marines or seizing /_the_/
Custom House" without specific instructions from the State
Department. This has often been cited as a proof of the
telegram's lack of serious intent. Also, Hay's slightly
superior entry in his diary saying how curious was the way
"a concise impropriety hits the public," has added to the
36
opera bouf f
e
aura surrounding the incident.
Yet, if the despatch was an obvious domestic politi-
cal response, it also had a very serious side. Roosevelt
and Hay were unaware that the most recent roadblock to the
release had been overcome — word only reached Washington on
the evening of the 22nd, four hours after the telegram had
been read in Chicago. In addition Perdicaris and Varley
were not freed until the 24th, and until the exchange was
completed no one in Washington or Tangier knew if Raisuli
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would go through with it. The brigand had increased his de-
mands in the past and could easily do so again. The still
serious nature of the situation in Morocco can be understood
when one remembers that Hay's famous message could have been
even more momentous. Except for Chadwick's afternoon nap,
the 22nd might have seen American bluejackets swarming over
Tangier, negotiations probably ended, and an even more riot-
ous response at the Convention.
On the same day as Hay's telegram to Gummere, Zellal
told Torres' negotiator that he would allow his village to be
used for the exchange, but only on receipt of a written prom-
ise by Torres that no harm would come to him or his people.
This promise was duly forwarded, and a courier sent to
Raisuli telling him to start out for Zellal 's village early
next morning. Gummere felt prospects for the captive's re-
lease rather more promising now than a few days ago, but he
still was not completely confident — everything depended
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upon the whim of Raisuli.
The younger Wazan brother, Muley Ahmed, took the
ransom money out from Tangier in the early morning hours of
the 23rd, and headed for Zellal 's village. With him went
the forty-two Moorish prisoners who were to be freed to
Raisuli, as well as some forty armed mounted guards. The
courier to Raisuli had for some unknown reason been delayed
on the road and did not deliver the letter setting up the
exchange until late on the 23rd. Because of this Raisuli and
his captives did not start out until the morning of Friday,
the 24th. This was just as well for the younger Wazan's
party also encountered problems in getting to the village.
It was still dark on Friday morning when Raisuli
left Terdants and headed down the mountains with his pris-
oners. Perdicaris was understandably elated that his six
weeks of detention was coming to an end. The sun rose as
they left the village and the recollection of that last sun-
rise at Terdants remained etched in Ion's memory. He would
later remember the white swirling mist which remained around
the base of the mountains, while the "peaks and turrets were
now flecked v/ith crimson or lilac, now shaded with purple,
by some passing cloud." On his left rode Muley Ali in a
spotless white silk bournous , and on his right Raisuli riding
a grey charger. The brigand was in an expansive mood at his
success and engaged Perdicaris in long rambling conversa-
tions. At one point when complimenting Ion on his horseman-
ship he told him t?iat if the Sultan "indulged in fewer
European fads, and had a little more grip, and would use the
spur more freely, he would have a better seat in the
saddle . ""^^
As the sun continued to rise Perdicaris could see
both the Mediterranean and Atlantic, as well as the Spanish
mainland. Once Raisuli pointed to a white fleck on the
African coast and said it was Tangier. At noon they found
themselves at Zellal's village, a "semi-fortified place,
hanging on to the steep hillside," half castle, half village.
Raisuli sent out scouts to make sure that the government had
not laid an ambush for him. Entering the village they found
it empty of government representatives, for Muley Ahmed, held
back by his prisoners, had not yet arrived. They were quite
weak because of their long imprisonment and, as they had to
walk, unable to keep up the pace.'^"'-
Soon, however, Muley Ahmed's party arrived and the
prisoners and ransom were exchanged. Raisuli was given $20,
000 in Spanish silver dollars and $50,000 in certified checks
drawn on the Comtoir d'Sscompte, the French bank in Tangier.
Perdicaris assured Raisuli the checks were valid and the
brigand accepted Ion's word. Fortunately Raisuli made no
mention of the great power guarantees. Wlien Ion took leave
of Raisuli the bandit told him that he had now come to look
upon him as a friend, and promised that if ever Perdicaris
42
ran into trouble his men would hasten to his relief.
Ion made the trip to Tangier in a litter that had
been especially provided for him, but as he came near the
town he mounted a horse and rode to his home. It was early
Saturday morning, just past midnight, when he reached El
Minzah. Chadwick and Gummere were there to meet him, as
v/ell as his wife and family. The armed escort rode into the
courtyard first and raggedly presented arms as Perdicaris
and Varley entered through the gateway. As soon as the men
dismounted both v/ere surrounded by their friends, "shaking
hands and talking with them." Afterwards, in his house. Ion
talked for a while recounting his adventures; and then, as
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Chadwick wrote to Hay, "Perdicaris was sent to bed, the rest
took a little supper, and the incident closed. ""^^
Reaction in the United States to the release of the
captives generally gave full praise to Roosevelt's and Hay's
diplomacy. The Sun (New York) headed its editorial on the
release, "Flag Follows The Citizen." To The Sun the large
naval demonstration was the key to the release. Although
its size was criticized in some quarters as inordinate, the
newspaper felt that this "is what ships are for." The
President's action was a practical success, and an "impres-
sive illustration of a fixed national purpose with regard to
all who have the right to claim the protection of the
American flag." The New York Tribune said of the release
that long ago America's rule with respect to the Barbary
pirates had been, "millions for defense, but not one cent
for tribute." It was a good rule, and "the sending of war-
ships to Tangier and the demand for 'Perdicaris alive or
Raisuli dead' were simply a worthy twentieth century revival,
or, rather maintenance, of the same spirit." The London
correspondent of the Tribune reported great relief in of-
ficial circles in Great Britain over the settlement of the
affair, and Roosevelt was receiving "full credit for his
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resolute and determined action."
Looking over his shoulder as his battleships steamed
into the Mediterranean, Rear Admiral Barker was even more
appreciative of the settlement. "It was fortunate for all
of us," he said, "including the Government and people of the
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United States" that Raisuli gave Perdicaris up. If the bri-
gand had kept him a prisoner, "it would have cost a pretty
penny to reach him with a force of sailors and marines. "^^
Curiously, the telegram had nothing to do with the
exchange. The brigand would certainly not have been aware
of its existence until long after the release had taken place.
He had already decided to exchange the captives some days be-
fore; however, in all fairness, no one outside of Terdants
knew this for sure. Roosevelt's telegram was, although out-
wardly directed at Raisuli, really meant for the Moroccan
government. At this stage the only action the United States
could take, or would want to take, was a seizure of Tangier.
The port could then be used as a pawn to put pressure on
Morocco to deal with Raisuli. It would indeed "have cost a
pretty penny" to track the brigand down, and with the recent
experience of the Philippine insurrection in mind, Roosevelt
would have had little desire to engage American power in an
expedition to the Atlas Mountains.
There was one small dark cloud on the horizon for
Roosevelt in the midst of his small coup, and it had to do
with Perdicaris' citizenship — or, to be more precise, the
lack of it. It had been made frighteningly clear to the
President and Hay during the affair that Perdicaris just
might not be an American citizen. If this information was
to prove correct and become public, the resulting laughter
could put a large dent in any election victory Roosevelt
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hoped for in November.
The first intimation that something was amiss came
at the beginning of June when Hay received a letter from a
Mr. A. H. Slocomb of Fayetteville
, North Carolina. Mr,
Slocomb raised certain questions concerning the citizenship
of Perdicaris, and on June 5th the State Department asked the
United States Minister in Athens, John B. Jackson, to in-
vestigate Slocomb' s allegations. Jackson in a confidential
despatch on the 7th informed Hay that an lonnas Perdicaris
had been naturalized a Greek citizen on March 19, 1862. This
individual, wrote Jackson, was described in the records as
"an artist, unmarried, aged 20." The Minister was "unable to
—
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ascertain anything in regard to /his othe_r/ antecedents."
On the 10th Jackson cabled Hay that although he could
not find any positive proof that both men were the same per-
son, he felt it highly probable that they were. Jackson said
that while he was in the navy a warship he was aboard had
pulled into Tangier in 1883, and he remembered that Perdicaris
"was frequently spoken of in a contemptous /sic/ manner as a
•Greek who had run away from New Jersey with another man's
wife.'" At the time Jackson had not thought of Perdicaris as
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an American citizen.
By now Roosevelt and Hay had no choice but to con-
tinue playing out the game, having already made the commit-
ment to intervention, and having no real proof that both
Perdicaris' were the same individual. They kept their
counsel until after the release. On June 28th Hay cabled
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Gummere ordering him to sound out Perdicaris about the
validity of the allegations. Gummere quickly contacted Ion,
then in Paris, and was informed by him on July 18th that the
charges were true. On July 24th Gummere forwarded this em-
barrassing confession to Washington."^®
The Roosevelt administration's reaction was to bury
the problem. Hay called it a bad business. He felt that we
"must keep it assiduously confidential for the present." So
successfully was the damning information hidden, including,
as Hay wrote, "Paregoric /~s7" confession, that it did not
surface until twenty-nine years later. In 1905 the adminis-
tration introduced a bill, probably inspired by the
Perdicaris problem, which when passed in 1907 covered the
questions raised by Ion's ambiguous citizenship. He was
issued a passport as an American citizen and was recognized
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and registered abroad as such.
The players in the drama soon went their separate
ways. Perdicaris, old now, and most of his desire to remain
living in Morocco gone, settled in Chiselhurst, England. He
died there some twenty years later at the age of eighty-five.
Gummere later served as the second-ranking member of the
American delegation at the Algeciras Conference, and was
made the first United States Minister to Morocco when the
government raised the status of American representation to
the Sultanate. He retired in 1909 to the life of a country
gentleman in Wimbledon, England, and died in 1920. Sir
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Arthur Nicolson went on to greater service in the Foreign
Office, eventually becoming Under Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, and Lord Grey's right hand man in the early days of
World War I. For their services the two Wazan brothers each
received an appropriate gift from Roosevelt — Winchester
lever-action repeating rifles with a suitable engraved in-
scription.
Raisuli's later career was even more adventurous.
He became the most important power in the Tangier area as a
result of the kidnapping, acquiring such prestigious titles
as, "The Sultan of the Mountains," and "The Eagle of Zinat."
His reputation became legendary among Moroccans and many
natives firmly believed that only a gold pistol ball cast in
the holy city of Mecca could kill him. He even acquired a
fleet of small ships to prey on coastal traffic.^"''
In 1906 Abd el Aziz tried to depose Raisuli from his
position, but the wiley brigand pulled an old trick from his
pocket and kidnapped the Sultan's chief general, Kaid
Maclean, and quickly checkmated the attempt. In the years
that followed Raisuli sometimes fought the Spanish, some-
times took their subsidies, but always maintained his inde-
pendence. Strangly this independence was ended not by
foreigners, but by a fellow Moor. Abd el Krim's native re-
bellion achieved a great deal of success against both the
Spanish and the French in the early 1920' s, but a jealous
Raisuli refused to recognize him as the one leader of the
Riffian state and Krim was forced to march against him.
Raisuli made a last stand in his fortress palace at
Tazrat in January, 1925. Captured after a fierce battle, the
old brigand, "/i/wollen with dropsy and constantly in pain,"
was carried away to confinement in a litter. When the
American correspondent Vincent Sheean talked to him, Raisuli
said he wanted to die. "I have asked to die. I do not
want," he said, "to be the prisoner of dogs and sons of
dogs." He declared that he would never "be a prisoner and a
slave to dogs in a place where Raisuli reigned as a lord.
They have taken my horse and saddle. Let them take the rest.
The Prophet will receive me in Heaven." By April he was
dead, within a few months of his old captive Perdicaris,
But what of the long range diplomatic impact of the
Perdicaris affair? The incident gave France the chance to
introduce the armed force which was the necessary first step
in the eventual French control of the Sultanate . The excuse
would have undoubtedly been found even if the kidnapping had
never taken pi ace — the Perdicaris incident simply made it
convenient- On June 28th the Foreign Office was informed by
the British Legation Secretary in Tangier that Tailandier
had confidentially informed him that France had reached
agreement with Morocco on "a police force for Tangier with
French and Algerian advisors." By the end of July a French
naval force arrived composed of the armored cruiser Kleber ,
and the smaller cruiser Galilee . They were, Gummere told
the State Department, to remain at Tangier for some time.
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The significance of the affair for the United States
lay not in its relationship vis-a-vis Morocco, but in what it
showed about the potentialities of Roosevelt's naval diplo-
macy. It was the naval power which the President had con-
centrated in Moroccan waters which was important. In itself
the kidnapping of an American would not have caused the re-
action it did in the United States, and especially in Europe,
if the fleet had not been involved. Americans living and
travelling abroad, including a number of missionaries, had
been kidnapped or killed before v;ith much less fuss. But in
1904 the coincidence of an aggressive President and a new
naval policy had combined to give the Perdicaris affair a
meaning far beyond the rescue of a lone citizen with a
quaint najne, and of dubious national heritage.
American involvement might have gone much further,
but Chadwick's last minute decision not to land troops pre-
vented this. If they had landed it is probable that they
would have been there a long time. Chadwick could hardly
have gotten away with simply seizing the Custom House, and
the taking of the entire port would have in all probability
followed -- plans for such a contingency were already in the
works
.
The central government in Fez, its authority al-
ready weakened by rebellion and anarchy, could not have
given any more to Raisuli without jeopardizing its own
existence. Morocco would also have found it extrem.ely
diffi-
cult. If not impossible, to use force. The brigand
was well
an
•n
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protected in his mountain eyrie, and in addition held
Perdicaris and Varley as valuable trumps. Landing Americ
marines and bluejackets in Tangier to put further pressure
on the Sultan would have had little effect on the situatio
as the Moroccan government did not control events — Raisuli
did; and if he had decided to bide his time all the blus-
tering by the United States and all the promises from Fez
would have meant little. The best that could be hoped for
would have been a stalemate, with the negotiations suspended
for the time being and Perdicaris and Varley still held
captive
.
Once in, could the United States have gotten out,
or, would Roosevelt have wanted to? The British would have
certainly landed forces to protect their special interests
in the port, and Spanish and French naval units most as-
suredly would have been sent. In one way the British might
have been perfectly happy to have the Americans in Tangier.
This was the period of the Anglo-American rapprochement, and
having the United States there, even permanently, would have
been much more acceptable than France or Spain controlling
this key port.
But these are only speculations. What was estab-
lished by the Perdicaris affair was the introduction of
American sea power to Europe; not just as touring naval
units, but as a force which had been used in a vigorous and
practical way, and which would be used again. At the other
end of the Mediterranean lay another Sultanate, with more
American interests and citizenc, 4-^a izens to be protected, and four of
Roosevelt's battleships were steaming toward it.
CHAPTER VII
"A BATTLESHIP TO PLAY WITH"
The length of the Perdicaris affair seriously dis-
rupted the planned itinerary of the three squadrons, but none
more so than Chadwick's. The Navy Department and he decided
that because of the time lost the South Atlantic Squadron
should not proceed into the Mediterranean, but immediately
head south along the African coast. Chadwick requested that
the Brooklyn be allowed to go to Genoa, Italy, for a brief
visit, and join the rest of the squadron later. This per-
mission was granted and the Brooklyn left Gibraltar on June
29th, while the other warships left for the Canary Islands
on the 30th. It was here that Chadwick rejoined them, and
on July I5th the reconstituted squadron steamed south for
1Sierra Leone.
Meanwhile, Jewell's European Squadron left Tangier
on the 29th for Gibraltar and remained there until July 5th.
Jewell had intended to follow Barker's squadron to Greece,
but the Navy Department ordered him to take on stores in
Gibraltar and await the arrival of the battleship Illinois
and the auxiliary cruiser Mayflower . Roosevelt's desire
"that the fleet be made as imposing as possible," as well as
the Perdicaris incident had combined to hurry repairs on the
two battleships, Missouri and Illinoi s, which Barker had
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lost earlier. Both had left the United States in mid-June.
The Missouri crossed the Atlantic at an average speed of al-
most fourteen knots — an amazing performance for a battle-
ship in this period — and arrived at Gibraltar on June 23rd.
Here Captain Cowles found that the Battleship Squadron had
already left for Greece and that events in Morocco were
rapidly drawing to a satisfactory conclusion, so after taking
on coal and stores he quickly hurried after Barker. The
Illinois was late in arriving at Gibraltar, and because of
this Jewell decided it would not be feasible for him to take
his ships to Greece; accordingly he cabled the Navy
Department and Barker that he would join with the Battleship
Squadron at its next port of call, Trieste.
It took Barker seven days to steam through the
Mediterranean to Greece, and on the morning of June 30th his
four battleships and the collier Abarenda sailed into
Phaleron Bay at Piraeus. This visit to Greece had not been
a part of the original plan for the Mediterranean cruise.
When Moody wrote Hay on February 20th, asking that the State
Department prepare the way for the fleet, no mention was
made of a stop at Athens. The farthest east the fleet was
to go v.'as Trieste in the Adriatic. At the time Hay made no
effort to add Greece to the itinerary, and indeed he went so
far as to warn United States legations in Europe that re-
quests for the fleet to visit would be inconvenient and em-
barrassing.
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Sometime between the end of February and the be-
ginning of May a decision xvas made in Washington to add
Athens to the cruise. Unlike the visits to the other ports
there exists no record of diplomatic preparations for the
Greek sojourn. The arrangements were in all probability
discussed and decided upon during the month of April when
the American Minister to Greece, John B. Jackson, returned
from Athens and held conversations with Hay in Washington."^
Why this need for a visit to Greece, and why the
apparent necessity for secret consultations in laying the
groundwork for the visit? The reason was to be found in
Turkey. In order to settle outstanding problems with the
Ottoman Empire the Roosevelt administration had elected to
use the fleet in order to put diplomatic pressure on the
Sultan. Chief among these problems was the ambiguous status
of American-run missionary schools and institutions in the
Empire. The administration was under increasing pressure
from missionary societies to settle this question, and the
failure of a naval demonstration to obtain results in 1903
only made Roosevelt's resolve to gain a satisfactory settle-
ment stronger. A confidential letter from Hay to the United
States Minister in Constantinople, John G. A. Leishman, on
May 24th made crystal clear the primary reason behind the
Greek stopover. Hay bluntly informed Leishman that a large
fleet would be cruising near Turkey in about a month, and
that Leishman "ought to be able to make some judicious use"
of this concentration of warships in his negotiations with
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the Turkish government.
The Roosevelt administration was being very careful
in its use of battleship diplomacy. Leishman was ordered by
Hay not to commit the fleet to any direct action. The ap-
pearance of the warships off the Turkish coast was to take
the form of an implied threat. The Straits lay only twenty-
four hours away from Piraeus — as did the great port of
Smyrna — and Turkish authorities could hardly fail to draw
the obvious conclusion
.
Reports of a coming clash with Turkey began to ap-
pear with increasing regularity in the nation's press during
the month of June. The New York Times openly speculated
that after the Perdicaris affair had been satisfactorily
settled the fleet would sail on to Turkey. The Public Ledger
of Philadelphia in an editorial on June 22nd wrote that
/^erica's relationship with the Turkish Sultan "at times
grows unbearable," It called for the fleet to be used
against Abdul Hamid, saying its appearance in Turkish waters
would show the displeasure and dissatisfaction of the
American government, and "might be fruitful of good results."
As early as June 3rd the New York World reported
that the "strenuous Roosevelt hand will fall next upon
Turkey," with the likely bombardment of Smyrna or Beirut if
the Sultan did not come to terms. By the 26th the World was
headlining: "Turkish Sultan's Turn Comes Next." With the
conclusion of our problems with the Sultan of Morocco, it
warned, our warships will go east. "Abdul Hamid owes us a
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big bill long overdue," and "Yankee guns are expected to in-
spire the Turk with a desire to settle."®
Just as the appearance of American warships in
Morocco caused a vigorous response from Spain and France,
the two powers with the greatest interest in the area, so
the possibility that these same warships would soon be
heading for Turkey occasioned a similar reaction from another
European power.
Russia was engaged in a life and death struggle in
the Far East, but the imminent movement of a large American
fleet toward Turkey and the vitally strategic Straits area
brought forth a warning from the Czar's government. The
approach was an unofficial one. Count Cassini, the Russian
Ambassador to the United States, met with Hay on June 11th
and attempted to sound him out on reports that the Roosevelt
administration was about to send warships into Turkish
waters. Hay admitted the reports were true, and Cassini
then unofficially informed him that this act would be offen-
sive to Russia and if carried out would undoubtedly bring a
formal and vigorous protest. It was reported that Cassini
also told Hay that while Russia would not object to one or
two warships, the Czar's government would certainly challange
9
the arrival of a fleet of battleships.
The battleships v/ere sent and Russia, beset by war,
could do nothing except grumble. For Abdul Hamid the pres-
ence of a fleet in Phaleron Bay was a display of naval power
which he and his government could not afford to ignore. How
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long did they intend to stay? Where would they go next?
And how far was Roosevelt prepared to go in using them? All
were unanswered questions which hung over the Topkapi Palace,
where the Sultan and his ministers pondered on how they would
deal with these barbarians from the Yenghi Dunia (New World).
It was just a little over one hundred years before
that the first official contact between the Ottoman Empire
and America had occurred and it too had involved the navy.
Before the United States went to war with the Barbary powers
it, like many of the nations of Europe, had paid tribute for
a number of years to these pirate states. In 1801 the
corvette George Washington under the command of Captain
William Bainbridge sailed into the harbor of Algiers with
that year's tribute installment. After the money had been
turned over the Dey of Algiers informed Bainbridge that he
was to take his special ambassador to Constantinople under
the flag of Algiers. Bainbridge at first refused, but as
his warship lay helpless under the guns of the Dey ' s harbor
forts he was finally obliged to give in."^^
Soon the George Washington was playing host to the
ambassador and his wife. Also crowded on board the small
corvette was the rest of the ambassador's suite, consisting
of one hundred men, one hundred Negro female slaves, four
horses, twenty-five cattle, four lions, four tigers, four
antelopes, and four parrots. The voyage was an unpleasant
one, and the frustrated Bainbridge took particular delight
in tacking his corvette wildly as soon as the Moslems began
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their prayers, forcing them "to swing round like pinwheels"
as they tried to continue facing Mecca.
When the George Washington arrived at Constantinople
Bainbridge was told he was lying when he informed Turkish
officials which nation he came from. They knew of no such
country. It was only when Bainbridge explained that he came
from "a new world discovered by the Italians and belonging
to the English" that he was believed. In 1904 things were
quite different. The Turk now knew full well where and what
America was, and the humiliating circumstances of that first
meeting promised not to be repeated under President Theodore
Roosevelt
.
If an observer had looked out over the European con
tinent on New Year's day of the year 1500, his attention
would certainly have been drawn to what was happening in the
Balkans. Up this mountainous land mass in the last half
century had poured a new and dynamic threat to Europe. In
the eighth century the Franks had beaten back an earlier
Moslem tide, but this new invasion promised to be even more
formidable. The expansion of Turkish power received a tre-
mendous strategic and psychological victory when the armies
of Muhammed II took Constantinople in 1453, and in the years
that followed they marched steadily up the Balkans menacing
the very heartland of Europe.
Yet within a century this power was in decline and
by the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was steadily
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contracting under continuous European pressure. Only jeal-
ousy between the great powers over control of the Straits
and a vague protection offered by Great Britain allowed this
"sick man of Europe" to survive. Like its sister Sultanate
at the other end of the Mediterranean, Turkey in 1904 was a
colonial pie v/aiting to be divided.
Nothing could typify the chaotic condition of this
formally great state better than its current ruler and the
sad plight of its once proud navy. Abdul Hamid II was an
absolute despot in the fullest sense of the word. His em-
pire still stretched from the Adriatic to the Indian Ocean,
but it was fatally riven by exploding internal nationalisms.
He had come to the throne in 1875 and soon proved himself to
be the most reactionary of rulers. There had been a number
of attempts to rejuvenate the Empire in the nineteenth cen-
tury, but with the accession of Abdul Hamid these efforts
largely petered out, and Turkey slumped back into a state of
13lethargy and decay.
The Sultan was a living proof of Lord Acton's dic-
tum on the corrupting influence of absolute power. Like
Sultan Abd el Aziz of Morocco, Abdul Hamid had his little
ways. His physical appearance suggested a calculating and
sensual character. A great hooked nose dominated a face made
more striking by heavy lidded eyes, a dyed beard, and
brightly rouged cheeks. He personally ran the foreign af-
fairs of his nation through the Sublime Porte (named for the
gate of the Sultan's Palace where justice was administered).
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In this absolute monarchy it was his decision which counted —
often to the despair of the more moderate and forward-looking
officials of the Porte. "^"^
He suffered from insomnia, constantly smoked pungent
cigarettes and drank endless small cups of sweet Turkish
coffee. Great rages alternated by severe fits of melancholia
dominated his waking hours. Living under the constant threat
of being overthrov/n or assassinated he had developed into a
deeply fearful and suspicious monarch, and was quick to see
menace where there was none. He always carried a pistol with
him and once killed a young slave girl when he caught her
playing with another pistol which he had left on a table.
Visitors were often warned before an audience with Abdul
Hamid not to suddenly strike a match in his presence as he
had a tendency to confuse the sound made with that of a pis-
tol. The consequences were left to the visitor's imagina-
15tion
.
Yet he could be charming on occasion. He loved
collecting birds, and was often to be found puttering around
a carpentry shop which he had installed in the Palace. One
of his favorite occupations was having Sherlock Holmes
stories read to him. Lounging in his well-stocked harem,
playing with his angora cats, and idly talking with his
favorite wife, a fairhaired little Belgian, Abdul Hamid had
whiled away almost thirty years of rule watching his shrinking
16
empire slide toward its inevitable destruction.
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Between the 1840
-s and the 1870- s the growth of
Ottoman sea power had been one of the more concrete expres-
sions of Turkey's attempt to modernize her institutions in
the face of a resurgent Europe. Under the reign of Abdul
Hamid the navy, which at one time was the third strongest in
the world — after Great Britain and France — was allowed
to fall into decay and disrepair. The British engineers and
advisors who had formed the backbone of the navy were sent
home, and by the end of the century this rusting fleet of
ironclads had settled into the mud of the Golden Horn. Care-
takers grew flowers on the decks and raised families and
1 7goats m the ship's interiors.
Only once did Abdul Hamid' s warships (those still
afloat) dare emerge from the Straits. During a war with
Greece in 1897 some of the best were sent to the mouth of
the Dardanelles but not allowed to go further. Even if the
Sultan had wanted them to steam into the Bahri Safid (Aegean)
they probably would not have been able to get back — in
1
8
their decripit state the greatest enemy was the sea itself.
In demonstrating American naval power against Turkey
Theodore Roosevelt had little to fear. Turkey, with her
rusting, immobilized ironclads, could be counted upon not to
interfere with the exercise of Rooseveltian naval diplomacy.
Relations between the United States and Turkey in
the nineteenth century primarily revolved around that formi-
dable figure of Western civilization, the Christian missionary
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Indeed, according to the American diplomat Lloyd G. Griscom,
the words American and missionary in Turkey were practically
synonymous with each other. These mainly Protestant mis-
sionaries were looked upon with deep suspicion, and in re-
cent years a long and bloody series of revolts by some of the
Empire's numerous Christian minorities had made the figure of
the missionary even more suspect in Turkish eyes.
The first important outrage against American mis-
sionaries occurred in 1862 when two of them were murdered by
bandits. The speed with which the authorities tracked down
the killers won for the Grand Vizier of the day a gift of
two solid silver pistols from President Lincoln as a token
of American appreciation. In 1879, when the next American
missionary was murdered, the Turkish government seemed less
eager to bring the culprits to justice. An attack on some
missionaries in 1883 led to the first United States demand
for an indemnity. This demand was haughtily dismissed by the
Porte because "the laws of the Empire in no case permit
it.
• A number of other attacks against American citizens
and their property occurred in the early 1890' s. In April,
1895, the American cruisers San Francisco and Marblehoad
called at Turkish ports, including Beirut and Smyrna, in a
thinly veiled warning to the Sultan and the Porte that the
United States was able and willing to protect its interests
in the Empire
.
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Another serious occurrence took place in November,
1895, during the great Armenian revolt. At Harput and Maras
there was extensive damage to missionary property, prompting
the United States to demand an indemnity of $84,519. The
Porte denied any responsibility for the destruction and
categorically refused to pay the indemnity. The attacks
caused a tremendous stir in the United States, and Congress
reacted by passing the Cullom Resolution. This invited
President Cleveland to ask the great powers to "stay the
hand of /th£/ fanaticism and lawless violence" of the Turk,
and it pledged congressional support for the President "in
the most vigorous action he may take for the protection and
security of American citizens in Turkey, and to obtain re-
dress for injuries committed upon the persons or property of
22
such citizens .
"
Abdul Hamid was now sure that the Armenian rebel-
lion was a plot by Christian missionaries, and he reacted by
trying to end their influence. In America missionary pres-
sure on the State Department to intervene was intense.
Lloyd C. Griscom, serving in Constantinople as United States
charge d' affaires at this time, later v;rote that almost
every instruction to the American Minister from State in-
cluded an exhortation to "get that Armenian indemnity." The
Secretary of State, said Griscom, "used to quake when the
23head of a Bible Society walked in."
The American Minister in Constantinople in late
1897, James B. Angell (former president of the University of
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Michigan), asked for some warships "to rattle the Sultan's
windows." Any temptation for President McKinley to agree to
this course of action was sidetracked by the Spanish American
war and the need for United States warships in the Caribbean.
Even the firing on the gunboat Bancroft by Turkish shore bat-
teries as she entered Smyrna in December, 1897, did not pro-
duce a strong American response. However, the victorious
conclusion of the war and the appointment of John Hay as
Secretary of State promised the missionaries a more sympa-
thetic hearing in Washington — Hay was a cousin of George
Washburn, the president of Robert College in Constantinople
and the most powerful missionary presence in Turkey.^'*
In December, 1898, a new United States Minister
managed to secure from the Sultan an admission of Turkish
responsibility on the claims, and was led to believe that the
indemnity would be paid. But Turkish procrastination con-
tinued and it soon became evident that the Sultan did not
wish to pay the claim outright, but to do so "behind a
screen." Other powers had similar claims against Turkey and
if the government publicly gave in to the Americans it would
have to submit to the rest. The screen was to be provided
by the purchase of a protected cruiser from a private ship-
building company. Cramp of Philadelphia. The indemnity would
25
be secretly added to the final bill for the warship.
Even this face-saving device was now subjected to
the inevitable Turkish delaying tactics. In September, 1899,
the American Minister was informed during the course of an
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audience with the Sultan that the purchase was still being
studied by the Minister of Marine, but he was assured that
it would be favorably passed on. In January, 1900, the
Sultan again promised that the contract would be signed
within a few months.
The settlement of the indemnity and the purchase of
the cruiser was finally brought about through the efforts of
a twenty-eight year old American diplomat, Lloyd G. Griscom.
As the American legation in Constantinople was between minis-
ters for the better part of 1900 Griscom found himself the
senior United States representative, and he used his position
as only a younger man with a name to make in the diplomatic
service might be tempted to do. In April Hay had sent a
handwritten note to the legation which, among other things,
told Griscom that he might "make as unprincipled a settlement
as you please." For the brash young diplomat nothing more
was needed. He imposed upon a young friend of his who was
temporarily in charge of the Reuter's Telegraph Agency in
Constantinople to send out to the world a series of inflama-
tory reports, written by Griscom, about the growing troubles
between the United States and Turkey. These reports achieved
their purpose and caused a great deal of newspaper comment
in America and Europe. Rumors swept Constantinople that a
27
force of three American battleships was steaming for Turkey.
Griscom' s target was the Sultan who he knew was an
avid reader of foreign newspapers and periodicals. In the
Uriited States Hay refused to deny the rumors of a fleet
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movement, and, according to Griscom, "subtly encouraged
them.- However the Sultan still refused to commit himself
on the cruiser or the indemnity. On May 23, 1900, Griscom
submitted a formal demand and hinted at an ultimatum if the
answer was not satisfactory. Again he was put off, this time
with the excuse that a Turkish admiral was in the United
States inspecting cruisers and that the Porte would have to
Of!
wait for his report.
Griscom still did not give up. In October, 1900,
he wrote Hay and asked him if he could persuade the Navy
Department to send a cruiser to Turkey. He assured Hay that
"nothing unpleasant would happen." Writing some years later
Griscom was still amazed at his cheek in taking this action.
"Had I been older," he wrote, "I would never have taken such
• 1 ..29
a risk .
"
Again Griscom caused infl amatory reports to be
leaked to the world's press through Reuters. This time he
got an immediate response in the form of a Palace courier
with a message from Abdul Hamid asking him to have the
American press stop printing these stories. Griscom refused,
saying that it was not within his power to do this. Within a
few days he had more good news for Hay cabled that the battle-
ship Kentucky , on her way to the Philippines by way of the
Mediterranean, would make an unscheduled four day layover at
30
Smyrna.
The main problem now for Griscom was "to frighten
the Turks enough to make them sign /the cruiser contract^/,
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yet not stir them up so that they really would defy us.-
Cleverly using the battleship as a powerful pawn Griscom be-
gan to put increasing pressure on the Turkish government.
One of Griscom' s friends wrote him during the crisis that
"/f/ew boys of twenty-eight are given a battleship to play
with. Be very careful it doesn't go off." On December 2nd
the Kentucky steamed into the harbor at Smyrna cleared for
action, with her guns run out. The Governor of Smyrna tele-
graphed the authorities in Constantinople that he feared the
port was in immediate danger of being bombarded. The roads
leading out of Smyrna were clogged with panicked refugees
O
1fleeing the city with their belongings.
After a few day's delay the Sultan gave in, but
asked that the Kentucky come to Constantinople. This was a
way for Abdul Hamid to save face, as it would publicly show
the visit of the battleship to be a friendly one. Griscom
received approval from Hay and the Navy Department to extend
the stay of the Kentucky
,
and the battleship proceeded to
Constantinople. Captain Chester and Griscom were royally
entertained by the Sultan at a state dinner in the Palace
on December lOth, and the Kentucky then continued on her voy-
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age to the Orient.
As days passed without any new word on the contract
Griscom' s initial satisfaction turned to gloom. He met with
Tewfik Pasha, the Turkish Foreign Minister, on the evening of
December 24th and demanded that the contract be signed. If
not, he said, he would feel his utility in Turkey to be at an
end and would ask his government to withdraw hirn. He demanded
an answer by midnight. This last ditch threat worked and one
hour before Griscom's deadline word came from the Palace that
the signing of the contract would take place at ten the next
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morning. it was a welcome Christmas gift.
Griscom had proved himself a master of bluff,
willing to take the desperate chance in order to gain success.
Some months later in Washington, where he had gone for re-
assignment, he met with Hay. "As head of our foreign ser-
vice, Lloyd, I suppose I ought to reprimand you for some of
those chances you took," said Hay, smiling quizzically. "You
O A
know we might have landed in a lot of trouble."
Hay was undoubtedly pleased with the work of his
young diplomat and his willingness to take a calculated risk
— it was a quality he was to bemoan as missing in the new
35American Minister to Turkey. For as one problem with the
Empire had been solved another one had taken its place; this
would lead to more naval diplomacy by the United States and
on a much larger scale. What had been successful once could
very well be successful again
.
CHAPTER VIII
THE SCHOOL QUESTION
John G. A. Leishman's appointment as Minister to the
Ottoman Empire in early 1901 initiated a new phase in America
relations with Turkey. The great problem which Leishman had
to confront revolved around the rights and protection of
American schools and property in the Sultanate, and most of
his efforts in the next few years were to be directed toward
this issue. Leishman was a former steel baron turned diplo-
mat. He had been born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1857
and raised in an orphan asylum. Apprenticed as an office
boy in an iron and steel works at the age of twelve the
young Leishman rose to a clerkship, saved his money, and
entered the steel business on his own. Soon he came to the
notice of Andrew Carnegie
,
joined the Carnegie Steel Company
,
and later became its president. Like Carnegie he was a
physically small man, and like him completely self-made. In
1897 the wealthy Leishman left the steel business and en-
tered the diplomatic service. Prior to coming to
Constantinople he had been Minister Plenipotentiary to
Switzerland for almost three years."*"
Before Leishman could settle down to dealing with
the school question he was faced with another, more immediate
problem. On September 3, 1901, a certain Miss Ellen Stone
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and a companion, both Protestant missionaries, were kid-
napped near Salonika in European Turkey. On the 28th word
came from the kidnappers demanding that a ransom of $100,000
be delivered by October 8th, or Miss Stone would be killed.
Unlike the Perdicaris incident the United States government
did not send a fleet to Turkey and instead of pressuring the
Porte to pay the ransom allowed a private campaign to be
organized m America to raise the necessary funds.
During October $66,000 was collected by missionary
societies and handed over to the State Department. In
January, 1902, the brigands agreed to accept this amount, and
by the end of February it had been turned over and Miss Stone
3
released. The American government acted with great restraint
during the incident, as well as understanding the great dif-
ficulties faced by the Turkish authorities. Roosevelt had
only just recently come to the Presidency with the death of
McKinley in September, 1901, and he was still unsure of him-
self in this new seat of power. Also the United States had
no naval units in the area. By 1904 Roosevelt was a much
more confident President, and he had a new naval policy with
which to back up this confidence.
In November, 1901, France showed one way to influ-
ence Abdul Hamid. During that month a French fleet seized
part of the island of Mytilene (Lesbos) and held it as ran-
som for a satisfactory settlement. The Sultan capitulated
in the face of such a vigorous move, and French schools and
property in the Empire were given full rights and protection.
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By 1903 all of the other great powers had come to similar
agreements with Turkey, but not the United States."^
The need for American intervention to humble Turkey
was forcefully expressed in an article in the North American
Review in late 1901. "To show the Bloodstained Sultan a few
battleships," wrote Urbain Gohier, "and warn him that every
human head that falls under the knives of his assassins will
be paid for by the destruction of one of his palaces this
would not be the work of a conqueror, but the action of a
5
noble heart .
"
Roosevelt himself had no great love for the Turk.
In 1898 he wrote William Wingate Sewell that "Spain and
Turkey are the two powers I would rather smash than any in
the world." During the Balkan War of 1912-13 Roosevelt told
Henry Cabot Lodge that the conflict would be "a benefit to
humanity because it will put a stop to that chronic condi-
tion of massacre, murder and bloodshed" existing in the
Ottoman Empire. Yet, the President was fully aware of the
hazards present in any general military involvement with
Turkey. He once warned Elihu Root about the dangers of re-
cent talk in the United States about "pushing matters to a
conclusion with Turkey and taking Smyrna." While he felt the
Turkish navy was absolutely impotent and could not oppose an
American fleet, he cautioned that the army was a different
matter. Turkish ground forces were "a most formidable body,"
and man for man there "are no better fighters in Europe."^
Roosevelt would not forget this earlier judgement, and when
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Sultan, first in 1903 and then in
power.
In the summer of 1903 a large delegation of promi-
nent Americans representing missionary opinion in the United
States, and led by the Reverend Stuart Dodge, came to
Washington and laid before Roosevelt a memorial which urged
the President to gain for the United States the same rights
and protection already "secured by the ambassadors of the
Great Pov/ers of Europe /for7 their subjects" in Turkey. An-
other powerful leader in this protest was John W. Foster, a
former high State Department official, and now a fervent
lobbyist for missionary interests. Roosevelt, hov;ever, was
continually frustrated by the inability of Leishman to get a
7
satisfactory solution to the problem from the Porte. It
had taken over five years of protests, threats, and finally
a naval demonstration to settle the Armenian claims; and the
much more serious matter of the school question promised to
take even longer to resolve unless some type of strong action
was initiated.
Roosevelt found an excuse to use something more than
mere words in August, 1903, when a cable was received from
Leishman reporting that the American Vice-Consul in Beirut,
William C. Maglessen, had been assassinated. Lying in the
harbor at Villefranche
,
France, was the European Squadron
under Rear Admiral Cotton composed of the cruisers Brooklyn
and San Frsncisco, The President did not hesitate to make
he came to deal with the
1904, he would use naval
use of them, and they were immediately ordered to steam for
Beirut.^
The assassination report turned out to be a false
alarm, but as the warships v/ere already on their way the
decision was made to make use of their presence in order to
put pressure on the Sultan. The news of the squadron's des-
patch to Beirut brought the Turkish Minister in the United
States running back to Washington from vacation. Chekib Bey
expressed his anxiety over the incident and begged Hay to
understand the chaotic conditions now existing in the Empire.
In an interview with the Washington correspondent of The
Times (London), Chekib Bey compared what was happening in
Turkey to some of America's internal problems. "Unhappily
massacres sometimes occur," he declared, "but do they not
occur in Christian lands? Nobody would be so foolish as to
hold the United States Government responsible for the
lynchings of negroes." Turkey deplores these incidents and
was doing all she could to prevent them. The outside world,
9
he said, must be patient.
On August 31st Hay told Roosevelt that the sending
of the squadron had, according to Leishman, "made a profound
impression" on Turkey. Leishman felt confident, Hay re-
ported, that the Turks would now make an effort to settle the
school question. Four days later Hay informed the President
that the government should be able "to finish up our little
chores" in Turkey within a few days. He said that he had
recently had two long meetings with Chekib Bey and told him
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that if the Sultan did not want American warships in Turkish
waters it would be very easy to make them depart — just set-
tle the school question and a few other matters "which have
dragged on /for/ too long."^*^
Most of the American press supported the administra-
tion's action, although some like the New York Times ex-
pressed concern over the impression made by this aggressive
move on the European powers. Their "sensibilities might be
ruffled" should Cotton remain in Turkish waters for any
length of time. "We cannot afford," affirmed the Times
,
"to
give any of the European Powers occasion to say or suggest
that we are meddling over there. The incident," it warned,
"would surely return to plague us. ""'""'
A slightly more acid view of Roosevelt's gunboat
diplomacy was expressed by the Berliner Neueste Nachrichten
,
when it charged that the United States appeared to be fol-
lowing in Russian footsteps with its aggressive policy
against Turkey. The newspaper tartly pointed out that this
action was being initiated by "the same American Chauvinists
who want to forbid European intervention in American affairs
on the ground of the Monroe Doctrine." How could the United
States raise such a terrible outcry when Germany acted in
Venezuela, and yet expect to freely get away with the same
12performance in the Mediterranean?
Hay left for a short stay at his vacation home in
Newbury, N. H.
,
regretfully leaving Assistant Secretary Adee
and Roosevelt "to struggle with the Beirut proposition." He
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humorously wrote Adee that after his last "long tussle with
that poor writhing worm of a Turk," Chekib Bey, he almost
did not have the strength of wind to go, but wanted "to give
up my ticket, dismiss my carriage, ring my wife and stay in-
definitely." On September 14th he wrote Adee that as he saw
it things were going pretty well for us in Turkey, and the
administration should certainly be able to "make something
out of /the/ incident."-'-^
But Hay had not counted on the age-old Turkish max-
ims of Bakalum (We shall see!) and Yarum gel (Come tomorrow!)
which had defeated other diplomats. Leishman's "wordy and
not very helpful" despatches brought Washington no news of
a settlement, only accounts of constant delays. By the end
of September no solution had presented itself, and the
American squadron at Beirut settled in for a long stay."'"'*
The next move was up to Roosevelt. If the Sultan refused to
settle what could the President do? Bombard and seize
Beirut? Cotton's squadron (recently joined by the gunboat
Machi as ) had obviously not impressed the Turks enough. Per-
haps it should have been larger? Perhaps Beirut was too far
away from Constantinople? Roosevelt was understandably
loath to take the next obvious step -- the use of force. As
a result the American v/arships just stayed in the area while
Leishman fruitlessly tried to persuade Abdul Hamid and the
Porte to come to terms.
The next two months passed fairly quietly. There
was a brief flurry of activity in early December when the
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American Consul in Alexandretta, Turkey, was set upon by
local police as he was escorting an Armenian (a naturalized
United States citizen) on board a steamer. Immediately
after the incident the Consul lowered the American flag and
left for Beirut by the same ship. Cotton, who had taken his
squadron to Alexandria, Egypt, for stores and repairs, was
ordered north. Taking the Brooklyn Cotton picked up the
Consul and brought him back to Alexandretta where the
Governor of the port offered an official apology. The in-
cident ended, Cotton sailed back to Beirut. '"^
The lack of any settlement despite all of this naval
activity caused increased pressure on the State Department
and Roosevelt by the missionary lobby. In answer to a let-
ter from the Reverend Stuart Dodge urging action, Adee com-
plained that the main problem was the "inertia of the
Turkish Government." He forcefully impressed upon Dodge that
he did not think it would be of any use to bring his commit-
tee to Washington again for another protest, as both the
President and Hay were in complete accord with his views.
Adee told him that the United States would keep up the pres-
sure on the Sultan, always hoping that "circumstances may
arise which will enable" the government "to profit by the
situation to the advantage of the Missionaries." One im-
mediate problem, he informed Dodge, was that Cotton's war-
ships had been overseas for quite a long time and the Navy
Department wanted "our men-of-war elsewhere.""'"^
on
,o
Leishman's year-end report to the State Department
was a bleak one. He called opposition to an agreement
the school question bitter and determined. There was n
sign of an immediate settlement, and he had "no confidence
in the daily promises which are broken with as little com-
punction as they are lightly made." He compared himself to
a shuttlecock, constantly passing back and forth between an
"irresponsible Porte and an invisible Sultan." The warships
were no longer considered a threat, complained Leishman,
only a nuisance. In some ways the continued presence of the
squadron without it being forcefully used was "more of a
17hindrance than an assistance .
"
With the Sultan apparently unimpressed by Cotton's
squadron, and the Navy Department pressuring to have the war-
ships withdrawn, Roosevelt and Hay were faced with finding a
way of removing the vessels without seeming to have given in
to Turkish intransigence. The decision to withdraw was made
in mid-January, 1904. Informed of this, Leishman wrote State
that a withdrawal without having obtained a settlement would
be bad, but since the administration was not prepared to
"adopt more drastic measures" he had no objection to their
removal. The Turkish government had made up its mind that it
could "hold off with safety resting easy under the impression
1
8
that forcible measures will not be resorted to."
In reply the State Department asked Leishman to in-
timate to Turkey that the ships were being "withdrawn for the
time being," in order to facilitate discussions. Later
Leishman was told to present the withdrawal as evidence of
Roosevelt's good will. The Minister was also ordered to ex-
press to the Sultan and the Porte the President's warm in-
terest in the school question. Leishman replied that giving
this face-saving impression would be difficult as the Turks
were well aware why the United States was withdrawing its
warships — all they had to do was read American newspapers
.
On January 30th Leishman cabled Hay that Tewfik
Pasha had written to the Sultan recommending a settlement,
but he believed that Abdul Hamid would never receive the
letter as his chief advisors would keep it from him.
Leishman said that as the Sultan had now made it a rule not
to give audiences to any foreign diplomat below the rank of
ambassador, it was impossible to deal with him personally.
The raising of American representation in Turkey to the am-
bassadorial level was another one of those small problems
with which Leishman was attempting to get the Porte to agree.
The unusual tactic of seeing only ambassadors appears to have
been a devious ploy especially designed to isolate the per-
sistent Leishman. By February, faced with delay after delay,
he was plaintively writing Hay that everything was "so dif-
ferent here from other countries that one is seldom in a
position to give a good reason for thinking anything . . . . "
At the beginning of April the final blow fell.
Leishman cabled Hay that the Porte had officially declined to
take favorable action on the schools. Leishman was terribly
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disappointed "after so many months of hard work and constant
labor and patient waiting" to reach this dead end. The Grand
Vizier, he felt, was the chief culprit. It was his influence
on the Sultan which had offset the favorable position of the
Porte.
Back in the United States missionary pressure on
Roosevelt and the State Department to do something remained
strong. The domestic correspondence of the Department of
State for this period contains many soothing letters sent
out to irate clergymen by Hay and Adee . One from Hay to a
certain Reverend Judson Smith of Boston might stand as an
example. Hay defended Leishman against a charge of "not
having acted with sufficient energy," and told Smith that the
United States had been given promise after promise, but
nothing was ever done. He ended the letter by declaring that
the government would continue its pressure "to get justice
done," but said we "have not yet come to the point of using
22
measures of violence."
But if not violence, what then? It was during April
that Roosevelt apparently decided to use his navy again --
this time in an even greater demonstration of naval strength
— to try and force Abdul Hamid to come to terms. Faced with
the seemingly intransigent attitude of the Turkish government
as outlined by Leishman on April 1st, as well as pressure
from missionary interests, Roosevelt began unlimbering the
big stick in the form of his battleships.
164
With a display of American naval might in the of--
fing Leishman told Hay on June 5th that the visit "would
prove more irritating than beneficial, as in the absence of
an ultimatum the Porte would be very apt to treat another
visit with the same outward tranquillity and indifference,"
To get the maximum benefit he suggested the American govern-
ment play upon the Turk's suspicious nature. He proposed
that he ask the Porte if the fleet could pay a friendly visit
to several Turkish ports. Given the Turkish way of looking
at things — they "generally view frankness as a cloak to
hide covert intentions" — this would worry them much more
2 3than an open approach.
The morning of June 8th Hay had a stormy interview
with John W. Foster. Foster, representing American mission-
ary societies, told Hay he wanted the government "to growl"
at Turkey. Hay informed him of what the Roosevelt adminis-
tration was proposing to do with the fleet and Foster went
away in a more reasonable frame of mind. The next day Hay
sent Leishman a strong cable ordering him to ask for an
immediate audience with Abdul Hamid and put the school ques-
tion before him . He said to ask for the audience "in the
name of the President." Hay confided to his diary the hope
that this solemn v^arning and the arrival of the battleships
—
-r 24
would have "some effect on /^Leishman '_s/ negroes."
Tev/fik Pasha quickly responded to this new threat
by promising Leishman to bring the school question up before
the Council of Ministers for review, and begged Leishman "to
grant him sufficient time to have the matter reconsidered."
Leishman felt this response, while not completely satisfac-
tory, offered some promise. He gave Tewfik Pasha to the end
of June to produce an acceptable response. On the evening
of the 16th the Grand Vizier informed Leishman that the
Council of Ministers had reviewed the case and referred it
to the Minister of Public Instruction "with a favorable rec-
ommendation." Leishman was by now very optimistic, and gave
full credit for the apparent success to the demand of the
9th as well as the approach of the battleships. He found
the Sultan and the Porte rather disturbed by recent events,
and both were now attempting "to find a way of backing dovvm
gracefully." But in Washington Hay, remembering his past
experiences with Abdul Hamid, still had reservations.^^
As the end of June approached a confident Leishman
wrote Hay that the Secretary's "medicine /was_7 working."
The Sultan was quite alarmed over the approach of the fleet,
and was unsure of just what would happen when it arrived in
2 6Turkish waters. The strategy appeared to be successful,
but with Abdul Hamid no one could be sure of this until the
royal decree on the schools had actually been signed.
Roosevelt's options in the event of continued
Turkish obstinacy were fairly limited. He could send the
fleet directly to a Turkish port, possibly Smyrna, but then
what would he do? He certainly would not bring his battle-
ships home in this election year without a satisfactory set-
tlement. The example of the French in 1901 might have been
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in his mind, for their seizure of the island of Mytilene
(lying just off the coast of Asia Minor near Smyrna) had
gained them a successful settlement. Roosevelt had little
desire to engage the Turkish army in battle and this would
apparently rule out the seizure of a mainland port; but
along the coast of Turkish Asia Minor in the Aegean lay a
neckl ace of small isl ands , one or two of which could easily
be taken and held with the superior American naval strength.
However , all depended upon the response of the Sultan
.
Would he give in as he had done in December, 1901, to the
presence of an American battleship, or, was this a more im-
portant matter of principle to Abdul Hamid than a simple in-
demnity? Only time would tell.
CHAPTER IX
ROOSEVELT GAMBLES
Barker's leisurely week-long journey across the
Mediterranean was necessitated by the presence in Phaleron
Bay of a large French fleet. During the slow passage Barker
took the opportunity of engaging his battleships in various
maneuvers and drills, including a number of torpedo exercises.
Except for a lone Russian corvette the anchorage at Phaleron
was empty as the American warships steamed in on the after-
noon of June 30th. It was on these same protected waters
that ancient Athens had first launched its galleys. It \;as
here too that the shattered fleet of Xerxes had fled for
safety after being defeated by the Athenians under
Themistocles at the battle of Salamis."'"
The American Minister at Athens, John B. Jackson,
was a graduate of the Naval Academy and a former naval of-
ficer. In 1886 he had resigned his commission, studied and
practiced law for a few years, and in 1890 entered the diplo-
matic corps . Prior to coming to Greece in 1902 he had
served in Berlin as legation secretary and charge d' affaires
2for almost twelve years. When the battleships arrived it
was Jackson, like Bryan in Lisbon, who was to officiate over
the visits and festivities which v/erc to follow.
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On July 3rd Barker and his officers met with King
George of Greece in a special audience held at the Royal
Palace. The meeting marked the renewal of an old acquain-
tance, for Barker had met with a recently crowned King
George and his new wife Queen Olga in 1873 while he was ex-
ecutive officer on the Wachusett. At the audience the King
expressed his pleasure to Barker and Jackson at the visit of
the battleships, only regretting that the stay would be so
short and that during the hot season the officers might find
things a bit dull socially in the capital. Barker took the
opportunity of extending to the King an invitation to call
on the squadron, v;hich George enthusiastically accepted and
asked if he could come aboard as soon as possible. This was
acceptable to Barker and the visit was scheduled for the
next day, the Fourth of July.
The afternoon of the 3rd the battleship Missouri
arrived at Phaleron bringing the squadron's strength up to
five armorclads, and the next morning all were dressed with
flags and booming out salutes over the bay celebrating the
nation's birthday. In the early evening Jackson came aboard
the Kearsarge
,
followed shortly by the King, Prince Andrew
and his wife Princess Alice, and a number of high officials.
As King George's party was piped over the side the Royal
Standard was hoisted to the main truck of the Kearsarge , and
each of the battleships roared out a twenty-one gun carron-
ade. All were completely outlined with electric lights and
4
in the fading sunlight they made a splendid sight on the bay.
169
Before sitting down to dinner Barker took the King
and his party on a brief tour through the Kearsarqe. Be-
cause of the warm weather tables had been set out on the
Quarterdeck, and the banquet was held under a covering of
white canvas. The entire affair, Barker wrote Moody, "passed
off pleasantly," and a little after eleven the Royal party
left the flagship, its way along the water to the shore
brightly illuminated by the searchlights of the battleships.
Other searchlights played on the large American flag hanging
from the stern of each vessel, as well as the Royal Standard,
and for a second time that evening each of the battleships
fired off a twenty-one gun salute. On the shore of the bay
and in the port of Piraeus the entire nightime tableau was
witnessed by thousands of Greeks who lined the wharf area
and sandy beaches.^
The next day Barker and Jackson headed a group of
twenty-three officers from the squadron on a journey to
Tatoie, the King's country residence about twenty miles from
Athens, for a luncheon. Tatoie lay in a forest at the foot
of the mountains enclosing the Attic plain, and the luncheon
took place outside under the pines. Afterv;ards the King
graciously escorted Barker and his officers through the ex-
tensive grounds surrounding the Palace.^
Jackson told Kay that one of the more favorable im-
pressions made by the squadron on the Greeks was the exem-
plary behavior of its enlisted personnel. The twenty-five
hundred sailors who streamed ashore on liberty had just
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received a month's pay, and their conduct in Athens and
Piraeus compared most favorably to that of the French crews
who had preceeded the Americans a few days before. On the
afternoon of July 6th the battleships steamed out of the bay
and headed for the Greek island of Corfu in the Ionian Sea.'^
Meanwhile, in Constantinople, Leishman was still un-
able to give Washington any satisfaction on a settlement.
The end of June passed without a definite reply from the
Porte, only the usual promises. Leishman informed Hay on
July 2nd that he would wait for a few more days and then, if
an acceptable response was not forthcoming, he would demand
8
a meeting with the Sultan.
When the Battleship Squadron left Phaleron on the
6th it still appeared that the naval display had had a salu-
tary effect on the Turkish government. The Porte had agreed
to review its earlier refusal to deal with the school cues-
tion , and although it was continuing to delay a final deci-
sion there were still grounds for optimism. More importantly
,
the fleet was scheduled to be in the Mediterranean for a
month or more, and, if nothing came of the American diplomatic
initiative it could easily be sent back to Turkish waters.
The five battleships reached Corfu on the morning
of July 8th, and after calling on the local American Consul
and engaging in a brief round of sightseeing Barker left the
next day bound north into the Adriatic. He reached Trieste
early on the 12th, followed in the afternoon by Jewell's
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three cruisers and the Mayflower. The battleship Illinois
came in on the 13th and her arrival finally brought the
fleet together for the first time in its full strength. Ten
white warships, and six of them — Kearsarqe
.
Maine
,
Illinois
,
Missouri
,
Iowa, and Alabama — battleships.^
Jewell had gotten himself into a bit of hot water
with the Navy Department by his decision to proceed directly
to Trieste and not join Barker in Greece. The Roosevelt ad-
ministration wanted the fleet at Athens to be as imposing as
possible for the purpose of impressing Turkey, and the
halving of its num.erical strength by Jewell did not sit well
at all in Washington. The Navy Department cabled Barker on
July 6th that since Jewell had already sailed from Gibraltar
it could not override his decision, but it would certainly
request "an explanation in the matter." Jewell's decision
to let the Illinois proceed to Trieste on her own also came
in for criticism. The navy's allegiance to the tactical con-
cept of concentration gave "the greatest importance that
vessels should at all times, when practicable, cruise and
make passage in com.pany," and by letting the I llinois steam
. T 10
alone Jewell quite obviously violated this principle.
On his way to the Adriatic Jewell attempted to in-
tercept Barker's warships at sea and accompany them to
Trieste. On July 9th and lOth he spread his four vessels
across the entrance to the Straits of Otranto where the ships
were to keep in touch by wireless while they searched for the
battleships. Unfortunately, Jewell's exercise failed due to
engine trouble on the Baltimore and a breakdown of the
2iYELEia'_s_ wireless, and Barker's squadron slipped through the
net.^1
Lying in the crescent-shaped bay of the port of
Trieste the ten warships were an impressive sight. From the
great medieval castle on the steep hill called the Schossberg
below which the old town had been built, the battleships and
cruisers looked like miniature model ships in a storybook
setting. Although Trieste was the chief seaport of the
Austrian Empire, it was Italian at heart and the atmosphere
was Latin. The names of the city's churches — San Giusto,
Santa Maria Maggiore, and Sant' Antonio Nuovo — further pro-
claimed the Italian spirit of the city. It was through
Trieste that most of those citizens dissatisfied with con-
ditions in the Empire had immigrated to America, and it was
from here in 1853 that the Archduke Maximillian and his v/ife
Carlotta had left their pseudo-Norman castle of Miramar,
four miles up the coast, in search of an illusory empire in
Mexico.
One immediate problem which Barker ran into was the
Austrian government's impression that the primary reason for
the fleet's presence in the Mediterranean was instructional,
and therefore official entertainment would be limited.
Barker promptly corrected this notion and there soon began
the usual series of dinners and receptions; the first given
by Admiral Jedina, the commander of the naval base, followed
by a grand fete by the Governor of Trieste, Count Goess, two
days later. On the 18th Barker gave a dinner for Austrian
officials on board the Mayflowe r. He then left Trieste for
a few days and joined his wife at Cortina in the Austrian
Tyrol for a brief vacation. "^^
While its Admiral was absent the fleet received a
serious scare when a number of cases of typhoid broke out on
the Kearsarge
. Luckily, the outbreak was confined to the
wardroom, and an investigation pointed to a supply of ice
taken aboard in Piraeus as the cause. Officers feared the
total water supply taken on in Greece was infected, and knew
that typhoid racing throughout the fleet would end its ef-
fectiveness. The humiliating spectacle of the heart of the
United States Navy lying helpless and isolated in the harbor
of Trieste v;ould have quickly terminated any benefits which
the Mediterranean cruise had brought the Roosevelt adminis-
tration, and it would have certainly emerged as an issue in
the election. Contamination, as it turned out, was limited
to the ice.
On July 24th the fleet left Trieste, and while the
Battleship Squadron and the Mayflower continued on to Fiume
the European Squadron steam.ed for Corfu. There Jewell would
coal his cruisers and then sail for Villefranche . """^ The
visit to Fiume was another stopover not originally a part of
the itinerary. The American government, bowing to a strong
hint from the Austrian foreign office, decided to honor the
port as a nod to Hungarian national sensitivities.
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Fiume lay on the other side of the Istrian penin-
sula frora Trieste. Situated at the head of the Gulf of
Quarnero this chief port of Hungary, like Trieste, was es-
sentially an Italian city. Sir Osbert Sitwell once visited
Fiume and wrote romantically of "its clustered houses and
its bay, a spur of hills sinking into the opalescence of the
far seas, and the quivering misty outlines of the islands."
Its chief historical sights were a Roman triumphal arch
erected in the 3rd century A.D. in honor of the emperor
Claudius II; the Austrian Emperor's Palace; and the Munici-
pal Palace. The latter, wrote Sitwell, was "built in the
well-known Renaissance-elephantoid style that is the dream
of every Municipal Council the world over.""^^
The six battleships and the Mayflower arrived at
Fiume in the early morning hours of the 25th. Barker and
his staff first called on the Governor of Fiume, Baron Evin
Roszner, and then the American Consul-General in Budapest,
Franklin Chester, who had come to Fiume especially for the
visit. Baron Roszner came aboard the flagship later that
same day and brought with him a telegram from Count Stephen
Tisza, the head of the Hungarian state, welcoming the fleet
to Hungary. On the evening of the 26th the Governor gave a
large reception at the Municipal Palace for Barker and his
officers. The Facade of the Palace was resplendently
lighted, while the extensive grounds around it were illumi-
nated by hundreds of colored Japanese lanterns. "Palms and
flowers abounded," wrote Barker, "and a fountain of crystal
water played in the bright moorxlight .
'
Inside the Palace a large American eagle with out-
stretched wings formed by electric lights was the center of
attention, while the national flags of Hungary and the United
States were prominently displayed on the walls. A concert by
the celebrated Hungarian Opera Troupe of Budapest was fol-
lov^ed by dancing and refreshments. The cobblestoned streets
outside the Palace were densely packed with people all hoping
to catch a glimpse of the festivities as well as the
18Americans
.
The next evening it was Barker's turn to entertain.
At a dinner on the Mayflower the Admiral in a brief speech
v/as careful to salute the Apostolic King of Hungary, the
Hungarian title for Franz Josef. All during the visit great
care v/as given to Hungarian sensibilities, even to the
playing of the Hungarian national hymn on all occasions.
However, one small gaffe did occur. When Barker's guests
sat down to dinner on the Mayflowe r Baron and Baroness
Roszner pointed out to the Admiral that the menu and the
musical program had been printed, "Fium.e, Austria." Both ex-
pressed themselves, only hal f-humorously , that their patriot-
ism was wounded at this slight, and an embarrassed Barker
immediately sent his flag secretary over to the Kearsarge to
have new menus and programs printed. This was quickly done,
and before the dinner had ended the new programs were being
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passed out to the delight of the Hungarians.
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Another incident which could have been potentially
damaging occurred when the Kearserge lost one of her tor-
pedoes in the harbor. The Whitehead Torpedo Company had a
large factory and practice area at Fiume and the director,
Count Hoyas, had invited the American officers to visit and
inspect the plant and its eguipment. On the 26th the
Ke arsarge test fired two Whitehead torpedoes from her tubes.
Both contained explosive but did not have primers. Boat
crews managed to recover one but the other could not be
found, and it was believed that it had sunk to the bottom of
the harbor. Nevertheless, watches were set and sm.all boats
continued to hunt the waters in the area while the warships
remained in port. Even though not primed for firing the
torpedo did contain explosives and could have possibly det-
onated if jarred forcefully enough. The loss or damaging of
an American battleship by one of its own torpedoes was not
an experience which would have resounded to the glory of
20
Roosevelt's navy.
On the 30th Barker and his staff made their parting
calls upon local officials. Baroness Roszner graciously told
the Admiral that she wished he were the American Minister to
Austria. The visit to Fiume had been an outstanding success
and Barker told Moody that the "greatest curiosity was shown
by the people to see the Americans and their white ships."
All during the cruise, he wrote Admiral Dewey, he was con-
sistently told how "pretty your ships look painted white."
To which Barker always replied that although his warships
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were always "prepared for war we believe in peace -- and
paint our ships accordingly Alas, the day of the white
man-of-war was drawing to a close. The nations of Europe
were already turning toward less conspicuous coloration for
their warships. Within a few years the more practical and
less visible hues of grey's and green's would predominate
display giving way to utility.
As Barker steamed back across the Mediterranean
toward Gibraltar he could be well satisfied with both the
performance and excellent effect created by his battleships
and cruisers. Leishman, however, could not claim the same
success for his diplomacy. With the removal of the fleet
from Turkish waters at the beginning of July the seeming
willingness of the Sultan and the Porte to come to terms be-
gan to dissipate, and Leishman was face to face again with
the same old series of delays and procrastinations which he
thought had ended.
Leishman called on Tewfik Pasha on July 5th and,
finding that the Foreign Minister could still not offer him
any conclusive sign of an immediate settlement, he asked for
an audience with the Sultan in the name of the President.
Tev/fik Pasha tried to dissuade him, saying that the school
question was being reviewed by the Porte and would be brought
before the Council of Ministers the following day. Leishman
refused to be mollified and the audience was scheduled for
27
Friday, July 8th.
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The meeting was not to take place. Early Friday
morning Leishman was informed by an official from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the audience with Abdul
Hamid would have to be postponed. The Sultan was very fa-
tigued and unable to see anyone. It was a much chagrined
Leishman who later found out that the Sultan's incapacities
had not prevented him from seeing both the Austrian and
Russian ambassadors that very same day.^^ The reason for
this deliberate insult -- the other two audiences could not
have been concealed nor did the Turks try — was not hard to
perceive. On the 5th there had been five battleships at
Piraeus; by the 8th they had gone. Turkish sensitivity to
American diplomacy was directly related to the amount of
coercion Roosevelt was willing to apply.
When Leishman next saw Tewfik Pasha "prudence and
policy," he told Hay, forced him to make no mention of his
knowledge of the ambassador's visits. "Com.pelled to swallow
/_his_/ indignation and express . . . sorrow at the ill health
of the Sultan," Leishman asked for an audience with Abdul
Hamid as soon as he was feeling better. He informed Hay
that he still felt "the Turks are slowly awakening" to the
idea that they could not continue putting the United States
off, but thus far he could report nothing of substance except
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the usual broken promises.
On July 15th Leishman again attempted to see Abdul
Hamid, and this time he was apprised that the Sultan would
not receive him that day "on account of important visits in
the harem." The Turks were laughing, no longer inventing
serious excuses. Adding to the affront was the Sultan's re-
ception of the Persian Ambassador the same day. Leishraan was
now in the position of having been twice refused an audience
with Abdul Hamid, both times with undisgijised discourtesy,
even after asking for the meetings in the name of the
President. He resentfully declared to Hay that he felt it
"beneath the dignity of the American Government" to again
ask for an audience under these conditions, and requested
that the State Department send him further instructions.
In response to this state of affairs Leishman was
ordered to again ask for an Imperial audience in the
President's name at a fixed date and time in the near future.
He was also instructed to tell Tewfik Pasha that the govern-
ment of the United States failed to comprehend the delay in
according its representative the treatment which should exist
between tvio supposedly friendly powers. Implicit in this was
a threat that if the audience was not granted it would be
taken as an unfriendly act. In anticipation of a refusal the
State Department asked Leishman which of the Turkish ports
2 6
would be best suited for a visit from the fleet.
Faced with a fresh and strong demand from the United
States the Turkish government granted Leishman' s request for
an audience. The meeting took place on Friday, July 29th.
In a long and outwardly friendly interview Abdul Hamid "spoke
very favorably" with Leishman about the school question,
promising to take "matters under immediate consideration and
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to give /J7 definite reply not later than Tuesday next."^"^
The problem would have to be settled now or never.
There could be no more delays as Roosevelt was about to lose
the strong position given him by his battleships. Barker
was steaming toward Gibraltar where, after taking on coal,
he would be heading back across the Atlantic. Jewell's
European Squadron was at Villefranche and would stay for a
few more days, but soon it too would be leaving the
Mediterranean. If the Sultan could manage to hold off these
insistent Americans and their white warships until then, he
would be safe for at least another year.
In the United States there was a great deal of hope
that a satisfactory settlement would now be gained since
Abdul Hamid finally had been brought personally into the
negotiations. The New York Times reported that because of
this the State Departm.ent was very optimistic. The key to
the Sultan's present amicability, said the Times , was a
direct result of the pressure exerted by the American fleet,
"so that the cruise of the squadron has served its purpose,
and it is not regarded as necessary now to extend the trip
28into Turkish waters."
Hay sincerely hoped Leishman could get a settlement,
"now that we have given him such a handful of trumps /battle-
ships/ to play." Assistant Secretary of State Loomis in-
formed Leishman that the Sultan's response on the 29th was
gratifying, but just in case problems arose Barker's six
battleships were going to be held at Gibraltar "in readiness
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subject to orders." He was also told by Loomis that the
American government fully expected its wishes to be complied
with and he was ordered to keep Washington advised about the
09
situation as it developed.
Tewfik Pasha sent his secretary to see Leishman on
the evening of August 1st to tell him that Abdul Hamid would
not be able to see him the next day. He blamed this delay
on rhe fact that the Council of Ministers had not yet con-
cluded its report on the school question, but he promised he
would definitely have a reply on Thursday, the 4th. Leishman
was disturbed but still optimistic. "The active considera-
tion which the m.atter is now receiving," he explained to Hay,
"warrants the belief that a definite decision will be reached
before the end of the present week." His confidence, how-
ever, was misplaced for the 4th passed without the promised
reply, and no word was offered on when one could be ex-
pected.
For Roosevelt this was the final insult. It v;as nov/
auite evident that the display of warships alone had not
worked. Something stronger was obviously needed, and on the
5th orders were sent to Rear Admiral Jewell at Villefranche
to immediately steam for Smyrna. Barker's battleships would
be held at Gibraltar.
Roosevelt had been actively trying to settle the
school question with Turkey for well over a year. His use
of the navy had not met with success in 1903 and he had been
embarrassingly forced to withdraw his warships. In 1904 the
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President attempted to end the sLalemate by the display of
a much larger naval force, but had been again rebuffed. Al-
though often accused of engaging in a blustering, half-
cocked diplomacy Roosevelt, as far as Q?urkey was concerned,
had acted with great restraint and had been very careful in
his manipulation of force against the Empire. He had not
sent the fleet directly to Turkey in 1904, but instead to
neighboring Greece in the hope that the Turks would draw the
obvious conclusion. They did, but their reaction had been
simply more delay while giving the surface appearance of
trying to come to terms.
The decision of August 5th to send warships directly
to Turkey was not the hair-trigger response of a warrior
President, but an integral part of a slow, purposeful
buildup of pressure. Yet a gamble was involved. As in
Morocco, Roosevelt was apparently locking himself into a
situation wi.th only two alternatives: either he or the
Sultan would have to back down. Roosevelt had done the sur-
rendering in 1903, but 1904 v;as a year of election — now
only two months away — and it was doubtful he would with-
draw this time without some kind of settlement.
CHAPTER X
"THE PRIMACY OF THE WORLD"
It was August and the city which L' Enfant had laid
out in the swamps beside the Potomac River sweltered in the
humid, tropical heat of late summer. The House and Senate
were in recess, and the broiling weather had managed to drive
most of the rest of official Washington to its vacation
abodes by the sea or in the mountains. Just about all of the
foreign community had also left the city, and even the duti-
ful Hay managed to slip away to his summer residence in New
Hampshire. The great diplomat was not well and indeed had
less than a year to live. A few months earlier Henry Adams
had watched the sculptor St. Gaudens modeling Hay's head as
well as John Singer Sargent painting his portrait, "tv/o steps
essential to immortality which," Adams observed, Hay "bore
with a certain degree of resignation." The failure of the
Sultan to give Leishman an answer on August 4th brought the
weary Secretary of State hurrying back to Washington from
his mountain retreat by a fast train.''"
On the morning of the 5th Roosevelt gathered the
Cabinet in a special session given over entirely to dealing
with the Turkish problem. After considering all the options
available to the government it was finally decided to order
the European Squadron to immediately steam for Smyrna, and
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Hay cabled Leishman Hchat afternoon of the President's deci-
sion. In the evening Hay dined with Roosevelt at the White
House where they again discussed the crisis.^
When the European Squadron separated from Barker's
force on July 24th Jewell headed for the island of Corfu from
where, after spending a few days taking on coal, he left for
France. Arriving at the Riviera port of Villefranche on
August 3rd he planned to spend about eight days, then steam
out of the Mediterranean and head for northern Europe. The
Navy Department's order of the 5th to take his three cruisers
to Smyrna caught him off guard. Most of the squadron's of-
ficers and men were scattered ashore on liberty, and the war-
ships were ].ow on provisions and coal. By the time the men
were gathered back aboard and stores taken on there had been
a delay of almost forty-eight hours. Around noon on Sunday,
August 7th, the cruisers led by the flagship Olympi a cleared
the harbor at Villefranche and headed south along the eastern
coast of Italy bound for the Straits of Messina.''
Compared with the despatch of warships to Morocco in
May the sending of the European Squadron to Smyrna created
much less of an impact in the nation's press. The New York
Times reported that the Roosevelt administration was exasper-
ated by the course which the negotiations had taken, and had
"become i^sary of the persistent evasions and obstruction"
being practiced by the Turkish government. The American list
of grievances was real but not impressive, said the Tinie^,
however, it hoped that the Sultan "v;ould come down and yield
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the satisfaction required."^
The New York Tribune gave the news front page cover-
age and carried pictures of the Olympia
.
Baltimore and
Cleveland, as well as an insert of Rear Admiral Jewell.
Under the headline "A Warning To Turkey," and "Guns Back Of
Demand," the Tribune wrote that the State Department had
taken this necessary action after having been "exasperated
to the last degree by the dilatory and unsatisfactory methods
of the Porte .
"
The Tribune argued that only a pov/erful show of
naval might could force the Sultan and his government to
come to terms. Unfortunately raw power seemed to be the
only message the Turk could understand. It pointed out that
in December, 190 3, it was only the arrival of a v/arship at
Alexandretta which persuaded Turkey to officially apologize
for that incident. Jewell's squadron should be enough, but
if more warships were required Barker's command, "the most
powerful fleet in the American navy," would be standing by at
Gibraltar. High administration officials, confided the
Tribune, were seen as feeling confident that Barkers' battle-
ships would not be needed, but their appearance in Turkish
waters "m.ay be necessary for its moral effect."
A report in the New York Times from Paris said that
official French opinion viewed the despatch of warships with
equanimity, and did not expect their use to cause interna-
tional complications. It was felt that the Americans would
not be "as promptly successful" in Turkey as they had been
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in Morocco. "The Sultan of Turkey is a greater master of
the art of temporizing than the Moorish potentate," these
sources believed, "and the satisfaction which America demands
from him involves a much more complicated problem than the
freeing of Mr. Perdicaris." The reason for this spate of
naval activity was seen in France as being directly related
to the presidential campaign, and that Roosevelt's "reputa-
tion for a strenuous European policy needs to be main-
7tamed. "
Early Monday morning, the 8th, Hay went to see
Roosevelt to discuss the developing situation. The President
immediately showed him a letter he had just received from
General Daniel Edgar Sickles protesting the "hostile demon-
stration against Turkey." Sickles was one of the more color-
ful figures produced by America in the nineteenth century.
A Union Major General in the Civil War, he fought at the
battle of Getteysburg, lost a leg, and after the war entered
the diplomatic service. His career was short but included a
controversial tour as United States Minister to Spain during
the Virginius affair. He later entered politics, served in
Q
the House, and became a power in New York.
Beyond sending warships to Smyrna nothing had been
apparently decided Friday or over the weekend about what they
should do once they got there. If left to his own ends
Roosevelt might have been prepared l-.o overreact as he had
done in Morocco, but the presence of the experienced Hay pro-
vided the President with an ingenious compromise between the
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actual use of force and abject retreat in case the Sultan re-
mained adamant. Hay advised Roosevelt that when the squadron
reached Turkey Leishman should be instructed to "demand an
answer to our claims," and if the Turks refused to do so he
should come away on one of the warships. Hay counseled there
should not be a hostile demonstration, and the withdrawal of
the American Minister would suffice for now. Later the en-
tire matter could be put before Congress for appropriate
action
.
Roosevelt agreed to adopt Hay's strategy, and in a
letter written that same day to Sickles the President an-
swered his complaints and outlined the steps he was prepared
to take. He told Sickles that because of Turkish intransi-
gence it was "imperative that som>e action should be taken"
by the American government, but assured him that he knew he
had no right to start a war with Turkey, and had "not the
dimmest or remotest intention of doing so." The President
ended by informing the General of the conservative course of
action he had earlier in the day decided upon; i.e., to with-
drav; the American Minister and lay the matter before Congress
if Abdul Hamid refused to agree to a settlement .
"''^
The strategy was extremely adroit for the serious
consequences of a full scale incident v;ere to be avoided —
at least for the time being — while the domestic benefits to
be gained from withdrawing Leishman and placing the problem
before Congress would be as satisfactory as an actual bom-
bardment of Smyrna, or the seizure of an island. It would
188
satisfy the missionaries for a while, quiet the jingoes, and
answer those critics who were attacking Roosevelt for in-
dulging in a too aggressive foreign policy. Putting the is-
sue before Congress would also keep the matter alive as an
election issue.
Neither the Sultan nor the Porte, hov^ever, knew of
this decision, and there still remained an excellent chance
the Roosevelt administration could bluff an acceptable agree-
ment out of them without having to actually withdraw
Leishman
.
When Hay returned from seeing the President that
morning he found the Turkish Minister, Chekib Bey, waiting
for him at the State Department. That "poor writhing worm
of a Turk" was full of "great perturbation about the fleet."
Hay attempted to set him somewhat at ease but told him
"things could not continue as they were," and that the United
States had been forced to act by his government's dilatory
action on the school question. Before Chekib Bey saw Hay he
had told waiting reporters there was nothing to recent re-
ports that Jewell's ships were being sent to Smyrna to men-
ace Turkey. After the meeting he refused to discuss what was
said, but admitted he would be staying in Washington instead
of leaving on vacation as originally planned. To the re-
porters he appeared nervous and anxious.
The same day Hay cabled Leishman that the European
Squadron would be at Smyrna in a few days, and that he should
use the time before it arrived attempting to obtain a
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settlement. If none could be gained he was ordered to leave
on one of Jewell's warships, putting the legation in charge
of the legation secretary."^
Next morning Hay found on his desk an unusual des-
patch from Constantinople. In it Leishman told him that late
the previous evening the Turkish Under Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs had called on liim and asked that he use his
influence to prevent the fleet from coming, promising a reply
on the school question "not later than Thursday." Leishman
was certain that the sending of the navy had achieved its
purpose, and begged Hay to detain it for a few days."*-"^
Hay was just a bit baffled by this despatch, for the
day before Leishman had sent a cable in which he told the
State Department "that unless strong measures are adopted to
force fulfillment, matters may continue to drag along in-
definitely." Hay felt that Leishman, who had been begging
for over a year for firm action, was now being inconsistent,
and he advised him that as the squadron was at sea it could
not be communicated with until it reached Turkey. Hay also
told him that he was to be governed by his instructions of
the 8th if he had not obtained a settlement by the time the
warships arrived.
Late in the evening of the 9th a second cable from
Leishman reached Washington repeating the Turkish hope that
the fleet's visit would be deferred. The Minister added he
v/as quite sure the Turkish authorities were "at last thor-
oughly alive to the situation and most anxious to avoid an
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unfriendly demonstration." He again requested that vTewell
be ordered to come no closer than Piraeus; however, he did
acknowledge Hay's most recent cables and said he would fol-
-1 r-
low the instructions of the 8th.
During the afternoon of the 9th Jewell's warships
passed through the Straits of Messina, and by the morning of
the 10th the squadron was steaming across the Ionian Sea at
a steady speed of ten knots. Press reports in American news-
papers were optimistic about a quick settlement now that the
administration had opted for stronger measures. The New York
Times
,
although conceding the demonstration had not been
simply made for a mere parade, felt there v/ould be no hostile
action and that Washington expected "the presence of the war
vessels at Smyrna will produce" good results. The worst
which could happen would be a severance of diplomatic re-
lations. The New York Tribune agreed with this estimate and
headlined its report of the situation on the 11th: "Turkey
Likely To Yield, Another Triumph For Secretary Hay's
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Diplomacy In Prospect."
But Europe, like Turkey, was unsure of just how far
Roosevelt intended to go in this affair. It did not know how
limited were his aims. It only knew that within the past
nine months the American President had used his navy aagres-
sively in Panama and in Morocco; and with American warships
steaming dov/n upon Turkey, seemingly bent on a mission of
obvious intimidation, it expected the worst.
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In London The Dail y Express was anything but opti-
mistic and commented on the uneasy feelings prevalent in
European diplomatic circles over the direction in which
Turco-American relations were evolving. It stated that the
cruisers had received imperative orders from Washington to
stay clear of a British fleet under Admiral Donville operating
in the area. The American government "desire it to be known
1 7they are acting entirely on their own initiative."
The conservative Daily Telegraph (London) said that
the United States had no desire to seize Smyrna as a coaling
station, and claims to that effect appearing in the European
press were unwarrented. The Telegraph reported that
Roosevelt's critics in America and elsewhere, faced with the
President's vigorous use of naval diplomacy in the past few
months, along with accusing him of waving the big stick were
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now describing him as "brandishing the marlinspike .
"
The official attitude of the British government to
this new American exercise of naval power in the Mediterranean
was, unlike the rest of Europe, quite mild. The close diplo-
matic co-operation shown by Great Britain and the United
States during the Perdicaris affair was again being repeated.
Indeed, the British view of the fleet's activities was
throughout looked upon both in the press and by the govern-
ment with generally benign or approving interest.
The British Am.bassador to Turkey was Sir Nicholas
Roderick 0' Conor. Born in Ireland, he had previously served
as British ambassador to China and Russia before coming to
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Constantinople in 1898. 0- Conor informed the Foreign Office
that he expected Turkey to yield to the American naval demon-
stration, but in the event it did not he was concerned a}^out
how the United States Minister would leave Constantinople.
He did not think the Turks would allow an American warship
to enter the Dardanelles under these circumstances, and
rather than inflict upon Leishman the humiliation of taking
the regular mail steamer 0' Conor asked if he could offer the
American the use of the British cruiser Imoqene which was
anchored at Constantinople. He did not feel Turkey "v;ould
take it in ill part," but wondered if the United States would
consider "its acceptance consonant with their dignity." Lord
Lansdowne approved 0' Conor's request, but cautioned him to
make sure the "Turkish Government will not be offended," as
1 9
"it would be a pity to vex them."
0' Conor assured Lansdowne that Leishman had shown
great patience during the negotiations, and the Sultan's re-
fusal to negotiate in good faith was "difficult to explain."
The ambassador still expected that the movement of American
warships and the "veiled threat of coercive measures" would
bring about a speedy settlement. 0' Conor was also confident
British support of the American position (not to mention the
offer of the Imogene ) , as well as the friendly relations
existing between him and the United States legation, would
gain for England "a powerful support for our views and
20
policy" in Turkey.
On the Continent, however, speculation about
Roosevelt's Turkish diplomacy v.as rife and none too flat-
tering. AS with the Moroccan incident less than three rr.onth
before the presence of American naval power in the
Mediterranean being used aggressively stirred up deep mis-
givings. The New York correspondent of the Berliner
Tageblatt cabled home that the entire incident was nothing
more than a gross election maneuver designed to increase the
President's standing at home. Le Temps (Paris) reported of-
ficial circles in Germany had expressed hostility at recent
American moves against Turkey, and in Vienna it was rumored
that the government "vigorously disapproves the idea of a
naval demonstration."
But it was in Russia that the greatest fear of
American intervention was most evident. Turkey lay within
Russia's sphere of influence and an American fleet bellig-
erently nosing around near the Straits was something to be
watched carefully. The St. Petersburg daily Russ condemned
the energetic response of the United States as unnecessary
when compared with the unimportance of the question involved
It cautioned the Americans not to become "too enterprising
in trying their strength on the various weaker powers of
Europe, as this might easily lead to a combination of the
stronger powers against them." Novoe Vremya (St. Petersburg!
viewed the action as a blatant attempt to gain influence in
the Near East while Russia was engaged in a war with
22Japan
.
19/1
Another newspaper, Birzheviya Viedomoriz (St.
Petersburg), warned that Europe was now faced with a new and
worrisome diplomatic problem. The United States, not con-
tent with her hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, was seeking
to apply the Monroe Doctrine to the Near East — an applica-
tion which could easily produce an "explosion of fanaticism"
among the Moslems with grave consequences to the Christian
population in the area. Not only was Turkey being menaced
by the naval aggression of the Americans, it admonished, but
the very peace of Europe itself.
Russian fears of what the Americans might do if the
Sultan failed to give way apparently took a more practical
turn than impassioned editorials. In a report from
Constantinople by the correspondent of The Daily Telegraph
the Russian Ambassador was said to be urging the Sultan and
the Porte to yield to American demands, "in order to leave
no pretext for interference by the United States, whose
methods are more drastic than those of the European Powers. "^'^
In Washington European concern about the developing
situation was vividly expressed by the hasty gathering in the
capital of a number of diplomats who had hurried back to
their posts from vacation. Both The Time s (London) and The
Daily Mail (London) informed their readers that the signatory
powers to the Treaty of Paris (which had ended the Crimean
War, and contained vital clauses concerning the neutrality of
the Straits) were beginning to take an active interest in the
affair. The Times said they were pressuring the Sultan to
give in "rather than force the issue to a point at which the
United States might regard the use of force as necessary .'• ^
5
On August 9th Baron Kengelmuller
, the Austrian
Ambassador, returned from his summer vacation home at Bar
Harbor, Maine, ostensibly, as he told reporters, to present
to Roosevelt "a compilation of Austrian statistics v/hich
Emperor Francis Joseph has sent to the President with his
compliments." The very same day he had a long luncheon at
the White House with Roosevelt, Hay and Senator Spooner of
Wisconsin. The latter was a prominent member of the Senate
Foreign Relations committee and had been summoned back to
Washington by Roosevelt because of the crisis. What was dis-
cussed at the luncheon was not announced and Hay's diary is
siJ.ent on the meeting, but it seems obvious that the conver-
sation was not given over to an exposition of Austro-
Hungarian agricultural and industrial production figures.
Later in the day the German Ambassador, Baron Speck von
Sternberg, arrived from his summer hideaway in the
Massachusetts Berkshires at Lennox, and had dinner with
Roosevelt and Hay. He told reporters that he had come back
to Washington "to attend some business of an unofficial
character." The next morning Fortes de la Fosse, counsellor
of the French Embassy, arrived at the State Department for a
meeting with Hay.^^
This sudden return to a humid capital of numerous
European diplomats all "imbued v;ith a desire to see President
Roosevelt" did not pass unnoticed, and although none of those
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involved would admit the cause for this precipitate burst of
high level diplomacy it was patent the reason was Turkey.
Two days before, the New York Time s reported, Washington had
been "almost completely deserted by the diplomatic body,"
but since then "representatives of the German, Austrian and
French Embassies have appeared here, and all of them have
communicated with the State Department or the White House. "^''
What the diplomats obviously wanted from the
President was some knowledge of just what he was up to in
Turkey, and how far was he prepared to go. It is not known
just what Roosevelt and Hay said to them, but it seems rea-
sonable to assume they were given assurances that American
intervention in the Empire would be limited and would not at
this time include force. One fairly reliable indication that
this segment of the crisis had been successfully dealt with
was the disappearance of the stoi-y from American newspapers
after August 12th.
While intensive diplomatic activity was taking place
in Washington Jewell's squadron was steadily nearing Turkey,
and Leishraan had still not cabled any word of a break in the
negotiations. Almost a week had passed since Roosevelt had
ordered the navy to Smyrna, but beyond a plea by Tewfik
Pasha to hold off the warships the Turks had remained obsti-
nate. It remained to be seen whether the physical presence
of three cruisers would spur them to give in.
The port of Smyrna, now called Izmir, was the third
largest city in the Empire and the one most accessible to
sea power. Founded by Alexander the Great it was known to
the Turks as the "eye of Asia Minor." It had been built on
the slopes of a large, steep hill called the Pagos , on the
crest of which sprawled the ruins of a great Byzantine cita-
^ 1
28del
.
When Jewell arrived off the old port on the morning
of August 12th he was prepared for any eventuality. The
previous day, while steaming across the Aegean, all the ships
had held preparedness drills, including General Quarters.
On the Olympi
a
there had been an ammunition drill with live
rounds being placed in the hoists and tested. In the harbor
at Smyrna the Turks could only muster a single opposing war-
ship, the small gunboat Sureyya . Going ashore in the after-
noon with his three captains the Admiral was received by the
Governor of the port "with much ceremony, a guard of honor
29
being paraded and a band playing 'Hail Columbia.'"
Meanwhile, in Constantinople, the imminent arrival
of the navy had finally forced the Turkish government into a
sort of conditional capitulation. Realizing the squadron
would not be withdrawn or stop at Piraeus, and that the old
gam.e of delay would no longer suffice — at least for the
present — Abdul Hamid gave in as he had in November, 1901,
to the advent of naval power. Rooseveltd.an marlinspike
diplomacy had succeeded again.
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On the afternoon of the 11th the Sultan sent one of
his private secretaries to see Leishman, and after a long
conversation the secretary submitted an informal memorandum.
In it Abdul Hamid declared "that there should be no distinc-
tion between American schools and those of other nationali-
ties." However, the Sultan also informed Leishman that
Turkey would be unable to raise the rank of its Minister in
Washington to the ambassadorial level because of financial
considerations. This, of course, would in turn prevent the
United States from raising its representation in
Constantinople — a condition which did not at all appeal to
30the ambitious Leishman.
He cabled Hay that the capitulation, once one had
delved beneath its surface compliance, was "rather ambiguous
and misleading." In his conversation with the secretary
Leishman had come to the conclusion thait the memorandum gave
less than what the French had secured after the Mytilene in-
cident, and that there still would be many problems for
American schools in the Empire. He was none too happy with
the Sultan's refusal to raise the level of Turkish repre-
sentation, and he saw problems if he was denied access to
Abdul Hamid in the future. Leishman told the secretary he
wished his objections to the memorandum be submitted to the
Sultan, and an acceptable answer be "furnished by formal note
31
through the Minister for Foreign Affairs."
The general tenor of Leishman' s interpretation of
the Turkish submission was a negative one, and he warned Hay
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that if matters were "not definitely settled" he would ask
Je\sfell "to send a ship to take me off."^''-
Leishman once described himself as feeling like a
shuttlecock flying between the Sultan and the Porte, but his
performance in the past few days could be equally given that
same interpretation. Previously an advocate of strong meas-
ures, he had temporized when they were finally introduced.
Now, faced with a partial success, he had again hardened his
attitude. For Roosevelt and Hay the problem was similar to
Griscom's in 1900; i.e., to force the Turkish government to
act, but not force it into a position which did not allow it
enough room to save face.
Unlike his minister. Hay felt the Sultan had
"virtually agreed to all our demands," and that the surrender
was sufficiently complete. He did not share Leishman's sus-
picions, and in any case they "did not justify a break of
diplomatic relations." Roosevelt agreed and when Hay showed
him a cable he intended to send Leishman, ordering him to
accept the first note, the President, fearing he still might
leave his post, "seized /the_7 despatch and wrote it all over
„33
again .
"
The cable which Roosevelt rewrote informed Leishman
that the United States did not regard the first memorandum
unfavorably, and because of this he "would not be justified
to leave" Turkey. The matter of raising American represen-
tation was to be left in abeyance. Allowing the Turks to
win on this point would permit them to keep a modicum of face.
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Leishman was further instructed to inform Jewell that his
warships were no longer needed and he could withdraw from
Smyrna. He was told to advise the Porte that the fleet was
being withdrawn because of the acceptable response con-
tained in the note of the llth; however, if these agreements
were not carried out Leishman was to warn Turkey that the
President would be forced to lay the entire matter before
the Congress. it was a threat which, by its very ambigu-
ousness, could mean anything — even a declaration of war.
On the morning of the 13th Leishman cabled that he
had received another note, this time directly from Tewfik
Pasha, which attempted to answer Leishman' s objections to
the first memorandum. The Foreign Minister especially tried
to make clear that it had "never entered into the intention
of the imperial Government to treat on a different basis the
schools, the institutions and the citizens of the United
States in the Empire." Leishman told Hay he hesitated to
recommend the administration accept this clarification. He
would have been willing to take what the Turks now offered
before the present crisis, but since the United States had
the Sultan quite obviously on the run perhaps even greater
concessions might be gained.
When Hay received this last despatch it was at once
evident that Leishman had not gotten the Secretary's cable
of the 12th and was still pressing the Turkish government for
more concessions. Hay immediately sent a second despatch
directing Leishman "to accept the Porte's /first/ note with
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our own interpretation," and repeating his order to have the
warships withdraw. The Secretary wrote in his diary that he
hoped this would close the school question for a while. But,
he noted ominously, "not forever, for the Sultan must grow
wise and honest, before we can be at peace with him alto-
gether. "
A somewhat chagrined but still obstinate Leishman
finally replied, accepting Hay's orders, but hinting that if
he had been allowed to take matters to the breaking point he
might have obtained a better settlement. Leishman told
Tewfik Pasha on the afternoon of the 13th that the United
States accepted the agreement outlined in the Sultan's memo-
randum of the 11th and v/ould order its warships to immediately
37leave Smyrna.
In a despatch sent on the 15th Leishman again
pointed out that the agreement was "not as satisfactory as
/^he_/ hoped for, but was the best obtainable without resorting
to extreme measures which /^he_/ judged the Department wished
to avoid. " He reasoned that the main problem now would be to
have the agreement "put into execution." For Leishman the
apparent end of the problem only increased his disenchantment
in trying to work with the Turkish government. One could not
deal with them, he wrote Hay, as one could deal with other
nations. He seemed to be unsure how he should act with the
Sultan and the Porto in the future, and he asked the State
Department to send him instructions "as to the line of action
33
it wishes me to pursue."
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Leishman's doubts were answered in part by a
soothing letter sent by Kay on August 22nd which attempted
to put the settlement into its proper perspective. Hay ad-
mitted the agreement had "not brought in the millenium," but
the United States had "accomplished a great deal" and had
put itself in a much better position in Turkey. He told him
the President could go to Congress during the winter "and
get authority for the next step required." Hay did not elab-
orate on what this next step might be, but to Leishraan it
obviously meant stronger action. As for now, Kay wrote, he
should not do or say anything which would throw doubt on the
idea that the United States had received anything but a
39
satisfactory settlement.
The apparent triumph of Roosevelt's and Kay's diplo-
macy was, on the whole, greeted enthusiastically by the na-
tion's press. The New York Tribune called the settlement,
"A Triumph For Mr. Hay." In an editorial it said the
President and the Secretary of State had "gained a noble
40
victory for the rights and honor and dignity of the nation."
The Brooklyn Eagle
,
however , saw the guns of
Jewell's squadron aimed more at Judge Parker, Roosevelt's
Democratic opponent in the campaign, than Abdul Hamid. We
could have attained an adequate settlement "at pretty nearly
any time," avowed the Eagl e , and it seemed quite suspicious
that the incident had suddenly burst upon the nation so near
the election. The Detroit Free Press, like the Eagle a
newspaper v/ith Democratic sympathies, took a different view.
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"That drastic measures should have become necessary just on
the eve of a political campaign may perhaps be unfortunate,"
it judged, "but it does not necessarily follow that there is
any political significance . "^•'
It V7as the New York Times which came closest to the
mark when it prophesied that there would be no permanence in
the solution gained by Roosevelt. The Empire had been hu-
miliated by the American display of naval power, and it
warned that an "exhorted assent leaves him who yields it in
no amiable frame of mind." The Times judgement was to prove
correct, for as soon as Jev/ell's warships departed the same
old series of delays and procrastinations began anew, and
Leishman soon found himself more or less back in the same
42position he had been before. There was to be no next step
for Turkey. By 1905 the election was over and Roosevelt had
moved on to playing for larger stakes in the world, and the
President was too perceptive to involve himself permanently
in a minor backwater at the expense of other, more profit-
able, game. In truth, the Ottoman Empire was almost in-
capable of dealing with other states on a rational diplomatic
level. Its internal order was rapidly breaking down, and the
central authority in Constantinople unable to look beyond the
narrow world of palace intrigue.
With the incident seemingly settled Barker's battle-
ships left Gibraltar on August I3th and headed back across
the Atlantic. Before dispersing his command for a much needed
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refit he took the Battleship Squadron to New York in
September in order to celebrate the launching of the new
battleship Connectj_cut. It was perhaps as good a way as any
to officially end the largest and most wide-ranging voyage
of American warships ever seen outside of the Western
Hemisphere, for the Connecticut was to be the flagship of
another, even greater, fleet which Roosevelt would send on
an epic round the world cruise three years later. To the
President the Turkish affair had been a qualified success,
and, when added to the international prestige gathered by
the cruise and the rescue of Perdicaris, it could only be
viewed as an eminently felicitous employment of the new
American naval power. This first use of the big stick in
the Mediterranean would give Roosevelt increasing confidence
in the power and range of his fleet, and it would be in-
creasingly employed by him in the next four years.
At home Roosevelt would use the success of the
cruise as an election issue with which to attack the opposi-
tion. At one point the Democrats accused him of not pro-
viding adequate efforts to protect Am.erican citizens abroad.
Roosevelt answered that in making this charge the Democrats
were shov/ing "ignorance of the facts or insincerity. Do they
object," he charged, "to the fact that American warships ap-
peared promptly at the port of Beirut when an effort had been
made to assassinate an American official, and in the port of
Tangier when an American had been abducted, and that in each
case the wrong complained of was righted and expiated, and
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that within the last few days the visit of an American squad-
ron to Smyrna was followed by the long delayed concession"
-P rn 44from Turkey? it was a record of minor triumphs which few
could argue with, and all achieved at little cost.
In Europe the cruise had a much more important im-
pact. The sudden appearance of the fleet in the Mediterranean
during the summer of 1904 gave Europeans notice that the
United States was a world power in the fullest sense- No
longer would it be confined to its own hemisphere and to oc-
casional and halting inroads into the Far East. Europe must
now confront this power in its own province. The uneasiness
felt in Europe was mirrored in apprehensive press comment
after the fleet had left. In Germany the Hamburger
Nachrichten
,
conveniently forgetting the recent proclivities
of its own ruler, complained that "American arrogance in re-
cent years has been increased to an unendurable extent."
The National Zeitung (Berlin) saw strong imperialistic pres-
sure in America as forcing "Roosevelt to vindicate the free-
4=.
dom of the American citizen even beneath the crescent."
Le Figaro (Paris) agreed, and VN^rote that "these
movements of the American fleet /were/ dictated by considera-
tions of domestic policy rather than by diplomatic neces-
sities." These "repeated interventions in European politics,"
it acidly reported, "singularly flatter Yankee Jingoism."
In Russia the departure of the fleet from the Mediterranean
was greeted with undisgu.ised relief. The semi-official
Vienna daily Fremdenbl att ' s_ analysis of the cruise contained
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a warning for the European powers. The American navy, it
said, was the primary instrument of Roosevelt's foreign pol-
icy, and the President unfortunately had come to view this
fleet of his "as a bulwark of peace." Europe must be cau-
tious in reacting to it for "the laurals of war are highly
prized in this modern Carthage
Only in England was the new American naval presence
greeted with something less than fear and suspicion.
"America," affirmed The Spectator
,
"has become one of the
great civilized Powers, and the first claim of every such
Power is that it is entitled to act throughout the world as
seems best to itself in pursuit of its own purposes and the
general interests of civilization." Europe had no right to
order the United States not to interfere in its politics
,
and it must instead treat her "as an honoured member of that
great European family which claims the primacy of the
world.
The editorial judgements found in the European pres
added a fitting postscript to the cruise of the fleet. The
Roosevelt administration had proved the long-range effective
ness of the American navy, and the President's decisions to
use the fleet in naval demonstrations against Morocco and
Turkey underlined this effectiveness. The voyage had been
a first-hand exhibition that the United States was a world
power. Europe could hardly ignore its implications.
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